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Introduction
The recent Great Recession has renewed interest in the role of financial markets and
credit in the economy, as well as in the boundaries of monetary, macroprudential and
fiscal policies that impact macroeconomic developments and may influence business
cycles. In the first two chapters of this thesis, I devote my attention to the role of
credit backed by real estate in the economy. In the first chapter of the dissertation,1
I investigate the role of subprime securitization on U.S. business cycles in order to
provide a better understanding of secondary financial markets and their impact on
macroeconomic variables. In the second chapter, based on joint work with Florian
Kirsch, I study the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies on the economy
with a special focus on housing prices. The third chapter of this dissertation, based
on joint work with Karlygash Kuralbayeva,2 features a real business cycle model
with a climate change externality and addresses the design of optimal environmental
instruments. The analysis of the optimal policy instrument to control CO2 emissions
under uncertainty arising from business cycles has also gained relevance in the
aftermath of the financial and economic crisis of 2008, particularly in the context of
reforming the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). In what follows,
I present more details about the three chapters of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 1. The first chapter examines the role of subprime securitization in
the transmission of business cycles, with a special focus on the role of the interbank
market in the Great Recession and the characteristics of subprime loans. The design
of hybrid subprime mortgage contracts arguably lies at the roots of the recent global
1Based on earlier work in Grodecka (2013).
2Grodecka and Kuralbayeva (2014).
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Introduction
financial crisis, as it made the payoffs from these types of loans sensitive to changes
in housing prices. The market of subprime mortgages, in turn, was highly financed
by securitization. Therefore, subprime securitization appears to be at the heart of
understanding the Great Recession. The formal setup used in the first chapter is
a quantitative macroeconomic model with different types of borrowers and banks
acting as financial intermediaries, in which households and entrepreneurs borrow
against housing collateral. It is shown that due to interbank linkages and banks
facing binding capital requirements, the existence of subprime securitization has
ambiguous effects on business cycle fluctuations, depending on who is the final buyer
of securitized assets.
The results suggest that if commercial banks buy mortgage backed securities issued
by other financial intermediaries, business cycle fluctuations are amplified as a result
of the larger systemic risk. The existence of the secondary market exposes the
commercial banks, which are otherwise considered “safe”, to a risky segment of the
loan market, namely subprime mortgages, and through the existence of low risk-
weights imposed by regulators on securitized assets, this leads to a higher leverage in
the economy. As a consequence, when a negative exogenous shock hits the economy,
it affects lending to productive firms in the economy relatively strongly, as the
deleveraging process is more accentuated. The opposite is true when the securitized
assets are sold to non-financial intermediaries. In that case, the subprime risk is
transferred from the intermediation sector to a group of agents that are better able
to digest the losses on the underlying loan portfolio, and the contraction in banks’
balance sheets is less pronounced than without securitization.
The main contribution of this chapter is the incorporation of some aspects of
financial modelling (mortgage backed securities) into an otherwise standard macroe-
conomic model. Moreover, the results of this chapter make clear that what should
be accounted for in the analysis of the effects of securitization on the economy are
not only the different abilities of financial versus non-financial agents to bear certain
losses, but also the fact that financial intermediaries among themselves differ in
their loss-bearing capacity. This is due to diverse regulations imposed on financial
intermediaries acting in different loan segments, as well as distinct asset portfolios
that are unique for each intermediary and affect their individual leverage. As a
result, for the transmission of business cycles in the economy, it is crucial not only
2
whether certain assets are retained in the banking sector or not, but also in which
part of the banking sector they are retained. Without accounting for heterogeneity
in the financial intermediaries’ sector and the existence of the interbank market, it is
impossible to correctly assess the role of securitization in the Great Recession.
CHAPTER 2. The second chapter builds on joint work with Florian Kirsch. Using
vector autoregressions for U.S. and U.K. time series, we investigate the effects of credit
and monetary shocks in the housing market to compare their effectiveness as policy
measures in affecting house prices. To identify the model, we use sign restrictions
derived from impulse responses generated by a DSGE model including credit and
housing. We find that a negative monetary shock leads to a decline in house prices in
both countries. The impact of a negative credit shock on house prices remains unclear
for U.S. data but is negative for the U.K. Both shocks generally tend to be more
powerful in the U.K. than in the U.S., which might be due to the different structure
of mortgage contracts in both countries. Using a historical decomposition, we also
investigate the role of credit and monetary shocks for house price developments during
the Great Recession.
The main contribution of this chapter is the analysis of the effectiveness of different
policy measures aimed at influencing the house price dynamics in an economy in
which housing purchases are mainly financed through credit. As Jordà, Schularick,
and Taylor (2014) note, p. 1: “to say that the recent crisis and its aftermath has led to
a reassessment of the importance of the housing finance for the macroeconomy would
be a distinct understatement.” We are the first to conduct the analysis using sign
restrictions derived directly from a structural DSGE model, in the context of credit
and house prices. From the perspective of a policy-maker, it is especially important
to know the effectiveness of different measures to intervene in the market for housing
credit and their consequences for the broader economy.
CHAPTER 3. The third chapter builds on joint work with Karlygash Kuralbayeva.
In this chapter, we study the design of optimal environmental policies in a business
cycle framework. Two classical alternatives for regulating pollutants are a cap-and-
trade or a tax; the former is a quantity control and the latter is a price control.
In applying Weitzman’s result (Weitzman, 1974) to the problem of greenhouse gas
emissions, the price-quantity literature has shown that, under uncertainty about
abatement costs, price instruments (carbon taxes) are preferred to quantity restrictions
3
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(caps on emission), since the damages from climate change are relatively flat. In
contrast, another recent piece of academic literature (Heutel, 2012) has highlighted
the importance of adjusting carbon taxes to business cycle fluctuations in a procyclical
manner. In this chapter, we bridge these two bodies of research, by analyzing the
relative performance and revisiting the optimal design of two instruments (prices and
quantities) in the face of shocks driving business cycles.
Our theoretical framework is a general equilibrium real business cycle model
with a climate change externality and distortionary fiscal policy. First, we find
that state-contingent policies imply that the carbon tax is approximately constant,
while emissions fluctuate more in response to a productivity shock. Second, we
find that a fixed price instrument is superior to a fixed quantity instrument due to
the cyclical behavior of abatement costs, which tend to increase during expansions
and decline during economic downturns. Our results suggest that the carbon tax is
approximately constant over business cycles due to “flat” damages in the short-run
and thus, procyclical behavior as suggested by other studies cannot be justified merely
on the grounds of targeting the climate externality.
The main contribution of this chapter is extending Weitzman’s results to a general
equilibrium framework under uncertainty and showing that the main intuition behind
the price-quantity argument holds in the “idealized” world in which the regulator
has access to state-contingent environmental instruments. We stress that in order
to study the optimal design of carbon taxes, one has to assure the completeness of
the tax system; otherwise the carbon tax may end up accommodating the business
cycles.
4
Chapter1
Subprime Borrowers, Securitization and
the Transmission of Business Cycles
1.1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 crisis, labeled as the Great Recession, has been the longest and
the most severe post-war recession in the U.S. The crisis drew the attention of
economists towards such subjects as bubbles, the role of financial intermediaries in
the economy, as well as various aspects of mortgage markets. A common point of
departure for researchers analyzing the Great Recession is often the relatively small
subprime mortgage market in the U.S. that may have been one of the roots of the
prolonged downturn. Globalized financial markets and mortgage derivatives enabled
the domestic housing market crisis to spread to other countries and continents. This
chapter investigates potential sources of the amplification mechanism during the recent
crisis in the U.S. market. I focus on the design of hybrid subprime mortgages that
were a combination of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate contracts which allowed hybrid
mortgages to have a short-term character, and their importance for business cycles.
Moreover, I discuss the role of securitization, a process that transfers the underlying
risk from loan originators to investors through the creation of securities backed by
pooled mortgages, in financing subprime loans. Since the subprime mortgage crisis
in the U.S. closely preceded the Great Recession, I want to investigate how these
two events are linked. Specifically, I analyze different securitization scenarios to see
under which conditions the securitization of subprime loans would have a dampening
impact on the responses of the economy to negative shocks.
This chapter presents a calibrated model in a linear New-Keynesian Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework that builds on models with credit
5
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frictions, particularly collateral constraints. The focus is on the role of subprime
mortgages and securitization in the recent crisis, and the importance of the bank lend-
ing channel in the presence of binding capital requirements. The model incorporates
some aspects of financial modeling (mortgage-backed securities, MBS) into a standard
macroeconomic framework, which is the main contribution of this chapter. Four
different versions of the model are compared: a baseline model without securitization,
two models with securitization in which only non-financial agents buy securitized
assets, and a model with securitization in which financial intermediaries acquire
asset-backed securities. I leave aside the modeling of the portfolio decisions of agents.
The aim of the exercise is much more modest; assuming that securitization took place
and securitized products were bought by different agents in the economy, I want to
investigate whether there is any difference in the reaction of the economy to different
shocks, depending on who is the ultimate bearer of the subprime risk.
In my analysis, I focus on two shocks: monetary and preference. The monetary
shock is modeled as an exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate set by the
central bank, that in the current setup equals to the interest rate on deposits. It is
important to understand the response of the model economy to such a change in
monetary policy, as the period of rising interest rates (starting from July 2004 and
ending in August 2007) immediately preceded the outbreak of the Great Recession
in the U.S. Moreover, it is a shock that is usually discussed in the macroeconomic
literature, which makes the predictions generated by the present model comparable
with other papers in that field. Secondly, I discuss the impact of a negative preference
shock in the economy, designed as an exogenous change in the demand for housing
stock experienced by households. A negative housing preference shock leads to a fall
in housing prices, which is the event that I am most concerned with in this chapter
for two main reasons: first, because the developments on the housing market played
a crucial role in the Great Recession, and second, because they are related to the
default behavior of adjustable-rate mortgages that I model in this chapter.
The results show that the specific design of subprime mortgage contracts alone,
which were highly sensitive to changes in housing prices, did not amplify the U.S.
business cycle - it merely led to a redistribution effect between subprime borrowers
and lenders. However, the securitization of subprime mortgages may have caused
an amplification through the balance sheet effects of banks that were holding the
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securitized products. If MBS were held by non-banks, securitization would have
had a positive effect of risk-spreading, leading to a smoother response of output to
different shocks. Securitization itself thus cannot be blamed for the severity of the
crisis. This is consistent with Jaffee et al. (2009) (p.71) who conclude: “The financial
crisis occurred because financial institutions did not follow the business model of
securitization. Rather than acting as intermediaries by transferring the risk from
mortgage lenders to capital market investors, they became the investors. They put
‘skin in the game”’.
The results of this chapter support the proposition that in principle, securitization,
even of the ‘dangerous’ subprime risk, makes sense, because different market partici-
pants have different investment horizons and may be better able to bear the credit
risk than the originator. Ideally, securitized products would end up in the portfolios
of institutions such as pension funds that can cushion short-term losses better than
financial intermediaries. The problem occurs if financial institutions themselves
engage in such transactions, because they mainly rely on short-term funding. The
present model shows that, if banks facing capital requirements buy MBS tranches,
which lose value in the downturn, the capital requirement gets tighter, so the whole
intermediation process is disrupted. Through the deleveraging process, lending to
other agents in the economy declines, causing a credit crunch, partial termination
of production and a fall in output. The model demonstrates the relevance of this
process in a general equilibrium framework and offers a theoretical explanation for
the negative correlation between subprime defaults and commercial lending observed
for U.S. banks during the crisis. It is important to note that, although this chapter is
motivated by the events in the subprime securitization market and hence, I model
specifically the securitization of adjustable-rate mortgages, the main mechanism
through which securitization impacts the economy in the model is the balance sheet
dynamics of financial intermediaries. Therefore, the model is also applicable to the
securitization of different types of assets, not only mortgages.
The present chapter relates to three main strands of the literature. It is an extension
of Iacoviello (2005) that relies on the seminal paper by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In
both models, the importance of collateral constraints and the imperfect enforcement
of lenders’ rights that lead to the establishment of a certain loan to value ratio are
emphasized. Iacoviello (2005) focuses on loans backed by real estate, which makes
7
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his model a natural starting point for my exercise investigating the role of subprime
securitization. I extend the model by adding the banking sector and considering the
securitization of subprime loans. The balance sheet effects discussed in the chapter
resemble dynamics occurring in Iacoviello (2014) that models the consequences of
an exogenous fall in banks’ equity. The second strand of literature important for
this chapter is mainly represented by Adrian and Shin (2010) and Adrian and Shin
(2011) that focus on the balance sheets of financial intermediaries and the empirical
properties of the behavior of banks. Lastly, the empirical evidence on the recent
crisis delivers many insights. The present chapter mainly relies on a comprehensive
study of Gorton (2008), who describes in detail the subprime mortgage market in
the U.S. and the securitization of subprime mortgages. Another important reference
is Gorton and Souleles (2007) who describe the basics of the securitization process.
Hellwig (2009) also delivers an extensive descriptive analysis of the events leading to
the Great Recession.
When it comes to the modeling of securitization in a general equilibrium macroeco-
nomic model, to my knowledge only three attempts have been made, and all of them
focus on the problem of asymmetric information. Faia (2011) models the secondary
market for bank loans in a model with solid micro-foundations in which several
economic agents face a moral hazard problem. On the one hand, capital producers
that obtain funds from banks may choose to exert low effort, which undermines the
success probability of their project, but provides them with a private benefit. On
the other hand, the incentive to monitor the projects decreases for bankers, once
a secondary market for loans exists. Faia (2011) concludes that the existence of
secondary markets amplifies the dynamics of macro variables. Hobijn and Ravenna
(2010) model securitization in a setup with banks that have access to costly screening
which provides them with information about the credit score of borrowers. Borrowing
households are either honest or dishonest, which leads to default events. Hobijn
and Ravenna (2010) demonstrate that securitization reduces the equilibrium interest
rates, and the decline is most pronounced for riskier, subprime borrowers who gain
the most from the securitization process. The authors examine the response of
financial variables, such as interest rate spreads, to a monetary and financial shock
and conclude that with securitization the reaction of financial variables is amplified
in comparison to a standard New-Keynesian model. Lastly, Kuncl (2014) analyzes
8
1.1 Introduction
the role of asymmetric information in the secondary loan market, in a setup in which
firms with profitable investment opportunities sell the cash-flows from their projects
to firms with low or no investment opportunities. Although all three papers deal
with securitization, the focus and modeling devices applied in these papers differ
considerably from the setup in this chapter. Firstly, I focus on the real estate market,
which is not described in any of the discussed papers. Secondly, in this chapter, the
intermediation role of banks (absent in Kuncl, 2014) plays an important part, as well
as the interbank market. Finally, while information asymmetry is at the heart of
analysis of the other three papers, in this work it appears only indirectly through the
existence of borrowing and capital constraints.
Why is it important to consider recent developments in a general equilibrium
macro framework when the finance and microeconomics literature deliver a fairly
good description of economic agents’ incentives and amplification processes caused by
financial frictions? The general equilibrium macroeconomic setup is especially useful
for examining the positive aspects of securitization through inter-market linkages.
To show why securitization may smooth out the business cycle, I explicitly model
the interbank sector. When distinct financial intermediaries are connected through
loan and deposit contracts (i.e. assets of one banking institution correspond to
liabilities of another banking institution), changes in the balance sheet of one of them
will automatically lead to changes in the balance sheet of the second intermediary.
Securitization of subprime loans releases the pressure on the subprime loan originators’
balance sheets, which, through the interbank market, has a positive effect on the
balance sheets of other financial intermediaries in the economy, since they finance
subprime lenders with deposits. This positive aspect of securitization is present in all
versions of the model with securitization that I consider. However, the overall impact
of securitization on the economy depends on other endogenously arising processes.
It turns out that the effect on business cycle fluctuations may be amplifying, if the
deleveraging effect, present in the model with banks investing in MBS, is stronger
than the positive effect of securitization. Moreover, deleveraging may lead to a
vicious circle of falls in asset prices and further deleveraging (Adrian and Shin, 2010),
leading even to instability of the system, if capital requirements imposed on banks are
very low. Low capital requirements lead to higher leverage and subsequently, more
pronounced deleveraging, when a negative shock hits the economy. It is important to
9
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note that, even if in the present model some decisions and constraints are exogenously
imposed on agents in the economy, their responses to shocks are endogenous, and
by calibrating the model to U.S. data, one can measure and assess the strength of
these reactions. Comparing different versions of the model with securitization enables
me to further conduct counterfactual analysis and determine how the U.S. economy
could have evolved after the initial shocks, had people followed the intended business
model of securitization. The results suggest that in this case the maximum quarterly
output loss in the U.S. economy during the Great Recession would have amounted to
13% of that observed in the data.
The model presented in this chapter is complex, as it incorporates agents differing
in their impatience level, two types of bankers, as well as diverse collateral constraints.
Yet, the main message of the chapter is simple - binding collateral constraints faced
by financial intermediaries may lead to disruptions in the lending market and may
amplify losses from an exogenous negative shock, leading to a decline in output.
The understanding of the deleveraging of banks’ balance sheets is crucial for the
analysis of the presented general equilibrium model. Readers who are not familiar
with the importance of binding capital requirements for the balance sheet dynamics
of banks may find the plain numerical example presented in Appendix 1.A helpful.
In what follows, I describe the peculiarities of the subprime market (Section 1.2.1)
and some empirical relations between the MBS and commercial loans observed in the
data during the crisis (Section 1.2.2), which will make the interpretation of chosen
assumptions and modeling devices easier. Section 1.3 presents the baseline model
and Section 1.4 is its extension with securitization. The main results are presented in
Section 1.5. Section 1.6 presents sensitivity analysis and discusses an extension to the
model in which I introduce impatient prime borrowers into the model economy who
may borrow long-term, which reflects the existence of fixed-interest rate mortgages in
real life. The main conclusions of the chapter are summarized in Section 1.7.
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1.2.1 Subprime Mortgage Market
The subprime mortgage market became one of the scapegoats of the Great Recession
in the United States. However, some commentators (see Liebowitz, 2009) point to the
fact that subprime borrowers themselves are not to blame, but rather adjustable rate
mortgages (particularly hybrid mortgages) that led to disruptions in both the subprime
and prime mortgage markets. This section provides evidence on the foreclosures and
delinquencies1 in the U.S. mortgage market, as well as a short review of empirical
facts that help to address this comment.
It is remarkable that the events in the subprime mortgage market are important
for the understanding of the roots of the crisis, because subprime borrowing accounts
for only a small percentage of the whole mortgage market (the share of subprime
originations is depicted in Figure 1.1). Although there is no exact definition of a
subprime borrower or market, there are certain features common to all subprime
loan contracts. A prime mortgage in the U.S. is usually collateralized and has a fixed
interest rate for 30 years. Subprime borrowers often can provide neither collateral,
nor income (so called “NINJAs” - No Income, No Job or Assets, see Jovanovic`, 2013).
The down-payment rate in the case of prime borrowers is usually higher than in the
subprime case. However, the difference is not as overwhelming as one may expect.
Amromin and Paulson (2010) provide detailed data on loan to value (LTV) ratios
for both groups of borrowers in the years 2004-2007. In the case of prime mortgages,
the average LTV ratio ranged from 74.89% to 77.75%, while in the case of subprime
mortgages, it ranged from 79.63% to 80.69%. The biggest difference between these
two groups has been noted in the FICO score, which measures the creditworthiness
of borrowers and is used by lenders to determine the credit risk. In the case of prime
borrowers it ranged from 706 to 715, while in the case of subprime borrowers, it
ranged from 597 to 617 (the FICO score ranges from 300 to 850, with the higher, the
better). Subprime borrowing was thriving thanks to a common belief that housing
prices will rise on average. Indeed, until the recent crisis the U.S. market did not
1A delinquent loan is a loan with a delay of payment of at least 30 days. The total delinquency
rate takes into account all past-due categories (30, 60, 90 days and over), but excludes loans in the
foreclosure process.
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experience a countrywide decrease in housing prices since the 1930s.
Since subprime borrowers often do not have well-documented assets or income,
it poses a challenge to create a loan contract that will enable them to pay the
installments. The solutions to this problem were hybrid adjustable rate mortgages of
type 2/28 or 3/27, in which the first period’s (2 or 3 years) interest rate was fixed
and the rest (28 or 27 years respectively) was varying. The shift from the fixed
interest rate to the adjustable one occurred at a previously specified reset date. As
Kliff and Mills (2007) note, before the outbreak of the crisis, these hybrid mortgages
made up about two thirds of all ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) originations and
were basically short-term fixed rate mortgages that converted into an adjustable rate
mortgage after the initial period. Gorton (2008) explains how this kind of contract
can be interpreted as a short-term contract. The initial interest rate depended on
the loan to value ratio, which in turn depended on changes in house prices. When
house prices were rising, households were able to refinance and repay the debt at the
reset date, and in even some cases, extract equity from homes. When house prices
were falling, the LTV ratio was rising, followed by an increase in the interest rate
at the reset date, so that many households were not able to repay the contracted
installment, or even defaulted. Amromin and Paulson (2010) provide evidence of
a high sensitivity of defaults to changes in home prices among subprime borrowers
already in the years before the crisis, compared to a very low sensitivity among prime
borrowers (for 2004: -0.183 for subprime borrowers and -0.00166 for prime borrowers).
The short-term characteristics of subprime loans as well as their high sensitivity to
housing prices observed in the data enable me to model the subprime loan contract
as a one-period contract with the possibility of default linked to changes in house
prices.
How do developments in the subprime mortgage market relate to the economic
performance of the U.S.? Figure 1.1 presents subprime loans originations as a share
of the total market, non-agency2 securitization activity (RMBS - residential mortgage
backed securities - and securities based on home equity loans), as well as the real
GDP growth rate.
2Agency securities are securities that are either issued or guaranteed by federal agencies and
government sponsored enterprises, such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Non-agency
securities are securities issued by private companies and lack the explicit or implicit guarantee of
the U.S. government.
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Figure 1.1: Subprime market and real GDP (annual data)
The peak of subprime originations coincided with the peak in non-agency securiti-
zation activities and both of them almost dried out in 2008 (further data for subprime
originations not available). This reflects the fact that securitization was the main
financing method for subprime originations. The majority of subprime mortgages
were pooled together and sold in the financial market as MBS, which were often a
base for a further securitization instrument - a collateralized debt obligation (CDO).3
Subprime originations peaked in 2006, while the 4th quarter of 2006 denotes the peak
in the U.S. house price index (USSTHPI). The developments in the housing and
mortgage market led the changes in U.S. GDP growth. According to the NBER, the
last recession started in December 2007 (4th quarter) and ended in June 2009 (2nd
quarter). Thus, the data supports the proposition that the recession was linked to
the housing market, similar to other recent crisis episodes in industrialized economies
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). In this chapter, I investigate a potential transmission
mechanism through which changes in the housing market affect U.S. GDP growth.
As noted before, the distinguishing feature of subprime mortgages was their hybrid
3The ratio of securitized subprime/Alt-A mortgages rose from 46% in 2001 to 93% in 2007 (Geithner,
2011, p.11). Alt-A mortgages are mortgages with characteristics that places them between prime
and subprime mortgages.
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character. However, prime borrowers also take out ARM loans. Examining foreclosures
and delinquencies data (exclusive of loans in the foreclosure process) enables me to
address the question of whether the subprime market or the ARM market was decisive
for the GDP developments. Figure 1.2 depicts the share of mortgages entering the
foreclosure process in the U.S., both for subprime and prime borrowers, taking into
account ARM and FRM (fixed rate mortgages).
Figure 1.2: Foreclosures
Figure 1.2 reveals that the fraction of foreclosures is the highest among ARMs, but
it is clear that the fraction of subprime foreclosures was higher and prime foreclosures
only followed the developments in the subprime market. An interesting observation
can be drawn from comparing Figure 1.2 with Figure 1.3, which presents delinquencies
for the same type of loans. The peak in loan delinquencies occurs visibly later than
the peak in foreclosures, which partially results from governmental actions in the
U.S. aimed at reducing the share of foreclosures in order to stop declines in house
prices. In 2009, the Home Affordable Modification Program was launched, which
“is designed to help financially struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure by modifying
loans to a level that is affordable for borrowers now and sustainable over the long
term".4 The increasing rate of delinquencies, even when foreclosures already started to
4https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/hamp.jsp
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Figure 1.3: Delinquencies
fall, suggests that banks and financial institutions that were exposed to subprime risk,
were holding the assets on their balance sheets. Notably, although ARM delinquencies
are much higher than FRM delinquencies for both types of borrowers, in the case
of subprime borrowers, the FRM delinquencies are almost as high as delinquencies
on the hybrid loans, and much higher than any delinquencies observed for prime
borrowers. Thus, Liebowitz (2009)’s conclusion that the mortgage crisis was caused by
ARMs, and not subprime loans, is not entirely correct. It was rather a combination of
subprime borrowing and adjustable rate mortgages that turned out to be problematic.
In what follows, the focus of this chapter is put on hybrid subprime mortgages, the
subcategory of ARMs. Their market almost vanished after the crisis. However, ARMs
still exist within and outside the U.S. despite the drop in the share of the market
(see Moench et al., 2010).
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1.2.2 MBS and Commercial Loan Holdings by Banks
As securitization was the main financing method for subprime originations, the
majority of subprime mortgages were pooled together and sold in the financial market
as MBS. The bonds or pass-through securities (called so because the monthly loan
payments are passed through to the holders of security) were then sold to pension
funds, banks, investment funds and personal investors. The securitization of subprime
loans might have made the whole financial system vulnerable to housing prices, which
is much less the case when financial intermediaries only securitize prime loans, whose
value does not depend so much on the condition of the housing market. Moreover, it
is important to stress that securitization is not equal to loan sales. A sold loan is no
more marketable than the loan itself, whereas securitization creates a new quality
through various credit enhancements.5 Loans are sold in a secondary market, whereas
securitization creates a new primary market. That is why Gorton (2008) calls the
chain of securitized subprime securities a chain of many primary markets. At the
first stage, securitization is often conducted via a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that
exists only for the purpose of securitization, is set up by the originator, and does
not even have any employees. The securitization process includes repackaging many
assets, including car or student loans into derivative securities consisting usually of
three tranches: senior, mezzanine and equity, with the latter being the most risky one.
The process of tranching is the most important credit enhancement of securitized
products, without which it would be difficult to explain the demand of investors for
the product. Individual pricing and payoff structures of distinct tranches provide
incentives for the acquisition - e.g. senior tranches were usually given an A rating by
rating agencies, which made them a perfect asset for banks wanting to loosen their
capital requirement. The residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) played the
biggest role in the securitization market just before and after the recent financial
crisis. Consequently, in my model, I concentrate on RMBS. The specific design of
SPVs enables me to model the securitization process without introducing a new agent
into the model economy.
The present model is calibrated to the U.S. economy, as it has been the root of the
financial crisis. The chapter emphasizes the importance of financial intermediation
5Credit enhancement includes: tranching of the risk of loss, over-collateralization, guarantee by an
insurance company. Discussed further in Gorton and Souleles (2007).
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for the production process that is financed by bank loans. It is a well-known fact
that opposite to European markets where banks are an important source of credit
to firms (bank-based system), the U.S. is characterized by a market-based system,
i.e. firms resort more to corporate bonds and stock financing rather than bank loans.
Although banks played a less and less important role over time in the financing of
non-financial businesses in the U.S.,6 bank loans still provide around 12% of funds
to non-financial corporations. This is a considerable share, and the bank lending
channel presented in this chapter may be one of the explanations for the size and
length of the Great Recession.
In order to understand the crisis, it is informative to look not only at the balance
sheets of non-financial businesses and their funding sources, but also at the balance
sheets of U.S. banks. In the following, I will focus on the asset side of banks, with
a special emphasis on commercial real estate loans (modeled in this chapter) and
MBS holdings. Figure 1.4 presents the fraction of MBS holdings, commercial real
estate loans and commercial loans (all loans to firms, including real estate) in all bank
assets over time. The graph is generated using data for large domestically-chartered
commercial banks that are a good proxy for all U.S. banks and are chosen due to the
better availability of data. A detailed data description is available in Appendix 1.B.
It is visible that the fractions of MBS and commercial real estate loans went into
opposite directions from ca. 2007. The negative correlation between the fractions can
be also observed while taking into account total commercial loans, not only the real
estate ones. An analogous graph for lending levels that exhibits the same pattern
can be found in Appendix 1.C (Figure 1.17).
Recalling Figure 1.3, one can see that the divergence in the fractions of MBS and
commercial real estate loans is preceded by a large surge in subprime default rates
that started in 2006 and coincided with the beginning of the fall in housing prices.
The fraction of MBS and commercial real estate loans were approximately equal
when expressed as a percentage of U.S. bank assets until the subprime default rates
began to increase. Only with an increase in subprime delinquencies did the fraction
of total MBS rise and the fraction of commercial real estate loans fall, suggesting
that securitized assets experiencing a fall in value may have crowded out lending to
6Detailed data on the balance sheets of non-financial businesses are available in the Flow of Funds
Tables of the Federal Reserve Board, Financial Accounts - Z.1, for flows see F.101, for levels: L.101,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/FOFTables.aspx.
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entrepreneurs.
We should thus observe a negative correlation between the fraction of commercial
real estate loans on the asset side of the bank and the subprime default rates. The
correlation is clearly negative for the period 2006-2010, as can be inferred from Figure
1.5. The graph presenting the correlation for the whole sample period 1998-2013
is given in Appendix 1.C (Figure 1.18). No visible correlation can be observed in
the pre-and post-crisis data. The negative correlation does not imply any causal
effects, but this chapter offers an explanation for the empirical facts. Rising subprime
default rates lead to a fall in the value of subprime loans or securitized products
backed by these loans. This puts a strain on banks’ balance sheets and forces them
to deleverage, which reduces lending to firms. Why does the fraction of held MBS
increase during the crisis despite the rising default rates on these securities? The
banks, even if they wanted, could not sell the toxic assets as the market for them dried
out when the scale of the crisis was made public: subprime MBS suddenly became
illiquid. The omnipresent illiquidity prompted the Federal Reserve to introduce some
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of its programs aimed at increasing liquidity,7 but the first acquisitions of toxic assets
in 2009 were focused on guaranteed agency mortgages whose boom and bust was
less pronounced than developments in the non-agency mortgage market. In fact, it
turns out that the role of government is decisive for the shape of the graph shown in
Figure 1.4. If one takes the agency and non-agency MBS held by banks separately
into account, it turns out that the agency MBS holdings were going up, while the
non-agency MBS holdings stabilized at the peak of the crisis (which confirms the
illiquidity hypothesis) and started to experience a persistent decline at the end of
2009, which is depicted in Figure 1.19 presented in Appendix 1.C. The Figure 1.20,
also presented in Appendix 1.C, shows the agency and non-agency MBS holdings as
a fraction of total assets.
I do not model the portfolio decision of banks - I assume that in a world with
7http://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-starts-program-to-buy-illiquid-mortgage-assets
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securitization they hold MBS on their balance sheet. It is a strong assumption, but
not so unrealistic given the empirical observations just discussed. In some states of
the world, like a financial crisis leading to the disruption of market liquidity, banks
may indeed have no choice but to keep some assets on their balance sheets.
1.3 The Benchmark Model
The model economy is inhabited by a continuum of households that differ in their
degree of impatience. All households offer labor services to entrepreneurs producing
intermediate output. Households consume final goods and derive utility from housing
services. Patient households save in the form of deposits kept at commercial banks
that grant loans to entrepreneurs and offer loans on the interbank market. In the
baseline version of the model, it is assumed that all impatient borrowers have subprime
characteristics: they borrow from a subprime lender against housing collateral (an
extension involving the existence of prime borrowers who may borrow for long-term
and do not default on their loan obligations is presented in section 1.6.2 and Appendix
1.G). The collateral constraints faced by borrowers determine the amount they can
borrow from the bank, while bankers set the interest rates on loans, taking into
account different borrowing constraints and default probabilities. The debt contracts
in the economy are written in nominal terms, as in Iacoviello (2005). The financial
connections of the agents are shown in Figure 1.6. There is a central bank in the
economy implementing a Taylor rule and choosing the interest rate on deposits.
Retailers, who produce a final good out of the intermediary good, are the source of
nominal stickiness in the economy.
1.3.1 Patient Households: Savers
The problem of patient households (‘savers’) is identical to the one in Iacoviello
(2005) with one difference: instead of providing loans to households and entrepreneurs,
they save in the form of one-period deposits held at banks. Patient households
consume, work and accumulate housing. Their optimization problem and the First
Order Conditions (FOCs) are presented in Appendix 3.C.1.
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Figure 1.6: Financial connections in the benchmark model
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1.3.2 Impatient Households: Subprimers
Impatient households are borrowers in the model economy. The feature that
distinguishes them from impatient households modeled in Iacoviello (2005) is that
they may default on their loan obligation, with the default rate sensitive to house
prices, which reflects the adjustable-rate feature observed in the data.
Impatient subprime households have the following utility function:
max
bSubt ,h
Sub
t ,L
Sub
t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βSub,t
 log cSubt + jt log hSubt − LSubt η
Sub
ηSub
, (1.3.1)
where cSubt denotes the subprimers’ consumption of the final good, jt is the marginal
utility of housing subject to random disturbances (following Iacoviello, the disturbance
is common to patient and impatient households, and is a proxy for a housing demand
or housing preference shock), hSubt is the housing stock held by subprime households,
LSubt denotes labor supply of impatient subprime households. The budget constraint
of the impatient subprime household in real terms is:
cSubt + qt(hSubt − hSubt−1) + (1− δs,t)Rs,t−1bSubt−1/pit = bSubt + wSubt LSubt , (1.3.2)
where Rs,t is the nominal interest rate on subprime loans bSubt , qt = Qt/Pt denotes
the real housing price, pit = Pt/Pt−1 is inflation and
δs,t = δs − φs,h(qt −Q) (1.3.3)
is the default rate on loans (δs denotes the positive steady state value of default
rate, Q is the steady state value of housing prices,8 φs,h denotes subprimers’ default
sensitivity to house price changes). The dependence on house prices is chosen to
capture the high sensitivity of the hybrid subprime mortgage contract to changes in
housing prices and its gamble characteristics.9 Subprime lenders bet on an increase
8The price level in the steady state (P) equals 1.
9Forlati and Lambertini (2011) consider a model with risky mortgages and endogenous default
rate arising from idiosyncratic shocks to households’ housing investment, which is also a proxy
for modeling negative home equity and its consequences. However, in their model firms do not
borrow capital from financial intermediaries, so one important transmission channel of the crisis is
excluded.
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in house prices because they may then expect a lower than predicted default rate
and thus, faster repayment of the loan.10 Note that the debt contracts in this model
are written in nominal terms (following Iacoviello, 2005), which reflects the majority
of loan contracts in low-inflation countries.
Impatient households may borrow against the future value of their housing collateral:
Rs,tb
Sub
t ≤ mSubEt(qt+1pit+1)hSubt , (1.3.4)
where mSub determines the LTV ratio for subprime borrowers.
The FOCs of subprime borrowers are presented in Appendix 1.D.2.
It is important to note that, although the collateral constraint of subprime borrowers
does not refer to their possible default, the interest rate paid on their subprime loans
includes the default premium. They pay a higher interest rate reflecting their ex ante
probability of default. The subprime interest rate is determined by the subprime
lenders’ optimization problem, see equation 1.3.14.
1.3.3 Entrepreneurs
The problem of entrepreneurs is similar to that in Iacoviello (2005) with the
exclusion of capital accumulation and investment conducted by firms.11 They pro-
duce intermediate output priced at Ptw, using housing stock and labor provided by
households, and sell it to retailers. They borrow short-term to cover their expendi-
tures, facing a collateral constraint analogous to the one faced by households. Their
optimization problem and the FOCs are presented in Appendix 1.D.3.
1.3.4 Retailers
The problem of retailers is identical to that in Iacoviello (2005). They are the
source of price stickiness in the economy. I present the equations concerning the
retailer sector in Appendix 1.D.4.
10Given the formulation in equation 1.3.3, theoretically, when a large shock occurs, the default rate
can turn negative. However, the positive steady state rate of default, as well as the fact that
in a log-linearized model only shocks of a small amplitude can be considered, prevent this from
happening in the current setup.
11Capital and investment were part of the model in the earlier version of this chapter, Grodecka
(2013), and their inclusion does not change the results qualitatively, so for simplicity reason they
were left out from this analysis.
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1.3.5 Bankers
Commercial Bankers
Commercial bankers collect deposits from patient households and issue loans to
entrepreneurs. They also provide interbank loans for subprime lenders that operate
as a bank.12 Commercial bankers maximize utility from their consumption cb (as in
Iacoviello, 2014):13
max
cb,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb(log cb,t), (1.3.5)
where βb is assumed to be lower than the discount factor of patient households
(necessary condition for the capital requirement to be binding - see Iacoviello, 2014).
The budget constraint of bankers is:
cb,t +
Rd,t−1dt−1
pit
+ bbt + be,t = dt +
Rb,t−1bbt−1
pit
+ Re,t−1be,t−1
pit
, (1.3.6)
where Rd,t is the interest rate on deposits dt, bbt denotes interbank lending and Rb,t
is the interbank interest rate, be,t are the loans to entrepreneurs and Re,t−1 is the
interest rate on corporate loans.
The commercial banker’s balance sheet looks as follows:
Assets Liabilities
Interbank loans: bbt Deposits dt
Loans to entrepreneurs: be,t Equity eqt
12The distinction between commercial and subprime bankers is not necessary for the benchmark
version of the model, but becomes important once securitization is introduced into the model
economy. The evidence from the U.S. suggests that there were several banks and financial
intermediaries that specialized specifically in the subprime market.
13Note that this formulation considers a risk-averse banker. Although financial intermediaries are
often considered to be risk-neutral, there is some evidence of their risk-aversion (see Ratti, 1980
and Angelini, 2000). More recently, examining interest rates for different deposit maturities for
a set of U.S. banks, Nishiyama (2007) concludes that individual banks’ relative risk aversion
coefficients fall between 0 and 1 (most likely around 0.2), which means that they are slightly
risk averse. The log-utility function is characterized by the decreasing absolute risk aversion and
constant relative risk aversion of order 1, it is thus higher than the estimates of Nishiyama (2007).
However, in the current setup the degree of risk-aversion does not matter. As the model is solved
using the log-linearization technique, it has the feature of certainty equivalence: what matters
for the solution are the first order-moments of variables, but not higher-order moments, such as
variance. Since uncertainty does not play a role under the first-order-approximation, the solution
of the model would not change if I assumed the risk-neutrality of bankers.
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Thus, a Basel-type capital requirement, given exogenously, has the form:
τ ≤ bbt + be,t − dt
χIntbbbt + χFirmbe,t
, (1.3.7)
where χIntb < χFirm are risk weights of assets and τ denotes an equity ratio set by
a regulator. The condition states that the ratio of equity (defined as assets minus
deposits) to risk weighted assets has to exceed some exogenously chosen number.
The FOCs of the bankers’ problem determine the interest rates paid on deposits
and different types of loans (Gt denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the capital
requirement):
w.r.t. bbt
1
cb,t
= βbEt
(
Rb,t
cb,t+1pit+1
)
+ (1− τχIntb)Gt, (1.3.8)
w.r.t. be,t
1
cb,t
= βbEt
(
Re,t
cb,t+1pit+1
)
+ (1− τχFirm)Gt, (1.3.9)
w.r.t. dt
1
cb,t
= βbEt
(
Rd,t
cb,t+1pit+1
)
+Gt. (1.3.10)
The interpretation of equations 1.3.8 to 1.3.10 is crucial for understanding the main
result of the chapter. The equations without considering the Lagrangian multiplier
on the capital requirement represent typical Euler equations, saying that the banker
must be indifferent between consuming one unit of consumption today, and lending
one unit today and consuming it tomorrow. The capital requirement of bankers
introduces a wedge between the cost and marginal gain from lending. Its bindingness
influences the bankers’ decisions between consumption and borrowing/lending and
gives rise to the process of deleveraging. This results in a shrinking balance sheet in
the face of a negative shock, as bankers are impatient and prefer to consume rather
than raise equity or increase their lending.
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Subprime Lenders
Subprime lenders operate as financial intermediaries that collect deposits bbt from
the interbank market and issue subprime loans bSubt .
Their optimization problem is:
max
cbb,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtbb(log cbb,t), (1.3.11)
s.t.
cbb,t + bSubt +Rb,t−1bbt−1/pit = bbt +Rs,t−1(1− δs,t)bSubt−1/pit, (1.3.12)
where cbb,t denotes subprime lenders’ consumption. I assume that subprime lenders
hold a reserve for future losses, taking into account the ex ante (steady state) default
rate. The subprime banker’s balance sheet is:
Assets Liabilities
Loans to subprime borrowers: bSubt Interbank deposits bbt
Loss reserve −δsbSubt Equity eqt
Thus, a Basel-type capital requirement, given exogenously, has the form:
τSub ≤ (1− δs)b
Sub
t − bbt
χSub(1− δs)bSubt
, (1.3.13)
where the risk weight on subprime loans is denoted by χSub and τSub is the capital
ratio imposed on subprime lenders by the regulator.
The FOCs of the subprime bankers’ problem (GGt denotes the Lagrangian multiplier
on the capital requirement of subprime lenders) are:
w.r.t. bSubt
1
cbb,t
= βbbEt
(
Rs,t(1− δs,t+1)
cbb,t+1pit+1
)
+ (1− τSubχSub)(1− δs)GGt, (1.3.14)
w.r.t. bbt
1
cbb,t
= βbbEt
(
Rb,t
cbb,t+1pit+1
)
+GGt. (1.3.15)
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Equation 1.3.14 determines the interest rate paid on subprime loans and makes
clear that when pricing the subprime loan, the subprime lender takes into account
the default probability of the borrowers. As a consequence, the steady state interest
rate on subprime loans is higher than that of loans with a zero default probability.
1.3.6 Central Bank
The central bank implements a Taylor type interest rate rule (identical to Iacoviello,
2005). It is assumed that the interest rate set by the central bank equals the interest
rate paid on deposits (disregarding reserve requirements):
Rd,t = (Rd,t−1)rR
(
pi1+rpit−1
(
Yt−1
Y
)ry
r¯r
)1−rR
eeR,t . (1.3.16)
1.3.7 Market Clearing Conditions
I assume that real estate is fixed in the aggregate, which guarantees a variable
price of housing. The market clearing condition for the housing market is:
1 = hSaverst + hSubt + he,t. (1.3.17)
The goods market clearing condition is given by:
Yt = cSaverst + cSubt + ce,t + cb,t + cbb,t. (1.3.18)
The market clearing conditions for labor are defined by equations 1.D.5 and 1.D.15
for the patient households’ labor supply and demand, and by equations 1.D.8 and
1.D.16 for the impatient subprime households. The lending to different agents is
determined through their collateral constraints, while the market clearing conditions
for the loan and deposits markets are given by the capital requirements of the bankers
(equation 1.3.7 and 1.3.13).
1.4 Model with Securitization of Subprime Loans
The data provides evidence for the importance of securitization in subprime lending.
The majority of subprime loans have been securitized, first in the form of a RMBS,
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which often was a building block of CDO structures. Usually, different subprime
borrowers have different default probabilities, so securitization may be a way to
average the risk on subprime exposure. In the present model, all subprime borrowers
have the same default rate, which can be interpreted as a default rate representing
the mean of the aggregate distribution over all subprime borrowers, who differ in their
default sensitivity at an individual level. Typically, an MBS structure consists of
three tranches: senior, mezzanine and equity. To simplify the computation, I assume
that the model’s RMBS consists only of two tranches: senior and equity.14 Figure 1.7
illustrates the payoff functions of investors in the RMBS.
                
     Senior tranche 
           A rated 
 
 
 
 
     Equity tranche 
 C rated 
Attachment point f 
Figure 1.7: A two-tranche MBS (face value written in nominal terms)
The security is a pass-through security, which means that the nominal loan proceeds
are redistributed to the MBS investors. The smaller the loss on the underlying loan
portfolio (determined by the default rate), the larger is the payoff of equity tranche
14Gorton (2008) argues that subprime securitization differs from the securitization of other assets
because the tranche sizes are not fixed. There is dynamic tranching as a function of excess spread
and prepayments, so the whole structure is sensitive to house prices. At the beginning of the
existence of a subprime MBS, the equity tranches are usually very thin and along with repayments
of the subprime loans they reach their target level. However, if house prices decline from the very
beginning, the equity tranche remains very thin and thus senior tranche holders are subject to
a very large subprime risk (that was the case for MBS issued in 2006 and later). This works as
another amplification mechanism in the design of subprime security. In the version of the present
model in which different tranches are bought by different agents, presented in Appendix 1.E, it is
assumed that tranche sizes are fixed from the beginning. Including varying tranche sizes in the
model would amplify the effects of shocks in the economy.
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investors. The size of the equity tranche, determined by the parameter f , called
the attachment point in the CDO jargon, defines the maximum risk exposure of
equity tranche investors. If there is a loss on the underlying loan portfolio, the equity
tranche investors get the difference between the size of the equity tranche and the loss.
However, if the loss exceeds the size of the tranche, the equity tranche investors simply
get nothing from their investment, and the senior tranche investors begin to suffer.
Their payoff function is a minimum function. They either get back the tranche size,
or the difference between the face value of the MBS and the loss (in the case where
losses are bigger than the size of the equity tranche). Ps,t = min(St− fSt, St−Losst)
denotes the payoff of senior tranche buyers, and Pe,t = max(fSt − Losst, 0) denotes
the payoff of equity tranche buyers, where the principal of the MBS is (in real terms)
St = Rs,t−1bSubt−1/pit, and loss equals δs,tSt. Independent of the outcome, the cash flows
distributed to investors always equal the cash flows from subprime loans (including
losses), which is illustrated in Table 1.1:
Scenario
Loss >the equity tranche Loss < the equity tranche
δs,tSt > fSt δs,tSt < fSt
Payoff of equity tranche holder 0 fS − δs,tSt
Payoff of senior tranche holder St − δs,tSt St − fSt
Sum of payoffs St − δs,tSt St − δs,tSt
Table 1.1: MBS payoffs - two scenarios
The characteristics of the MBS presented in Table 1.1 make the inclusion of
securitization in the benchmark model straightforward. In what follows, I assume in
each version of the model with securitization that the same investor buys both the
senior and the equity tranche of the MBS, in practice acquiring the whole cash-flow
from loan proceeds. It is also possible to assume that different tranches are bought
by different investors. I consider this case in Appendix 1.E that explains how equity
and senior tranche payoffs resemble payoffs from investment in European options
and presents the characteristics of the chosen approximation of the maximum and
minimum functions (the logistics function), which are functions with a kink (see
Figure 1.21). The qualitative results of my analysis do not change irrespective of
the fact whether different agents buy different tranches (results with the use of
the logistics function presented in Appendix 1.E) or one agent buys both tranches
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(presented in the main part of the chapter).
In what follows, I present results for three different models with securitization: in
the first version, the entrepreneur invests in the loan proceeds; in the second version,
it is the patient household that acquires the MBS claims; and in the third version,
commercial bankers are investors in securitized assets. Why might commercial bankers
buy claims on MBS? One reason may be the diversification of their credit risk and the
exposure to a different credit market. Also, they may be as optimistic as subprime
borrowers are, and believe that housing prices will continue to rise. Moreover, senior
tranches usually have the highest possible rating, so the risk weight on them is very
low and the purchase has a positive impact on the balance sheet of banks. The
regulatory capital arbitrage is the reason why subprime lenders may want to conduct
securitization and why commercial bankers may want to buy certain tranches, as
described in Jones (2000). Why might patient households and entrepreneurs buy
MBS tranches? For them, this investment is just another possibility to smooth their
consumption.
I assume that certain agents in the economy invest in MBS securities, and I do not
model their decision as a portfolio choice decision, which allows me to use the first
order approximation to solve the model.15 For answering the research question of
this chapter this approach is sufficient, as I do not aim to explain how the securitized
assets were distributed among the investors.
Securitization changes the capital requirement faced by originators of the subprime
loans, as they may remove part of the risk from the balance sheet due to the
repackaging and sale of the assets. In the case of entrepreneurs and patient households
who buy MBS tranches, their budget constraint changes to include the new asset
acquired, and the FOC with respect to the new asset determines its price. When
commercial bankers invest in MBS tranches, apart from a changed budget constraint,
the capital requirement of the bankers also changes in order to include the new asset
into the balance sheet of the investor. Since these changes are not substantial relative
to the baseline model, I discuss their impact on specific model equations in Appendix
1.F.
15For the determination of the portfolio choice, higher-order solutions have to be used, as under the
first order approximation, the equilibrium portfolio is not determined (Devereux and Sutherland,
2010).
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1.5 Calibration and Results
1.5.1 Calibration
The model is log-linearized around the steady state. The log-linearized equations
present variables in the form of percent deviations from the steady state, which makes
the interpretation of model variables easier. All equations describing the model (also
shock processes) are given in Appendix 1.D.5.16 I calibrate the model using parameter
values from the literature, as well as empirical papers (see Table 1.2).
Following Iacoviello (2005), I assume that patient households have the highest
discount factor, followed by entrepreneurs and both types of bankers. The most
impatient agents in the economy are subprime borrowers. The choice of discount
factors assures that the collateral constraints in the model are always binding. The
parameter J controls the stock of residential housing over annual output in the steady
state, J = 0.09 fixes this ratio around 150%, which is in line with the data from the
Flow of Funds accounts (table B.100, row 4). The LTV ratios for firms and subprime
borrowers are set at 0.99, which is a high value, but is consistent with the literature
(Iacoviello, 2014). Parameter η is chosen to fix the Frisch labor supply elasticity at
1. The chosen value lies between the estimates provided by microeconomic studies
(0-0.54) and by macroeconomic studies (2-4) (see Peterman, 2012). The steady state
gross markup is a value taken from Iacoviello (2005). The patient households’ wage
share of 0.87 corresponds to the conclusions of Jappelli (1990a) who finds that 19%
of U.S. families are rationed in credit markets and they account for 12.7% of total
wage income. The value of 0.55 for the parameter θ describing the price rigidity is
consistent with the evidence of Dhyne et al. (2006) who show that the average price
duration in the United States equals 6.7 months.
Parameters describing the risk weights of different types of loans are based on
U.S. regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Code of Federal
Regulations - Title 12: Banks and Banking, 12 CFR Appendix A to Part 325 -
Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital). Interbank loans have the lowest risk
weight, followed by the risk weight on commercial loans (the factor for risky loans
16A list of the log-linearized equations for the extended version of the model (including capital and
investment, as well as impatient prime borrowers), may be found in the previous working paper
version of this model, Grodecka (2013).
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Description Parameter Value
Discount factor of patient households β 0.995
Discount factor of impatient households βSub 0.93
Discount factor of entrepreneurs γ 0.96
Discount factor of commercial bankers βb 0.97
Discount factor of subprime lenders βbb 0.95
Weight on housing services J 0.09
Loan to value entrepreneurs m 0.99
Loan to value subprime households mSub 0.99
Labor supply aversion ηSavers = ηSub 2
Housing share in production function ν 0.15
Steady state gross markup X 1.05
Patient households wage share α 0.87
Probability fixed price θ 0.55
Capital adjustment costs φ 2
Risk weight of interbank loans χIntb 0.2
Risk weight on commercial loans χFirms 1.5
Risk weight of subprime loans χSub 4.5
Commercial bankers capital requirement τ 0.13
Subprime lenders capital requirement τSub 0.2
Subprimers’ default sensitivity to house price changes φsh 0.183
Steady state subprime default rate δs 0.05
Weight of policy response to interest rate rR 0.73
Weight of policy response to inflation rpi 0.27
Weight of policy response to output ry 0.13
Autocorrelation of preference shock ρj 0.95
Standard deviation of preference shock σεj 1
Standard deviation of monetary shock σεR 1
Tranche retention by banks t 0.01
Table 1.2: Calibrated parameters
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has been applied). The risk weight on subprime loans has a very high value, which is
consistent with the Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs,17 stating
“that an institution would hold capital against subprime portfolios in an amount that
is one and a half to three times greater than what is appropriate for non-subprime
assets of a similar type”. The capital ratio for commercial bankers corresponds to
the average regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets for the United States before
the crisis, reported in the FRED database.18 The capital ratio for subprime lenders
is higher than for commercial bankers, which again, corresponds to the Expanded
Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs: “Institutions with subprime programs
affected by this guidance should have capital ratios that are well above the averages
for their traditional peer groups or other similarly situated institutions that are not
engaged in subprime lending. (...) institutions that underwrite higher-risk subprime
pools, such as unsecured loans or high loan-to-value second mortgages, may need
significantly higher levels of capital, perhaps as high as 100% of the loans outstanding
depending on the level and volatility of risk”.
The sensitivity of subprime households to housing price changes has been chosen
according to the pre-crisis data. Over time, the sensitivity changed, but on average
one can assume that it did not exceed 20% (Amromin and Paulson, 2010). The
subprime default rate is chosen to be 5% in the steady state. According to the data
presented in Demyanyk and Hemert (2011), in the decade preceding the crisis, the
default rate on subprime hybrid loans oscillated around 10%. However, usually when
a household defaults on its mortgage, the bank seizes and sells the property, receiving
some foreclosure value. The present model does not have this feature, thus the steady
state default rate is half of that in the data. Also, a higher steady state default
rate would result in an unreasonably high steady state value for the interest rate on
subprime loans. The Taylor rule coefficients are taken from Iacoviello (2005). The
shocks are assumed to be persistent, with the autocorrelation coefficient equal to
0.95. I consider a 1 percent shock in each case. For the parameters governing the
securitization process, evidence suggests that on average, retention of securitized
assets is higher in Europe than in the U.S. Whereas originators usually held around
5% of issued securities in Europe, the retention rate was often at 0% and rarely
17http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf
18Series DDSI05USA156NWDB
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exceeded 1% for MBS in the U.S. Retention percentages for CDOs and ABS (Asset
Backed Securities) were usually higher, but in the years 2002-2009, on average they
did not exceed 7% (Global Financial Stability Report, October 2009, p. 100-107).
1.5.2 Model Dynamics
I consider two shocks: monetary and preference.19 The monetary shock is defined
as an exogenous increase in the interest rate set by the central bank and can be
interpreted as a discretionary deviation from the Taylor rule. The negative preference
shock represents a change in the preference for housing among households. This may
capture - in reduced form - a regulatory or taxation reform that makes investment in
the housing market less attractive to households (regulatory reforms allowing for a
large range of mortgage products could have led to a positive preference shock in the
U.S., see Temkin et al., 2002).
The introduction of a subprimers’ default rate sensitive to housing prices has only
a negligible impact on impulse response functions to shocks in the baseline model
without securitization. The varying default rate, particularly, the rising default rate
after a negative shock leading to a fall in housing prices, is a positive wealth effect
from the subprimers’ perspective - they may repay less than contracted. Feeling
wealthier, subprime borrowers will reduce their labor supply when compared to the
case where the default rate does not vary, which drives output down. For subprime
lenders, the rising default rate represents a negative wealth effect, because they do
not get back all the contracted loan installments. Suffering losses on their loan
portfolio, subprime lenders face a tighter capital requirement. They will reduce their
lending to subprime borrowers and raise the interest rate on subprime loans, but their
consumption will also go down. The described redistribution effect and balance sheet
effect have a negative effect on overall consumption, and more responsive housing
prices affect other borrowers in the economy who use housing stock as collateral
for their loans. However, the subdivision of the banking sector into the subprime
and the commercial segments prevents the negative developments in the subprime
market from spreading to other sectors of the economy, especially the production
19An earlier working paper version presenting this model (Grodecka, 2013) includes also a technology
and an inflation shock. Monetary and preference shocks are the most important in explaining the
main transmission mechanism, so I only focus on them.
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sector which is unaffected by subprimers’ defaults and no significant effect on the
aggregate output can be observed.
A more interesting comparison is given in Figure 1.8 which presents the impulse
responses for output of the benchmark model (solid line) and three versions of the
model with securitization. Impulse responses are presented as percent deviations
from the steady state. The dashed green line shows the responses of the model
in which entrepreneurs buy MBS tranches, the dotted magenta line presents the
second version of the model with securitization, in which patient households buy
MBS tranches, whereas the dashed-dotted red line shows the responses of the model
in which commercial bankers buy MBS tranches. In the case of both shocks in the
model, in which patient households or entrepreneurs acquire claims on subprime
loans, the output response is smaller than in the benchmark case. While looking
at Figure 1.8, it is important to note that the model with securitization in which
patient households buy MBS claims leads to a relatively worse output performance
compared to the version in which entrepreneurs become the investors of new assets.
This is due to the special role patient households play in the model economy: they
are the source of commercial bankers’ deposits, and their savings behavior affects
the aggregate balance sheet of the economy. In the model in which they invest in
MBS, they have less resources to save in form of deposits, and so this version of the
model with securitization leads to less lending than the version in which firms acquire
subprime loan proceeds.
Due to securitization, the capital constraint of subprime lenders becomes relatively
looser (they hold less assets decreasing in value on their balance sheets; the numerical
example discussing the relation between the value of assets and the bindingness of the
capital constraint is given in Appendix 1.A) and their consumption is less responsive
to shocks than in the benchmark model. As subprime lenders’ liabilities (interbank
deposits) are assets of commercial bankers, securitization, by enabling subprime
lenders to sell toxic assets, will protect their balance sheets from shrinking in the
case of a negative shock. The mechanism of interbank linkages is presented in Figure
1.9, which shows balance sheets of the subprime lender and the commercial lender
(balance sheets do not necessarily have to be of the same size, as depicted in Figure
1.9). Before a negative shock, the balance sheets have a size depicted by the solid
black line. After a negative shock, the overall lending decreases, but the deleveraging
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Output response to shocks
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Figure 1.8: Output responses of model versions with and without subprime securiti-
zation
Note: All impulse responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state
effect is different depending on who is the ultimate bearer of the securitized risk.
Through the interbank linkages, a larger (relative to the benchmark without
securitization) subprime balance sheet leads, ceteris paribus, to a larger commercial
bankers’ balance sheet, and thus more potential lending to firms. Of course, buying
claims on MBS tranches changes the budget constraints of the investors and has
impacts on their consumption, but they can absorb losses on MBS through working
and saving (patient households) or borrowing (entrepreneurs). The overall effect of
securitization is to dampen the fall in lending and output, because the risk is spread
among different agents in the economy. This is the way securitization was expected
and is supposed to work.
However, another possibility was also considered - that commercial bankers buy
MBS proceeds. If securitized assets are bought by commercial bankers, there is an
amplification of the output response after shocks. The amplification occurs not only
in comparison to the version of the model in which securitized products are bought
by savers and entrepreneurs, but also with respect to the benchmark model without
securitization. What is the reason for this amplified contraction? All the effects occur
through the balance sheets of both types of bankers. Issuing MBS makes the capital
constraint of subprime lenders looser (in the case of a negative shock), whereas it
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Figure 1.9: Interconnected balance sheets of financial intermediaries in the model
tightens the capital constraint of commercial bankers because they hold the MBS
(that is declining in value after a negative shock because of the increasing default
rate) on their balance sheets. To reduce the tightness of the constraint, commercial
bankers may either reduce their consumption or lending (a similar mechanism occurs
in Iacoviello, 2014). In the present model, they do both.
When a negative shock hits the economy and commercial bankers buy MBS tranches,
their capital constraint gets tighter and they reduce the lending to entrepreneurs
who finance housing stock purchases with loans from the bank. As the housing
stock is a production factor, output in the economy goes down more than without
securitization. When non-banks buy MBS tranches, there is no loss on the balance
sheet of commercial bankers and securitization reduces business cycle fluctuations.
In the benchmark case, entrepreneurs are relatively unaffected by the defaults in the
subprime sector. When commercial bankers engage in securitization, a more direct
link is created between the production sector and the subprime mortgage market,
so that entrepreneurs suffer from losses in the subprime portfolio more than in the
benchmark case. These dynamics are visible in Figures 1.10 and 1.11 which present
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Figure 1.10: Impulse responses of models with and without subprime securitization
Note: All impulse responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state
chosen model variables after a monetary shock and the preference shock. From
Figures 1.10 and 1.11 it is visible that commercial bankers become buyers of MBS,
the entrepreneurial borrowing and housing stock are considerably lower than in the
benchmark case and in the case where only patient households and entrepreneurs
buy MBS. Also the aggregate balance sheet represented by the overall lending sector
confirms the intuition presented in Figure 1.9. Due to a negative shock, the lending
goes down in all of the considered models, but the strength of this effect differs. The
fact that bankers face a capital requirement is crucial for obtaining the above result.
Apart from considering the impulse response functions, one can also have a look
at the model’s theoretical moments. Table 1.3 presented below shows the standard
deviations of the main variables of interest for the benchmark model and the three
versions of the model with securitization. For the purpose of the table, I denote
the model with securitization in which entrepreneurs buy MBS as Sec1, the model
in which patient households buy MBS by Sec2 and the model in which commercial
bankers buy MBS as Sec3. I normalize the standard deviations of the benchmark
model to 1 and present the standard deviations for the other models in relation to the
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Figure 1.11: Impulse responses of model versions with and without subprime securiti-
zation
Note: All impulse responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state
benchmark, so the numbers presented in columns 3-5 have a percentage interpretation.
A number smaller than 1 means that a given variable is less volatile relative to the
benchmark model without securitization, while a number larger than 1 denotes larger
volatility.
Standard deviation
Variable Benchmark Sec1 Sec2 Sec3
Output 1 0.503 0.795 1.664
Aggregate lending 1 0.442 0.790 2.454
Nominal interest rate 1 0.485 0.668 1.421
House prices 1 0.252 0.212 1.75
Entrepreneurial borrowing 1 0.378 0.791 2.455
Entrepreneurial housing stock 1 0.464 0.933 2.527
Table 1.3: Simulated moments of chosen variables
In case of each variable, the standard deviation of the model in which commercial
bankers buy MBS (Sec3) is considerably larger than in the benchmark case without
securitization. In the case of the model where entrepreneurs (Sec1) and patient
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households (Sec2) buy MBS, the opposite is the case: both models exhibit a much
smaller volatility of considered variations relative to the benchmark. Notably, the
model with patient households as MBS investors (Sec2) demonstrates larger variable
volatility than the model with entrepreneurs as investors. Thus, the simulated
moments of the economy confirm the intuition provided by the analysis of impulse
response functions: securitization may either dampen or amplify aggregate volatility
depending on the final buyer of securitized assets, and they are most positive in the
model in which entrepreneurs invest in MBS tranches.
1.5.3 Crisis Experiment
How do the model’s predictions relate to the housing prices and output fall observed
in the data during the Great Recession? To answer this question, I take into account
the seasonally adjusted USSTHPI series20 and real GDP (available from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis). The raw data exhibits a trend in both cases. In order to make
the data comparable to the model outcomes presented as percentage change from
the steady state, I use the HP-filter to calculate the trend and cyclical component
of both series and express the cyclical component as percentage deviations from the
trend. Figure 1.12 presents the percent deviations from trend observed in the data
for real GDP (upper panel) and housing prices (lower panel) in the U.S. in the years
1975-2013. The gray bars indicate NBER recessions. The last recession started in
December 2007 (4th quarter) and ended in June 2009 (2nd quarter).
The analysis reveals that the cyclical component of housing prices fell below zero
(steady state) between the 4th quarter of 2007 and the 1st quarter of 2008 (and
crosses the zero-line from below for one period in the 2nd quarter of 2008), while
the cyclical component of GDP turned negative two quarters after housing prices
fell, in the 3rd quarter of 2008. Notice that the time when the cyclical component
turns negative does not coincide with the peak of GDP and housing prices, as in both
cases, the peaks represent positive cyclical divergence from the steady state. Using a
log-linearized DSGE model as an analysis tool, I can by construction only look at the
deviations from the steady state - before the exogenous shock occurs, the economy
is at the steady state. After the cyclical component of house prices turns negative,
it reaches a low of -3.81% in the 4th quarter of 2009. The low of the GDP cyclical
20The series has been adjusted using the X-12-ARIMA program.
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Figure 1.12: U.S. GDP and USSTHPI
component, -2.91%, occurs earlier, even if the fall itself starts later, and experiences
a relatively fast recovery afterwards (while the cyclical component of housing prices
shows a W-shaped pattern).
To investigate how the predictions of my stylized model correspond to the dynamics
observed in the data, I calibrate the housing preference shock in three considered
models to get an initial fall in housing prices of 1.2627%, as this has been the deviation
from the trend in the first two quarters when the cyclical component of housing prices
turned negative. Figure 1.13 shows the results of this exercise, presenting the results
for three models and the data series (starting from the 3rd quarter of 2008, when the
cyclical component of GDP turns negative and the cyclical component of housing
prices falls below zero for the second time) for the first 10 quarters after the shock.
The model, especially its version with banks investing in MBS does a good job
replicating the hump-shaped response of output after the negative preference shock.
The initial fall of housing prices of 1.2627% leads to a relatively fast come-back of
housing prices to the steady state in the two models with securitization in which
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Figure 1.13: Crisis experiment
Note: All impulse responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state
non-financial agents buy claims on MBS. The baseline model predicts a maximum
drop in housing prices of 2.17% and the model with securitization in which bankers
invest in MBS shows a drop of 3.45%, which is closest to the data (3.81%). When it
comes to the output response, unsurprisingly the model with securitization in which
commercial bankers engage in the acquisition of MBS tranches, comes closest to
the data, generating an output fall of 2.2% (compared to 2.91% in the data). The
deviations from trend observed in the data are larger than the ones generated by the
model, but having in mind Figure 1.12, one may recall that the fall in prices and
GDP started from an above-trend level, which may have given more impetus to the
variables.
Given the simplicity of the model and the fact that the model is not explicitly
estimated to match the data, the comparison of the model and data series is more than
satisfying. The version of the model in which bankers buy MBS generates impulse
response functions similar to the output behavior in the data, which suggests that the
model may highlight an important amplification mechanism that played a role in the
crisis. A comparison of the red dashed-dotted line in Figure 1.13 with the other lines
allows for conducting a simple counterfactual exercise and shows how output could
have evolved if there was no securitization or if securitized products were bought by
final buyers other than commercial bankers. In both cases, the fall in output would
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be lower and the recovery would be faster. Specifically, the maximum output fall in
the model with securitization and entrepreneurs as investors corresponds to only ca.
13% of the maximum output fall in the model with bankers as investors. Assuming
that in reality the latter case occurred and applying this number to the output fall in
the data, we get a maximum output fall of 0.36% instead of 2.91% observed in the
data, corresponding to the case in which only non-financial investors (entrepreneurs)
buy MBS tranches.
1.6 Sensitivity Analysis and Extension
1.6.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to test the model’s robustness, I compute a sensitivity analysis with respect
to the housing share in the production function, commercial bankers’ capital ratio
and tranche retention by subprime lenders. The results are presented as the difference
between the IRFs of the benchmark model (solid blue line in all graphs) and the model
with securitization in which bankers are the investors, after a monetary shock.21 The
larger the difference, the larger the negative effect compared to the economy without
securitization.
Figure 1.14 presents the differences for different values of housing share in the
production function. The larger the housing share, the stronger the negative effects
of securitization on housing prices and output. This is an intuitive result: given
that entrepreneurial housing stock falls in response to the negative shock, if it is a
relatively more important factor of production (ν is larger), output will experience a
larger drop.
21Results for the preference shock are qualitatively the same.
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Figure 1.14: Sensitivity w.r.t. ν
From the policymaker’s point of view, it is important to examine the effects of
increasing regulation in the banking market. Could more strict regulations, i.e. higher
capital ratios and higher tranche retention rates protect the economy from large
output falls, analogous to those that occurred during the Great Recession? Figure
1.15 presents the sensitivity analysis w.r.t. different capital ratios, and Figure 1.16
presents results for different tranche retention rates.
Figure 1.15 shows that, as capital ratios for commercial bankers increase, the
difference between the baseline model and the model with bankers as investors in
securitized assets falls. This suggests that, given the existence of equity constraints,
their higher value is better for the economy, as it reduces deleveraging effects and
the fall in housing prices and output. When it comes to imposing higher retention
rates on subprime lenders, Figure 1.16 suggests that such a macroprudential policy is
less effective than determining the level of capital ratios. Higher retention rates lead
to smaller differences between the baseline and the ‘bad securitization’ model, but
the effects are quantitatively negligible even for tranche retention rates as high as
50%. This can hinge on the fact that the subprime lending sector is more regulated
in the first place. Higher capital ratios for subprime lenders and high risk weights on
subprime loans significantly reduce the leverage of the subprime sector as compared
to the commercial banking sector, so introducing stricter regulations has a relatively
smaller marginal impact on the behavior of the economy.
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Figure 1.15: Sensitivity w.r.t. τ
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1.6.2 Extension
In the baseline version of the model, I consider only subprime impatient borrowers
that constitute 100% of all households’ borrowing. As discussed in Section 1.2.1,
subprime hybrid contracts were in reality a minor part of the U.S. mortgage market,
which was dominated by prime fixed-interest rate contracts. In an extension of the
model, I consider the existence of impatient prime borrowers that do not default
on their loans and have access to long-term contracts. Equations describing the
optimization problem of the prime borrower are presented in Appendix 1.G. I assume
that prime borrowers, unlike subprime borrowers, have access to loans offered by
commercial bankers. In this version of the model, I calibrate the subprimers’ share in
the market to reflect the average share observed in the data in the pre-crisis years:
20%. I also assume that prime borrowers have access to 4-period contracts.22
It turns out that adding impatient prime borrowers to the model reduces the
volatility of the model’s variables. Prime households that take out fixed interest
rate loans are not as sensitive to changes in housing prices and interest rates as the
subprimers, which makes their borrowing less responsive to shocks. As subprimers are
now only a subset of borrowing households, in the extended model, their default leads
to less disruptions. The effects are quantitatively less strong than in the presented
baseline model, but the qualitative results remain the same. In addition to the
deleveraging effect w.r.t. lending to firms, the extended version of the model features
also a reduction in lending to prime households in the model with bankers as investors
in the securitization market. The graphs presenting the behavior of the main variables
of interest for the model with prime borrowers are included in Appendix 1.G.
1.7 Conclusion
In the first chapter, I analyze the importance of the specific design of subprime
contracts and the securitization of subprime loans in generating cyclical fluctuations
in the U.S. in a New-Keynesian model. The evidence suggests that the existence of
subprime borrowers alone cannot account for the amplification of the responses of
22In the earlier version of the model, two-period subprime and six-period prime loans were also
considered. The results do not change qualitatively in this case, and the quantitative impact is
limited.
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output and housing prices to different shocks in the economy. This chapter also gives
an answer to the question whether the securitization of subprime loans could be a
factor that amplified the response of the economy to negative shocks, like the ones we
observed during the Great Recession. It turns out that the effects of securitization of
subprime loans depend on who is the final buyer of securitized assets. If households
and entrepreneurs purchase MBS tranches, securitization reduces business cycle
fluctuations, spreading the subprime risk among different agents. Facing a negative
shock and losses on securitized portfolios, these agents adjust their labor supply and
saving decisions (patient households) or borrowing (entrepreneur) so as to cushion
the effects of the exogenous disturbances. The positive effects of securitization arise
thanks to an interconnected banking sector in which changes in the balance sheet of
one financial intermediary have an impact on the balance sheets of other financial
intermediaries in the economy through interbank loan contracts. However, if financial
intermediaries (that are the source of credit to firms in the economy) purchase
MBS tranches, the negative effects of securitization prevail. This results in a bigger
contraction of output after a negative shock when compared with the case where
non-banks buy MBS tranches or without securitization. The positive risk-sharing
aspect of securitization is mostly suppressed in this situation, because the capital
requirement on the side of banks is a source of additional financial frictions. The
counterfactual exercise conducted in this chapter suggests that if financial institutions
followed the intended business model of securitization, the maximum quarterly output
loss in the U.S. economy during the Great Recession would have been much smaller
and shorter-lasting compared to that actually experienced.
The results of the model are in line with narrative explanations of the crisis provided
by Hellwig (2009) and Jaffee et al. (2009). It is shown that securitization per se
cannot be blamed for the crisis, because it may dampen business cycles arising in
response to negative shocks if the securitized products are bought by agents that do
not play the role of a financial intermediary in the economy. Obviously, it may be
that unless there was the possibility of securitization, the bankers would not issue as
many subprime loans as they did in the first place. The present model deals, however,
with the possible transmission mechanism in an economy with subprime borrowers
and securitization, rather than the reasons for the existence of the subprime market
and the subprime securitization with their incentive problems.
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The setup addresses several important issues in policymaking, like the burden of
regulation in the economy. It turns out that raising capital ratios is an effective
method of reducing negative deleveraging effects, while imposing higher tranche
retention rates on subprime lenders is relatively less efficient, as they are already
more regulated and the marginal effect of additional regulation is comparatively small.
Moreover, the chapter’s results suggest that the segmentation of the banking sector
and avoiding interbank linkages between banks operating in different segments may
be a good way of preventing the negative spillovers of credit defaults in the economy.
This may not only reflect the separation of the subprime and prime loans segments,
but also the separation of commercial and investment banking, which was the case
in the United States for several decades due to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The
separation between commercial and investment banks was abolished at the beginning
of the new century, and it might have been one of the causes of the widespread crisis,
as the current chapter shows. Thus, from the point of view of the policymaker, it is
crucial to ensure that banks disclose all information about their assets, even those
hidden from the balance sheet that may give a hint about potential linkages between
different banking sectors and branches.
The model operates in a closed-economy setup, however it is easy to imagine that
the two banking sectors presented in the model represent financial intermediaries of
two different countries.23 If toxic assets generated in country A are sold to commercial
banks in country B, country A is basically able to transfer all the default risk and
losses to country B, which will suffer from a recession due to the engagement in
the international financial market (country A will remain practically intact). This
narrative can be easily adopted to explain what happened during the recent financial
crisis. The U.S. was the country issuing toxic assets and it was selling them to foreign
investors, transferring the subprime risk from the country to the international market.
This is why, e.g. many European banks, municipalities etc., had problems when
the defaults in the U.S. subprime market started, and the crisis spread around the
world. In reality, not only did the international buyers of RMBS suffer from losses,
but the U.S. economy experienced a recession as well (thus the country A from our
example did not remain intact). This is partially due to the fact that U.S. banks also
23Kollmann et al. (2011) investigate the role of bank capital requirements in the international
context, modeling a global bank subject to loan default shocks.
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engaged in the acquisition of toxic assets. Also, other factors, such as labor market
developments in the U.S. played a role, which are, however, not considered in this
model.
To sum up, this chapter combines the macroeconomic framework with financial
economics, presenting one important channel that may have played a role in the
amplification of the recent crisis in the U.S. economy. It provides evidence that
financial intermediaries and the constraints they are facing are an important feature
of macroeconomic models.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A Bank Capital Requirements and Deleveraging
One of the major results of this chapter hinges on the fact that the financial interme-
diaries face collateral constraints, forcing them to maintain a certain equity to assets
ratio. Following Adrian and Shin (2010), this section focuses on the balance sheet
effects of capital requirements faced by bankers that are crucial to understand the
effects of securitization in the model presented in this chapter. Consider a simplified
balance sheet of a financial intermediary:
Assets Liabilities
Loans L = 100 Deposits D=90
Equity E= 10
The ratio of equity to assets is given by 10/100 = 10%. Assume that these 10%
correspond to the capital requirement set by the regulator. The leverage ratio is
given by the inverse of the capital ratio, i.e. 100/10 = 10. The capital constraint is
always binding, i.e. the banker will avoid holding excess equity which would lower
his leverage ratio, and I assume that equity adjusts first to changes on the asset side.
Consider a scenario in which the value of assets falls by 1%. The balance sheet looks
in this case as follows:
Assets Liabilities
Loans L = 99 Deposits D=90
Equity E= 9
At first, the capital ratio falls to 9/99 = 9.09% and leverage increases to 99/9 = 11.
A banker trying to maintain a constant equity ratio will try to bring leverage down
to the previous level and he can do so in two ways. He may choose to deleverage,
i.e. reduce lending from depositors, which would lead to a shrinking balance sheet,
since as D falls, loans L also have to fall. To reduce leverage to 10, the banker has
to reduce deposits and assets by D solving the following equation: (99−D)/9 = 10.
Thus, borrowing from depositors has to be reduced by 9 units which results in the
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following balance sheet:
Assets Liabilities
Loans L = 90 Deposits D=81
Equity E= 9
After this operation, the capital ratio and leverage are back to the original levels.
The initial fall in asset prices of 1% resulted in a fall in lending by 10%. Alternatively,
the banker may choose to raise new equity, which would result in an expansion of the
balance sheet. To determine how much equity needs to be raised, we solve for E in
equation (99 + E)/(9 + E) = 10. The bank needs to raise 1 additional unit of equity
to bring the leverage down to the previous level, which results in the same balance
sheet as before the fall in asset prices.
Which of the two alternative ways of reducing leverage is mostly chosen by financial
intermediaries that face a fall in their asset prices? Unfortunately, the first one is
more common, i.e. deleveraging leading to shrinking balance sheets and sales of assets.
It is unfortunate, as the initial fall in prices may lead to sales of assets, which may
further drive their prices down, leading to a vicious circle. Why do banks tend to
adjust their deposits rather than equity? As Adrian and Shin (2011) document, the
equity of financial intermediaries behaves in many cases like a pre-determined variable
and it is relatively sticky, which may be explained by possible non-pecuniary benefits
to bank owners (new equity leads to dilution of the value of stakes of the insiders, loss
of the control over shares). In the stock market context, raising new equity through
issuing new shares may be difficult in times of falling asset prices. Thus, even if
theoretically a financial intermediary facing an increased leverage has two options
to cope with that situation, a fall in asset prices often leads to a contraction in the
balance sheet.
This mechanism is crucial for understanding the behavior of bankers in the model.
Facing losses on subprime MBS, bankers decide to reduce their lending to productive
firms, worsening the effects of the initial negative shock in the economy. They
could raise new equity, but this would mean that they have to reduce their current
consumption. As they are modeled as impatient agents maximizing their consumption,
a shortcut that enables me to capture the stickiness of the equity observed by Adrian
and Shin (2011), they choose to deleverage rather than cut consumption.
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Can higher capital ratios reduce the deleveraging effect? Consider an economy in
which there is a capital ratio of 20%. Then, the balance sheet looks as follows:
Assets Liabilities
Loans L = 100 Deposits D=80
Equity E= 20
In this case, a fall of asset prices by 1% will require an adjustment by D units:
19/(99 − D) = 20%. D=4, i.e. the initial fall of 1% will lead to shrinking of the
balance sheet by overall 5 units, which is 5% of its overall size, as opposed to 10%
when the capital ratio was 10%. Thus, a higher capital requirement reduces the
negative deleveraging effects.
How does the risk-weighting of assets (present in Basel regulations and in this
model) change the considerations about changes in the size of the balance sheet?
Until now, it was assumed that the risk-weight of the assets is 1. What if it were
twice as big or two times smaller? Consider the second case and assume that L=100
and the required capital ratio is 10%. The risk weighting enables us to keep only
5 units of equity E (E/0.5*L=10%), and finance the lending mostly with deposits
D=95, which means that our leverage increases to 20 (10 in the base case without
risk-weighting). What happens if asset prices fall by 1%? The capital ratio becomes
4/0.5 ∗ 99 = 8.08%. To bring the capital ratio up to 10%, the banker will reduce its
borrowing and lending by D: 4/0.5 ∗ (99−D) = 10%. The solution is D=19. That
means that the initial fall of asset prices by 1% leads to the overall decline in lending
by 20%. Introducing the risk weights influences the strength of the bankers’ response
in the event of asset price decline. A risk weight smaller than 1 increases the leverage
of the financial intermediary and exacerbates the deleveraging process, whereas a risk
weight larger than 1 will have stabilizing effects.
The basic analysis of banks’ balance sheets suggests that higher capital ratios and
risk weights higher than 1 (100%) may help reduce the negative effects of a fall in
asset prices in the economy. Will the dynamic general equilibrium model confirm
these conclusions? It turns out that yes - binding capital constraints may indeed lead
to large amplification effects in the face of a crisis, and higher capital requirements
reduce the deleveraging effect.
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1.B Data Description
To produce the Figures 1.5 and 1.18 and compare them to the data for all U.S.
chartered banks, I use monthly data provided by the Federal Reseve in Table H.8
Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States.24 The data on
MBS holdings and data on commercial real estate loans begins in 10.1996 for large
commercial banks. If I wanted to use data for all commercial banks, the data on
MBS holdings starts in 07.2009 and the data on commercial real estate loans begins
in 06.2004. Since I am interested in a longer perspective, I use data for large banks
as a proxy for all U.S. banks. The total assets of the large domestically-chartered
commercial banks constituted in years 1985-2013 around 56% to 68.5%, with a falling
tendency over time. The developments in the fractions of total commercial loans and
commercial real estate loans follow similar patterns. In the period 06.2004-06.2013,
the correlation coefficient between the fraction of total commercial loans in large
domestically-chartered banks and all banks stood at 91.14%. For the fraction of
commercial real estate loans, the coefficient in the same period was even larger:
95.38%. Thus, the conclusions remain relevant for the whole banking sector in the
U.S., even though some of the graphs in this chapter are only prepared using data
for large domestically-chartered banks. For total consumer loans, the corresponding
correlation coefficients are significantly lower: for the fraction of consumer real estate
loans we obtain a correlation of 61.34%, while for the fraction of total consumer loans
the correlation is 59.02%.
I use the following series:
For large domestically chartered commercial banks:
Commercial and industrial loans: B1023NLGAM
Commercial real estate loans:B1219NLGAM
Commercial loans: B1023NLGAM + B1219NLGAM
Treasury and agency securities: Mortgage-backed securities (MBS): B1301NLGAM
Other securities: Mortgage-backed securities: B1303NLGAM
Total MBS holdings: B1301NLGAM+ B1303NLGAM
Consumer real estate loans: B1027NLGAM + B1220NLGAM
Other consumer loans: B1029NLGAM
24Available on http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/.
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Total consumer loans: B1029NLGAM+ B1027NLGAM + B1220NLGAM
Total assets:B1151NLGAM
For all commercial banks:
Commercial and industrial loans: B1023NCBAM
Commercial real estate loans: B1219NCBAM
Commercial loans: B1023NCBAM+ B1219NCBAM
Treasury and agency securities: Mortgage-backed securities (MBS): B1301NCBAM
Other securities: Mortgage-backed securities: B1303NCBAM
Total MBS holdings: B1301NCBAM+ B1303NCBAM
Consumer real estate loans: B1027NCBAM+B1220NCBAM
Other consumer loans: B1029NCBAM
Total consumer loans: B1029NCBAM+ B1027NCBAM+B1220NCBAM
Total assets: B1151NCBAM
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Figure 1.18: Subprime default rates and commercial loans in the U.S.
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and FRB data
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1.D Baseline Model Equations
1.D.1 The Optimization Problem of the Patient Household
All equations and constraints are written in real terms. Patient households maximize
the utility function given by:
max
bSaverst ,h
Savers
t ,L
Savers
t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
 log cSaverst + jt log hSaverst − LSaverst η
Savers
ηSavers
, (1.D.1)
where cSaverst denotes the consumption of the final good, jt is the marginal utility
of housing subject to random disturbances (following Iacoviello, the disturbance is
common to patient and impatient households, and is a proxy for a housing demand or
housing preference shock), hSaverst is the housing stock held by savers, LSaverst denotes
labor supply of patient households.
The budget constraint of the patient household in real terms is:
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cSaverst + qt(hSaverst − hSaverst−1 ) + dt = Rd,t−1dt−1/pit + wSaverst LSaverst + Ft, (1.D.2)
where dt denotes deposits, Rd,t is the interest rate paid on deposits, Ft are profits from
retailers (redistributed only to patient households), wSaverst LSaverst is labor income,
qt = Qt/Pt denotes the real housing price, pit = Pt/Pt−1 is inflation. The deposit
contract is a nominal debt contract.
The First Order Conditions (FOCs) are:
w.r.t. dt
1
cSaverst
= βEt
(
1
cSaverst+1 pit+1
)
Rd,t, (1.D.3)
w.r.t. hSaverst
qt
cSaverst
= βEt
(
qt+1
cSaverst+1
)
+ jt
hSaverst
, (1.D.4)
w.r.t. LSaverst
wSaverst = LSaverst
ηSavers−1
cSaverst . (1.D.5)
1.D.2 FOCs of the Impatient Subprime Household
The FOCs are (λSubt is the Lagrangian multiplier on the borrowing constraint):
w.r.t. bSubt
1
cSubt
= βSubEt
(
(1− δs,t)Rs,t
cSubt+1pit+1
)
+ λSubt Rs,t, (1.D.6)
w.r.t. hSubt
qt
cSubt
= βSubEt
(
qt+1
cSubt+1
+ λSubt mSubqt+1pit+1
)
+ jt
hSubt
, (1.D.7)
w.r.t. LSubt
wSubt = LSubt
ηSub−1
cSubt , (1.D.8)
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1.D.3 The Optimization Problem and the FOCs of the
Entrepreneur
The utility function of the entrepreneur is:
max
be,t,he,t,LSaverst ,L
Sub
t
E0
∞∑
t=0
γt log(ce,t), (1.D.9)
where be,t is the borrowing of firms, he,t denotes their housing stock, Lt is the labor
of households, and ce,t denotes firms’ consumption.
The production function is:
Yt = hνe,t−1LSaverst
α(1−ν)
LSubt
(1−α)(1−ν)
, (1.D.10)
where ν denotes the housing share in the production function and the parameter α
controls for patient households’ labor share in the production function.
The entrepreneurs’ budget constraint is:
Yt
Xt
+ be,t = ce,t+ qt(he,t−he,t−1)+ Re,t−1
pit
be,t−1 +wSaverst LSaverst +wSubt LSubt , (1.D.11)
where Re,t−1 is the nominal interest rate on loans between period t-1 and t, and Xt is
the markup of final over intermediate goods.
Entrepreneurs face a borrowing constraint:
Re,tbe,t ≤ mEt(qt+1he,tpit+1). (1.D.12)
The FOCs of the entrepreneur are (denote by λe,t the Lagrangian multiplier on the
borrowing constraint):
w.r.t be,t
1
ce,t
= γEt
(
Re,t
ce,t+1pit+1
)
+ λe,tRe,t, (1.D.13)
w.r.t. he,t
qt
ce,t
= Et
[
γ
ce,t+1
(
ν
Yt+1
Xt+1he,t
+ qt+1
)
+ λe,tmqt+1pit+1
]
, (1.D.14)
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w.r.t. labor:
wSaverst =
α(1− µ− ν)Yt
XtLSaverst
, (1.D.15)
wSubt =
(1− α)(1− µ− ν)sYt
XtLSubt
. (1.D.16)
1.D.4 Retailers
Retailers acquire intermediate goods produced by the entrepreneurs at price Ptw,
then differentiate them into Yt(z) (retailers of mass 1 are indexed by z) and sell at
price Pt(z). The aggregate output index is given by:
Y ft =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(z)
ε−1
ε dz
) ε
ε−1
, (1.D.17)
where ε > 1. The price index is given by:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(z)1−ε dz
) 1
1−ε
. (1.D.18)
Retailers can change their sale price every period with probability 1− θ. A fraction
θ stays unchanged every period. The reset price of the retailer is denoted by P ∗t (z)
and Y ∗t+k(z) =
(
P ∗t (z)
Pt+k
)−ε
Yt+k is the corresponding demand.
The retailer maximizes the following equation:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
Λt,k
(
P ∗t (z)
Pt+k
− X
Xt+k
)
Y ∗t+k(z)
, (1.D.19)
where Λt,k = βk
(
cSaverst
cSavers
t+k
)
is the patient household relevant discount factor, Xt = PtPwt
is the markup of final over intermediate goods and X denotes the steady state value
of the markup.
The aggregate price level evolution is given by:
Pt = (θP 1−εt−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−ε)
1
1−ε . (1.D.20)
Combining the last two equations and log-linearizing leads to the following formulation
of a forward-looking Phillips curve
pit = βEt ˆpit+1 − κXˆt, (1.D.21)
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where κ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
and hatted variables denote percent deviations from the steady
state.
1.D.5 All Baseline Model Equations
1. Aggregate demand block
Yt = cSaverst + cSubt + ce,t + cb,t + cbb,t (1.D.22)
1
cb,t
= βbEt(
Rb,t
cb,t+1pit+1
) + (1− τχintb)Gt (1.D.23)
1
cb,t
= βbEt(
Re,t
cb,t+1pit+1
) + (1− τχfirm)Gt (1.D.24)
1
cb,t
= βbEt(
Rd,t
cb,t+1pit+1
) +Gt (1.D.25)
1
cSaverst
= βEt(
1
cSaverst+1 pit+1
)Rd,t (1.D.26)
1
ce,t
= γEt(
Re,t
ce,t+1pit+1
) + λe,tRe,t (1.D.27)
1
cSubt
= βSubEt(
(1− δs,t)Rs,t
cSubt+1pit+1
) + λSubt Rs,t (1.D.28)
1
cbb,t
= βbEt(
Rs,t(1− δs,t+1)
cbb,t+1pit+1
) + (1− τSubχSub)(1− δs)GGt (1.D.29)
1
cbb,t
= βbEt(
Rb,t
cbb,t+1pit+1
) +GGt (1.D.30)
2. Aggregate supply
Yt = hνe,t−1LSaverst
α(1−ν)
LSubt
(1−α)(1−ν) (1.D.31)
wSaverst =
α(1− µ− ν)Yt
XtLSaverst
(1.D.32)
wSubt =
(1− α)(1− µ− ν)sYt
XtLSubt
(1.D.33)
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pit = βEt ˆpit+1 − κXˆt (1.D.34)
3. Housing market block
1 = hSaverst + hSubt + he,t (1.D.35)
qt
cSaverst
= βEt(
qt+1
cSaverst+1
) + jt
hSaverst
(1.D.36)
qt
cSubt
= βSubEt(
qt+1
cSubt+1
+ λSubt mSubqt+1pit+1) +
jt
hSubt
(1.D.37)
qt
ce,t
= Et[
γ
ce,t+1
(ν Yt+1
Xt+1he,t
+ qt+1) + λe,tmqt+1pit+1] (1.D.38)
4.Borrowing constraints
Rs,tb
Sub
t = mSubEt(qt+1pit+1)hSubt (1.D.39)
Re,tbe,t = mEt(qt+1he,tpit+1). (1.D.40)
τ = bbt + be,t − dt
χIntbbbt + χFirmbe,t
(1.D.41)
τSub = (1− δs)b
Sub
t − bbt
χSub(1− δs)bSubt
(1.D.42)
δs,t = δs − φs,h(qt −Q) (1.D.43)
5. Budget constraints/ evolution of state variables
cSaverst + qt(hSaverst − hSaverst−1 ) + dt = Rd,t−1dt−1/pit + wSaverst LSaverst + Ft (1.D.44)
Yt
Xt
+ be,t = ce,t + qt(he,t−he,t−1) + Re,t−1
pit
be,t−1 +wSaverst LSaverst +wSubt LSubt (1.D.45)
cb,t +
Rd,t−1dt−1
pit
+ bbt + be,t = dt +
Rb,t−1bbt−1
pit
+ Re,t−1be,t−1
pit
, (1.D.46)
cbb,t + bSubt +Rb,t−1bbt−1/pit = bbt +Rs,t−1(1− δs,t)bSubt−1/pit (1.D.47)
6.Shock processes and monetary policy rule
ln jt = ρj ln jt−1 + εj,t, (1.D.48)
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Rd,t = (Rd,t−1)rREt(pi1+rpit−1 (
Yt−1
Y
)ry r¯r)1−rReεR,t . (1.D.49)
1.E The Option Characteristics of the Tranching
Problem
The payoffs of equity and senior tranche holders resemble payoffs from investment
in European options. A European option is a financial instrument that gives the
holder the right (but not the obligation) to buy (in case of a call option) or to sell (in
case of a put option) the underlying asset at a certain price (reference price, called
also strike) at a certain period in time (expiration date of the option). Buying a call
option or writing (selling) a put option, the economic agent bets on the increase of
the underlying asset price. By selling a call option (having a short call position) or
buying a put option (having a long put position), the investor bets on the fall in the
underlying asset price. The holder of an equity tranche of MBS gets payoffs equal
to the ones from a long put position - he invests in the hope that the default rate
(which can be interpreted as the underlying asset) will decrease. Also, investing in a
senior tranche of an MBS is profitable when the default rate decreases. Note that
Ps, t = min(St − fSt, St − δs,tSt) = St(1− f)−max(Stδs,t − fSt, 0) =
St(1− δs,t)−max(fSt − δs,tSt, 0). (1.E.50)
Thus, the payoff of the senior tranche can be rewritten as having a long position in the
face value of the tranche and a short call position, or a long position in the cash flows
from subprime loans and a short put. Notice that in the case of the equity tranche
and the senior tranche payoff, the face value of the MBS, St, can be factored out. The
underlying asset for the investors of MBS tranches is the default of subprime loans
δs,t, whereas the exercise price of the options they trade equals f (the attachment
point of senior tranche). Figure 1.21 visualizes the profit (on the vertical axis) of
investing in a short call and long put position depending on the default of subprime
loans (horizontal axis). The lower the default, the higher the profit of investors (or
the lower the loss).
After a shock, payoffs are realized and it is known whether the loss was bigger than
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Figure 1.21: Option position of MBS investors
the size of the equity tranche. Thus, the investors get a well-known proportion of
subprime cash-flows. However, while deciding about investing in the next period, they
take into account the expected future value of payoffs to evaluate the amount of money
they want to pay for the given tranche. Note that while evaluating the expected payoff
of tranches, Et(Losst) = Et(δs,t+1St+1) is unknown, because the default rate is a jump
variable. Thus, an appropriate expression for Et[min(St+1 − fSt+1, St − δs,t+1St+1)]
and Et[max(fSt+1 − δs,t+1St+1, 0)] is needed. As noted before, in both cases the
Et[St+1] can be factored out. However the uncertainty remains with respect to
the development of Et[δs,t+1]. One can use the Black-Scholes formula to evaluate
payoffs, but this requires certain assumptions that cannot be made here (stable
volatility of default rate, risk-free interest rate). There is a simple method to
smoothly approximate a function with a kink, like the ones drawn above. The logistic
function provides an approximation of maximum and minimum functions, which
makes the solution tractable.25 The maximum and minimum payoffs can be thus
approximated with a logistic function: Et[max(f − δs,t+1, 0)] ≈ Et[f − δs,t+1−f1+e(δs,t+1−f) ],
whereas Et[max(δs,t+1 − f, 0)] ≈ Et[−f − δs,t+1+f1+e(−δs,t+1+f) ]. Figure 1.22 provides a
visualization of the approximation by the logistics function. The solid line presents the
maximum function, while the dotted line its approximation. The x-axis corresponds
to different values of δ - subprimers’ default rate.
25Actually, the logistic function is used in one of the financial methods of estimating the value of
securitized products. In finance, apart from the Black-Scholes formula and copula methods for
option pricing, neural networks have been used to price options (that have a logistic function in
the solution) at least since the publication of Hutchinson et al. (1994).
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The maximum function and its logistics approximation (f=0.2)
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Figure 1.22: Logistics function as an approximation of the maximum function
Equation 1.E.50 shows three analogous representations of the payoff that goes to
senior tranche holders. From this representation, one can see that the minimum
function can be rewritten in such a way that only one approximation with the logistic
function has to be made to find the expected payoffs of both tranche holders (for
a long put). Having rewritten expected payoffs using the approximating function,
one can log-linearize the conditions determining the behavior of the price of MBS
tranches and consumption of the agents engaged in the transaction.
In what follows, I show that the solution of the model with the use of the logistics
function to approximate the maximum functions denoting investors’ payoffs yields
qualitatively the same results as the easier model presented in the main part of the
chapter, even though the approximation by the logistics function is not very exact
near the model’s steady state (δ = 0.05 presented by the vertical dashed green line
on the Figure 1.23).
To investigate whether the engagement of commercial banks in the securitization
process could be one of the factors amplifying the negative results of different shocks
in the economy, I consider two cases. In the first case, I assume that the generated
MBS tranches are bought by patient households (because they are more patient, they
acquire claims on the senior tranche) and entrepreneurs (because of their degree of
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The maximum function and its logistics approximation (f=0.2)
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Figure 1.23: Logistics function as an approximation of the maximum function
impatience, they are more prone to acquire claims on the equity tranche). In the
second case, I assume that the commercial bankers buy the senior tranche of MBS
and the entrepreneurs invest in the equity tranche (one could also assume that the
commercial bankers buy both the equity and the senior tranche, which would be
a more extreme case and would lead to quantitatively stronger results). In both
cases, subprime lenders retain a vertical fraction t of the issued security (equivalent
to retaining a percentage t of cash flows).26
1.E.1 First Version: Patient Households and Entrepreneurs
Invest in MBS Tranches
In the first version of the model with securitization of subprime loans, patient
households invest in the senior tranche, and entrepreneurs in the equity tranche.
The budget constraints of investors change and a new term describing investment
in the derivative security appears. First, denote the payoff of the senior tranche
26In general, the literature discusses three main types of retention: vertical slice retention, horizontal
slice retention, and an equivalent exposure of the securitized pool, discussed further in Geithner
(2011). In the present model’s case, vertical slice retention generates the same payoff for the bank
as equivalent exposure.
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Et[min(St+1−fSt+1, St+1−δs,t+1St+1)] as MBSs,t and the price of the senior tranche
by ps,t. Then, the budget constraint of the patient household is (remember that
subprime lenders retain portion t of every tranche):
cSaverst + qt(hSaverst − hSaverst−1 ) + dt + (1− t)ps,tMBSs,t =
Rd,t−1dt−1/pit + wSaverst LSaverst + Ft + (1− t)MBSs,t−1. (1.E.51)
In each period, the patient household gets revenue from investing in the senior tranche
and buys a claim on future proceedings from investment in MBS. The FOCs of prime
households do not change, but there is a new equation determining the price of the
new claim:
β
1
cSaverst+1
= ps,t
1
cSaverst
. (1.E.52)
Analogously, denote the terms describing the investment in the equity tranche
Et[max(fSt+1 − δs,t+1St+1, 0)] as MBSe,t and max(fSt − δs,tSt, 0) as MBSe,t−1 and
the price of the equity tranche by pe,t. Then, the budget constraint of the entrepreneur
is:
Yt
Xt
+ be,t + (1− t)MBSe,t−1 =
ce,t + qt(he,t−he,t−1) + Re,t−1
pit
be,t−1 +wSaverst LSaverst +wSubt LSubt + (1− t)pe,tMBSe,t.
(1.E.53)
The FOC w.r.t to the new claim is:
γ
1
ce,t+1
= pe,t
1
ce,t
. (1.E.54)
The long-put approximation is given by the logistics function:
Pt = Et[max(f − δs,t+1, 0)] ≈ Et[f − δs,t+1 − f1 + e(δs,t+1−f) ] (1.E.55)
Along with the optimization problems of agents investing in the security, the
problem of subprime lenders also changes in the wake of securitization of subprime
loans. They have now to include only the retained proportion of subprime loans in
66
1.E The Option Characteristics of the Tranching Problem
their balance sheet:
Assets Liabilities
Loans to subprime borrowers: tbSubt Interbank deposits bbt
Loss reserve −tδsbSubt
Thus, a Basel-type capital requirement, given exogenously, is now given by:
τSub ≤ t(1− δs)b
Sub
t − bbt
χSubt(1− δs)bSubt
. (1.E.56)
The budget constraint of subprime lenders changes. Note that when it comes to
the transfer of already realized cashflows, it holds that:
(1−t)[min(St−fSt, St−δs,tSt)+max(fSt−δs,tSt, 0)] = (1−t)[St(1−δs,t)] = (1−t)[Rs,t−1bSubt−1(1−
δs,t)/pit].Yet, in the case of claims purchases on future proceedings, this shortcut cannot
be made because the prices of both tranches differ, since the agents that buy them
have different discount factors. Thus, the budget constraint of the subprime lender is:
cbb,t + bSubt +Rb,t−1bbt−1/pit − (1− t)[ps,tMBSs,t + pe,tMBSe,t] =
bbt + tRs,t−1(1− δs,t)bSubt−1/pit. (1.E.57)
The prices of the tranches are determined by equations 1.F.66 and 1.F.62.
1.E.2 Second Version: Commercial Bankers and Entrepreneurs
Invest in MBS Tranches
In the second version of the model with securitization, commercial bankers invest
in the senior tranche, whereas entrepreneurs, as in the first case, buy claims on the
equity tranche. The problem of the entrepreneurs does not change with respect
to the version of the model when patient households and entrepreneurs buy MBS
tranches. The budget constraint of commercial bankers changes, as well as their
balance sheet and capital requirement. I assume here that the risk weight on the
senior tranche is as high as in the case of interbank deposits (since it is highly rated),
whereas the risk weight on the equity tranche equals the risk weight of subprime loans.
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The commercial bankers’ balance sheet is:
Assets Liabilities
Interbank loans : bbt Deposits dt
Loans to entrepreneurs: be,t Equity eqt
MBS security - senior tranche: (1− t)MBSs,t
Thus, a Basel-type capital requirement, given exogenously, has the form:
τ ≤ bbt + be,t + (1− t)MBSs,t − dt
χIntbbbt + χFirmbe,t + χInt(1− t)MBSs,t . (1.E.58)
The budget constraint of commercial bankers is now:
cb,t +Rd,t−1dt−1/pit + bbt + be,t + (1− t)ps,tMBSs,t =
dt +Rb,t−1bbt−1/pit +Re,t−1be,t−1/pit + (1− t)MBSs,t−1. (1.E.59)
New FOC:
w.r.t. MBSs,t
βb
1
cb,t+1
= ps,t
1
cb,t
+ (1− τχInt)Gt. (1.E.60)
The problem of subprime lender is analogous to the case where patient households
and entrepreneurs buy MBS tranches.
1.E.3 Results
For calibration, it is assumed that the attachment point f = 0.2. The attachment
point of the senior tranche corresponds to the data average (Hull and White, 2010).
Figure 1.24 shows the results of the baseline model (blue solid line) and the two
models with securitization in which different agents buy MBS tranches (green dashed
line - entrepreneurs buy the equity tranche, patient households buy the senior tranche;
red dotted-dashed line - entrepreneurs buy the equity tranche, commercial bankers
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Figure 1.24: Impulse responses of model versions with and without securitization,
monetary shock
buy the senior tranche) after the monetary shock, and Figure 1.25 shows the impulse
response functions of chosen variables after the preference shock. The slightly different
solution method from the one presented in the main part of the chapter does not
affect qualitatively the results: when commercial bankers engage in the acquisition of
MBS, the securitization has an amplifying effect on business cycles, while when only
non-financial agents in the economy buy MBS tranches, the securitization dampens
the response of lending and output to contractionary shocks.
1.F Three Versions of the Model with Securitization
1.F.1 First Version: Entrepreneurs Invest in MBS Tranches
In the first version of the model with securitization of subprime loans, entrepreneurs
buy both the senior tranche and the equity tranche.
The budget constraint of investors changes and a new term describing investment
in the derivative security appears. First, denote the payoff from the investment
(St+1 − δs,t+1St+1) as MBSe,t and the price of tranches by pe,t. Then, the budget
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Figure 1.25: Impulse responses of model versions with and without securitization,
preference shock
constraint of the entrepreneur is (remember that subprime lenders retain portion t of
every tranche):
Yt
Xt
+ be,t + (1− t)MBSe,t−1 =
ce,t + qt(he,t−he,t−1) + Re,t−1
pit
be,t−1 +wSaverst LSaverst +wSubt LSubt + (1− t)pe,tMBSe,t.
(1.F.61)
The FOC w.r.t to the new claim is:
γ
1
ce,t+1
= pe,t
1
ce,t
. (1.F.62)
Along with the optimization problems of agents investing in the security, the problem
of subprime lenders also changes in the wake of securitization of subprime loans.
They have now to include only the retained proportion of subprime loans in their
balance sheet:
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Assets Liabilities
Loans to subprime borrowers: tbSubt Interbank deposits bbt
Loss reserve −tδsbSubt
Thus, a Basel-type capital requirement, given exogenously, is now given by:
τSub ≤ t(1− δs)b
Sub
t − bbt
χSubt(1− δs)bSubt
. (1.F.63)
The budget constraint of subprime lenders changes. Recall that when it comes to
the transfer of already realized cash-flows, it holds that:
(1−t)[min(St−fSt, St−δs,tSt)+max(fSt−δs,tSt, 0)] = (1−t)[St(1−δs,t)] = (1−t)[Rs,t−1bSubt−1(1−
δs,t)/pit]. The budget constraint of the subprime lender is:
cbb,t + bSubt + Rb,t−1bbt−1/pit − (1 − t)pe,tMBSe,t = bbt + tRs,t−1(1 − δs,t)bSubt−1/pit.
(1.F.64)
The price of the tranches is determined by equations 1.F.62.
1.F.2 Second Version: Patient Households Invest in MBS
Tranches
Analogous to the problem described in the previous subsection, when patient
households acquire MBS claims, their budget constraint changes. First, denote the
payoff from the investment (St+1 − δs,t+1St+1) as MBSs,t and the price of tranches
by ps,t. Then the budget constraint of the patient households looks as follows:
cSaverst + qt(hSaverst − hSaverst−1 ) + dt + (1− t)ps,tMBSs,t =
Rd,t−1dt−1/pit + wSaverst LSaverst + Ft + (1− t)MBSs,t−1. (1.F.65)
In each period, the patient household gets revenue from investing in the senior tranche
and buys a claim on future proceedings from investment in MBS. The FOCs of prime
households do not change, but there is a new equation determining the price of the
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new claim:
β
1
cSaverst+1
= ps,t
1
cSaverst
. (1.F.66)
The problem of the subprime lender is analogous to the case where entrepreneurs
buy MBS tranches.
1.F.3 Third Version: Commercial Bankers Invest in MBS
Tranches
In the third version of the model with securitization, commercial bankers invest in
subprime loan proceeds. The budget constraint of commercial bankers changes, as
well as their balance sheet and capital requirement. I assume here that the risk weight
on both tranches in this version of the model is as high as in the case of interbank
deposits, reflecting the fact that securitized assets were highly rated.
In this case, the payoff from the investment (St+1 − δs,t+1St+1) is denoted MBSs,t
and the price of tranches by pb,t
The commercial bankers’ balance sheet is:
Assets Liabilities
Interbank loans : bbt Deposits dt
Loans to entrepreneurs: be,t Equity eqt
MBS security: (1− t)MBSs,t
Thus, a Basel-type capital requirement, given exogenously, has the form:
τ ≤ bbt + be,t + (1− t)MBSs,t − dt
χIntbbbt + χFirmbe,t + χInt(1− t)MBSs,t . (1.F.67)
The budget constraint of commercial bankers is now:
cb,t +Rd,t−1dt−1/pit + bbt + be,t + (1− t)pb,tMBSs,t =
dt +Rb,t−1bbt−1/pit +Re,t−1be,t−1/pit + (1− t)MBSs,t−1. (1.F.68)
New FOC:
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w.r.t. MBSs,t
βb
1
cb,t+1
= pb,t
1
cb,t
+ (1− τχInt)Gt. (1.F.69)
The problem of the subprime lender is analogous to the case where entrepreneurs
and patient households buy MBS tranches.
1.G Extension: Impatient Prime Borrowers
Impatient prime borrowers consume, work and demand real estate.
They maximize a lifetime utility function given by
max
bPrimet ,h
Prime
t ,L
Prime
t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βPrime
t(log cPrimet + jPrimet log hPrimet −
LPrimet
ηPrime
ηPrime
)
(1.G.70)
The budget constraint of the impatient household looks as follows:
cPrimet +qt(hPrimet −hPrimet−1 )+1/T
T∑
j=1
RT,t−jbPrimeT,t−j∏j−1
i=0 pit−i
= bPrimeT,t +w
Prime
t L
Prime
t , (1.G.71)
where bT,t is a loan contract with maturity T purchased at time t.
The setup differs from the Iacoviello (2005) version, because it is assumed that
impatient prime households have access to more than one-period loans.27 Their
borrowing in period t depends on the expected value of housing in period t+T and
the amount of outstanding debt. Figure 4 shows an example of loan installments in
this setup for T=2, two-period contracts (in nominal terms). Total interest cost is
due in equal fractions in every period ( as in Calza et al. (2013)). This assumption
aims to capture the characteristics of a prime mortgage contract in the U.S., which is
characterized by a fixed interest rate over a longer time period. It also distinguishes
27This issue has been addressed by Calza et al. (2013) who show that the variable-rate mortgage
structure magnifies the responses of consumption and residential investment to monetary policy
shock, whereas a contract in which the rate is fixed for T=2 periods dampens the impulse response
of considered variables. Unlike in Calza et al. (2013), in the present model, borrowing in each
period depends not only on the future value of housing prices, but also on the outstanding debt
from previous periods.
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Figure 1.26: Installment payments of the prime borrower in the case of two-period
contracts (in nominal terms)
prime borrowers from subprime ones who have only access to short-term, one-period
loans.
They face a borrowing constraint (household commits to repay debt at time t+ T ):
RT,tb
Prime
T,t ≤ mPrimeEt(qt+T )hPrimet+T−1
T∏
j=1
pit+j − 1/T
T−1∑
j=1
RT,t−jbPrimeT,t−j∏j−1
i=0 pit−i
, (1.G.72)
The FOCs are (λPrimet is the Lagrangian multiplier on the borrowing constraint):
w.r.t. bPrimet
1
cPrimet
= Et(1/T
T∑
j=1
βPrime
j RT,t
cPrimet+j
∏j−1
i=0 pit+1−i
)+
λPrimet RT,t + Et(1/T
T−1∑
j=1
λPrimet+j β
Primej RT,t∏j−1
i=0 pit+1−i
), (1.G.73)
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w.r.t. hPrimet
qt
cPrimet
= Et(βPrime
qt+1
cPrimet+1
+ βPrime1−TλPrimet+1−TmPrimeqt+1
T−1∏
i=0
pit+1−i) +
jt
hPrimet
,
(1.G.74)
w.r.t. LPrimet
w′′t = LPrimet
ηPrime−1
cPrimet , (1.G.75)
w.r.t.λPrimet
Rtb
Prime
t = mPrimeEt(qt+1
T∏
j=1
pit+j)hPrimet − 1/T
T−1∑
j=1
RT,t−jbPrimeT,t−j∏j−1
i=0 pit−i
. (1.G.76)
For computation of the extended version, I assume that impatient prime borrowers
differ from impatient borrowers in the following characteristics: their LTV ratio
is lower (mPrime = 0.75), they have access to 4-period loans, the risk-weight on
their loans is lower than for subprime loans (χPrime = 0.5), and they borrow from
commercial bankers.
As stated in the main part of the chapter, the existence of prime borrowers does
not change the conclusions from the model. The output response, presented in
Figure 1.27, is less negative in the case where bankers invest in MBS compared to
the baseline model without prime borrowers, because in this version of the model
subprime borrowers constitute only a subsection of households’ borrowing.
The logic behind the contraction of balance sheets applies also to the extended
model, both for the preference and the monetary shock, presented respectively in
Figure 1.28 and 1.29. Apart from the effect of securititzation on entrepreneurial
borrowing and housing stock, in the model with prime borrowers, we observe also
changes in prime borrowers’ housing and borrowing responses.
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Figure 1.27: Output responses of model versions with and without securitization
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Figure 1.28: Impulse responses of model versions with and without securitization
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Figure 1.29: Impulse responses of model versions with and without securitization
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Chapter2
House Prices, Credit and Monetary Policy
in the U.S. and the U.K.
2.1 Introduction
The Great Recession after the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 dramatically demon-
strated the importance of credit markets for economic developments. The notion that
this crisis was triggered by turmoil in the market for U.S. housing debt, especially
subprime mortgage loans, and the long-run empirical evidence on the relationship
between booms in real house prices and financial crises (see Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009), ask for a joint analysis of developments in the credit and the housing market.
The large credit growth observed in the decade preceding the crisis was accompanied
by rising house prices in the United States. When the house prices began to drop in
2005 and 2006, credit growth stalled and ouput began to fall. In the U.S., regulation
and tax changes were designed to increase the homeownership rate among U.S. citizens
(see Temkin, Johnson, and Levy, 2002) and, along with the rising house prices which
raised the value of loan collateral, contributed to a very large credit volume in the U.S.
The combination of the recent experience of the crisis together with the long history
of housing bubbles and financial crises, leads to a reconsideration of possible policy
interventions. From the perspective of a policy-maker, it is especially important to
know how different measures available to intervene in the market for housing credit
differ in their effectiveness and in their consequences for the broader economy. In this
chapter, we analyze the effects of two possible measures: a contractionary monetary
policy shock and a negative credit supply shock, resulting from a decrease of the
admitted loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for borrowers, which can be a measure from the
set of macroprudential policies.
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For our analysis, we estimate a vector autoregressive model (VAR). We identify
the two structural shocks by imposing sign-restrictions on the impulse response
functions as proposed by Uhlig (2005). The sign restrictions are derived from a
structural dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We use the model
by Iacoviello (2005), which is a natural starting point, as it delivers a straightforward
and empirically plausible relation of credit and house prices. The model reflects
important features of real world credit markets as houses are used as collateral for
loans to households and entrepreneurs in the economy. We take this model, which
has already a monetary shock built in, and add to the model a credit shock, defined
as an exogeneous decrease in the LTV ratio for residential housing. We run the
model for admissible parameter values and use the resulting impulse responses to
generate sign restrictions for certain variables. Given these restrictions, we use the
structural VAR model estimated with U.S. und U.K. data to analyze the effects of
the considered shocks on house prices which are not robustly clear from the DSGE
model. We use data from the U.S. because of the importance of its credit market in
the global financial crisis. We focus also on the U.K. due to the ongoing debate about
macroprudential measures in that country and the establishment of the Financial
Policy Committee dealing with regulation and macroprudential policy as a part of
the Bank of England in 2011. Moreover, having identified monetary and credit shocks
in our model, we want to investigate the role of these shocks in the development of
house prices and output. We find that a negative monetary shock leads to a clear
and persistent decline in house prices, while the impact of a negative credit shock
on house prices remains unclear for U.S. data. For the U.K., we find a short-term
decline of house prices after a negative credit shock.
Of course, we are not the first who examine the effects of a credit shock to the
economy in a VAR setup. However, our analysis with its joint focus on credit and
house prices in combination with the use of sign restrictions derived directly from a
structural DSGE model, has (to our knowledge) not been done before. Moreover we
focus on the housing and residential mortgage market, not the total credit value or
the corporate credit market, which is often done in other studies. Thus, our main
contribution is the analysis of the effectiveness of different policy measures aimed at
influencing the house price dynamics in an economy in which housing purchases are
mainly financed through credit. We find it particularly interesting to examine the
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effects of monetary and macroprudential policies in mitigating house price growth in
the U.S and the U.K. Which measure seems to be more effective in influencing house
prices - changing the policy interest rate or altering the credit supply by introducing
caps on the LTV ratio? Which of these two policies would have longer lasting effects?
And are there differences in the effect on output in the economy after each of the
two shocks? These are all important questions because several countries in the world
experience house price booms that may not end up in a global crisis as the recent
downturn in the housing market in the U.S., but may still have severe consequences
for the economies of the affected countries. Using datasets for two different countries
enables us a comparison of the results in the context of differences in their mortgage
and financial markets.
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section,
Section 2.2, briefly discusses the related literature. Section 2.3 outlines the employed
estimation procedure and the data used in our analysis. In Section 2.4, we derive
the sign restrictions used to generate our results, which in turn are presented in
Section 2.5. We conclude with Section 2.6.
2.2 Related Literature
Naturally, the events of the Global Financial Crisis amplified the attention of
economic researchers on subjects related to credit and housing. As Jordà, Schularick,
and Taylor (2014) note, p. 1: “to say that the recent crisis and its aftermath has led to
a reassessment of the importance of the housing finance for the macroeconomy would
be a distinct understatement.” The Great Recession of 2007-2009 that had its roots in
the subprime credit market in the U.S. again drew researchers’ attention towards the
role of credit markets in generating business cycles, as well as towards the importance
of financial regulation and macroprudential policies. Recent empirical studies like
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) provide a long-run perspective on the empirical historical
evidence. Schularick and Taylor (2012) observe that the previously stable relationship
between money and credit growth broke down after the Great Depression and that
credit growth can be a good predictor of financial crises.
Also the modern macroeconomic literature has studied the role of credit in the
economy. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) deal with the credit channel of monetary
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transmission. In their seminal paper, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) examine the role of
collateral constraints that lead to the amplification and higher persistence of shocks.
The financial accelerator model by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) also shows
the propagation effect of credit for shocks in the economy. In light of the Global
Financial Crisis, Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Dedola and Lombardo (2012)
among others extend these approaches to open economy models and investigate the
international propagation of financial shocks, while Kollmann, Enders, and Müller
(2011) look at the effect of capital constraints for lending by an international bank in
a macroeconomic model.
2.2.1 VAR Studies on Credit Shocks
There are several VAR studies examining the effects of credit shocks in the economy.
Many of them investigate the role of credit shocks in the U.S. for the developments
in the rest of the world. This is often done in a panel VAR framework. An example
of such a study is Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) who perform an analysis for 17
industrialized countries in the period from 1973 to 2006. They include six variables
in their VAR (GDP, CPI, short-term nominal interest rate, nominal house prices,
nominal broad money, and nominal bank credit to the private sector) and identify the
system by using a Cholesky decomposition, ordering the variables as stated before.
Their main finding is that the effects of monetary and credit shocks on house prices are
stronger when house prices are booming. They also refer to macroprudential policy,
providing a descriptive analysis of LTV ratios in different countries. Assenmacher-
Wesche and Gerlach (2008) perform a panel VAR study for 17 countries by identifying
the system with a Cholesky decomposition and using data from 1986 to 2006 and six
variables: consumer prices, real GDP, credit, three-month interest rates, residential
property prices, and equity prices. They find that credit shocks do not have a large
impact on property prices and that there is only weak evidence on the effects of U.S.
credit shocks in other countries. These two papers are interesting from our point
of view because they investigate the effects of a credit shock in a model with house
prices. However, the authors use a Cholesky decomposition for identification, while
we prefer to use sign-restrictions to generate interpretable structural shocks. In the
case of the following papers, the opposite is the case. The methodology used by the
authors is similar to ours, because they identify the VAR system by imposing sign
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restrictions, but their estimations do not include house prices which are, in our view,
an important factor that should be included in the analysis.
Eickmeier and Ng (2015) perform a VAR study for 33 countries in the period
from 1983 to 2009, using real and financial variables like GDP, inflation, short term
interest rates, government and corporate bond yields, credit volume, equity prices
and exchange rates. A credit supply shock is defined as an exogenous change causing
a fall in output and credit volume, as well as a fall in credit volume to GDP, a rise
in the credit interest rate, and the credit spreads. Their analysis of international
economic linkages and the international propagation of credit supply shocks shows
that negative U.S. credit supply shocks have stronger negative effects on domestic
and foreign GDP, compared to credit supply shocks from the euro area and Japan.
Domestic and foreign credit, as well as equity markets exhibit significant responses
to the credit supply shocks.
Hristov, Hülsewig, and Wollmershäuser (2012) perform a panel VAR analysis for
eleven eurozone countries for the period from 2003 to 2010, taking into account
five variables: GDP, price level, loan volume, loan rate, short-term interest rate.
Their approach is most similar to ours, because, before imposing sign restrictions,
the authors examine results of different DSGE models. However, not all models
considered by the authors deliver the same sign restrictions so ultimately the decision
about imposed conditions is not derived systematically from any model, as opposed
to our study. The authors identify four out of five shocks in the system, defining
a credit supply shock as a shock causing a fall in real GDP, the money market
rate, the loan volume, and a rise in the loan rate. The effect of the credit supply
shock on the inflation rate that has been left unrestricted is unclear. The variance
decomposition shows that the credit supply shock played an important role in output
growth during the recent crisis, however, there are big differences among particular
eurozone countries.
Helbling, Huidrom, Kose, and Otrok (2011) also investigate the effects of credit
supply shocks in a global study, concentrating on global business cycles and the
importance of the shocks originating in the U.S. They perform a VAR and a FAVAR
analysis and their dataset includes quarterly series of credit, credit spread (measured
by the yield difference on corporate bonds), default rate (on corporate speculative
bonds), GDP, labor productivity, inflation, and the interest rates of the G-7 countries
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for the period from 1988 to 2009. The credit shock is identified as an exogenous
disturbance leading to a decrease in credit and an increase in credit spreads, the
authors also assume that productivity does not fall and the default rates do not
rise. The results show that while the effects of credit supply shocks are generally not
significant, they played an important role during the Great Recession.
2.2.2 Macroprudential Literature
Another strand of the economic literature considers different measures which can
help prevent or alleviate housing bubbles. This is mainly research conducted by
international organizations, such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund) or the BIS
(Bank of International Settlements) that consider the effectiveness of macroprudential
policies as opposite or complementary to monetary policy tools. Macroprudential
instruments are implemented in order to reduce the systemic risk that might endanger
the whole financial system. They include regulations on bank capital in the form of
capital requirements, ceilings on the LTV ratios or the debt-to-income ratios and
limits on borrowing in foreign currency.
In the wake of the crisis, some institutions suggested introducing stronger macro-
prudential policies (see IMF, 2011). Among the proposed measures there is a cap on
the loan-to-value ratio for residential mortgages. The historical experience of Asian
economies that implemented this macroprudential measure suggests that introducing
limits on the LTV ratios leads to subdued house price growth and lower sensitivity of
delinquency rates to house prices (see Wong, Fong, fai Li, and Choi, 2011). However,
no such data is available for advanced economies.
The survey paper of Lim et al. (2011) shows that the effectiveness of macroprudential
measures does not depend on the stage of economic development of a given country.
Noticing that the use of macroprudential policies is at the centre of policy debate,
Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2011) build in two macroprudential measures into
the macroeconomic model of Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010) which in
turn is strongly based on Iacoviello (2005). They consider countercyclical capital
requirements and changes in the LTV ratios that adjust to the economic situation.
The authors discuss the impact of monetary and macroprudential policies in an
economy, considering two cases - in the first case the authorities cooperate minimizing
a common loss function, in the second they do not cooperate, minimizing their own
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loss functions. The results show that in normal times macroprudential policies do
not contribute much to the stabilization in the economy and may be in conflict with
monetary polices. Yet when a financial shock occurs, macroprudential policies become
an important factor in stabilizing the economy. The authors do not discuss the effects
of a credit shock in the economy.
Crowe, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Rabanal (2011) discuss different possibilities of
preventing house price booms in the economy (fiscal policy, monetary policy, macro-
prudential tools) and include an LTV shock in a DSGE model. Unlike Iacoviello
(2005) they find that including house prices in the Taylor rule of the central bank
may increase the welfare of the economy’s population. They also find that using
taxation to reduce house-price volatility has only minor effects on the economy and
is less effective than other policy tools. The LTV ratio shock temporarily reduces
house prices and leads to a permanent decline in the credit volume. Countercyclical
changes in the LTV ratio are found to be beneficial for the economy, and they should
rather react to credit growth than house price developments. The authors conclude
that the macroprudential measures are the best way to curb real estate prices and
leverage.
2.3 Estimation and Data
A VAR model is given by:
yt = µ+B(1)yt−1 +B(2)yt−2 + ...+B(p)yt−p + ut, (2.3.1)
where yt is a k × 1 vector of observations in period t. Correspondingly, yt−1 to yt−p
are vectors of the same k variables in the p periods before t. B(1) to B(p) denote k× k
matrices of coefficients and µ is a vector of constants. ut is the k×1 vector of the one-
step ahead prediction errors of the reduced form VAR model. The variance-covariance
matrix of ut is given by the k × k matrix Σ = E [utu′t].
To obtain shocks to the system that have a structural interpretation, one has to
find the matrix A in the equation
ut = Avt, (2.3.2)
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which relates the reduced form errors to the vector of structural shocks vt, with
E [vtv′t] = Ik. While there are other approaches which directly impose restrictions
on the matrix A to identify the structural shocks, we employ the approach by Uhlig
(2005) that identifies a structural shock by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse-
response functions of selected variables for a specified number of periods. To do so,
we construct a large number of potential A matrices and check for each of them
whether the resulting impulse-response functions fulfill the sign restrictions (outlined
below) or not. The candidate matrices that pass this test are stored, while the others
are discarded.
In our analysis we want to investigate the effects of two structural shocks: a
negative credit shock and a contractionary monetary policy shock. To identify these
two orthogonal shocks, we follow Mountford and Uhlig (2009) who explain that one
has to identify a sub-matrix of A with a rank equal to the number of structural
shocks one wants to identify. The matrix A has to satisfy AA′ = Σ and the identified
sub-matrix can be written as
[
a(1), a(2)
]
= A˜
[
q(1), q(2)
]
. (2.3.3)
a(1) and a(2) are the k × 1 impulse vectors of the two identified shocks. They are
given by the product of A˜, which is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of Σ, and
q(1) and q(2), which are the first two columns of a k × k matrix Q that consists of
orthonormal columns.
As Uhlig (2005), we estimate the VAR with Bayesian methods using a Normal-
Wishart prior. We use the algorithm described by Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and
Zha (2010) to implement the sign-restrictions: We take a draw of the coefficients
of the matrix B and the variance-covariance matrix Σ from the Normal-Wishart
posterior. To obtain Q in equation (2.3.3) we draw an arbitrary k × k matrix X
with independent standard normal elements and use the QR-decomposition of X
to get a Q satisfying QQ′ = I and QR = X. Given Q and the draw of Σ we can
construct impulse vectors according to equation (2.3.3). If the impulse response
functions implied by the impulse vectors fulfill all imposed sign restrictions, the draws
are kept. In total, we collect 5000 draws that are consistent with our specification of
the restrictions. The VAR for the U.S. is estimated including a constant, a trend and
two lags of the variables. We choose the lags consistent with the indications of the
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Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The
VAR for the U.K. is estimated including one lag of the variables.1
For our analysis of the U.S. we employ data from the FRED (Federal Reserve
Economic Data) database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The house prices
are given by the index data (USSTHPI) provided by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency.2 We use quarterly series starting in the first quarter of 1987 to make the
sample length equal to the one used for the U.K.3 The sample includes the subprime
mortgage crisis and ends with the fourth quarter of 2013.4 In our estimation, we use six
variables: the real gross domestic product (GDPC1), real consumption (PCECC96),
inflation (calculated on the basis of the GDP deflator GDPDEF), the federal funds
rate (FEDFUNDS), house prices and outstanding mortgage loans (REALLN). We
take the natural logarithm of real GDP, real consumption, deflated mortgage loans
and the deflated house price index. All data apart from the house prices and the
federal funds rate is seasonally adjusted. Figure 2.1 shows the time series of the six
variables over the considered period.
In the case of the U.K., we use the following data sources. The house price index
is the Nationwide series for all U.K. houses. The nominal interest rate is the end of
quarter official bank rate (IUQLBEDR) of the Bank of England. The data source for
GDP and the GDP deflator are the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the
International Monetary Fund. The lending data is provided by the Bank of England
(LPQB3SE). The series provides information on the quarterly amounts outstanding
of monetary financial institutions’ sterling net secured lending to individuals and
housing associations. The data for U.K. households’ consumption is provided by
1Another possibility suggested by the information criteria would be to estimate a model with four
lags. We did this excercise too and our conclusions do not change.
2Another source for house price data in the U.S. is the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price in-
dex. The USSTHPI index includes valuations from conforming conventional mortgages
provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and refinance appraisals as well, while the
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price index includes purchase prices and uses information from
county assessor and recorder offices, see http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/
Housing-Price-Index-Frequently-Asked-Questions.aspx. To make sure that our results do
not depend on the house price data we use, we repeat our analysis using the S&P/Case-Shiller
Home Price index. Since the correlation of the series is around 99% over the considered period, our
results are robust to this change.
3The lending data for the U.K. starts in the first quarter of 1987.
4Our sample includes the zero lower bound period that started in the U.S. in December 2008. We
do a robustness check and perform our analysis also for the period until the 4th quarter of 2008.
Our main conclusions remain the same.
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Notes: Data Sources: FRED and Federal Housing Finance Agency. The series of real GDP,
deflated house price index, deflated loans backed by real estate and real consumption show the
logarithm of the variables.
Figure 2.1: U.S. data series used in the analysis
Eurostat (namq gdp c). The data is seasonally adjusted and the nominal series are
deflated with the GDP deflator (GDP, consumption, house price index and lending
backed by mortages). Figure 2.2 shows the time series of the six variables over the
considered period. There is a striking similarity between the charts for the U.S. and
U.K. data, and the data series seem to follow the same patterns.
2.4 Establishing Sign Restrictions
To identify the structural shocks for our analysis, we have to establish sign restric-
tions that we impose on the impulse response functions. The restrictions should be
uncontroversial in order to generate reliable results. We identify the two structural
shocks of interest by using the impulse response functions from a dynamic stochastic
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deflated GDP, deflated house price index, deflated loans backed by mortgages and deflated
consumption show the logarithm of the variables.
Figure 2.2: U.K. data series used in the analysis
general equilibrium (DSGE) model in order to pin down robust sign restrictions. This
approach is also used for example by Enders, Müller, and Scholl (2011), who study
the effect of fiscal and technology shocks on the real exchange rate in the U.S. The
DSGE-model that forms the basis of our analysis is the model by Iacoviello (2005).
In the following, we briefly outline the model by Iacoviello (2005) which is a New-
Keynesian monetary business cycle model that includes nominal loans and collateral
constraints tied to housing values. The model includes patient households, impatient
households and entrepreneurs. Both, the impatient households (by definition) and
the entrepreneurs are assumed to discount future consumption more heavily than
the patient households. Consequently, in equilibrium they both borrow from the
patient households. Borrowing is limited by a collateral constraint which relates
the maximum amount borrowed to the stock of housing held by the borrower. If
borrowers repudiate their debt obligations, lenders can repossess the borrowers’ assets
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by paying a proportional transaction cost, equal to (1−m) times the present value
of the assets. Thus, lenders will make the amount of loans depend on the parameter
m, which can be interpreted as the LTV ratio. Households have higher LTV ratios
than entrepreneurs, which reflects the different riskiness of loans to the two types
of agents. Output is produced by the entrepreneurs using labor provided by the
households, capital, and the housing stock. Monetary policy is conducted by the
central bank which sets the interest rate according to a policy rule responding to
output and inflation. Iacoviello (2005) considers four different shocks to the model
economy. An inflation shock, a technology shock, a monetary shock and a shock
changing the preferences for housing. In addition to these four shocks, we define a
(negative) credit shock as an exogenous decrease in the allowed loan-to-value ratio
for the households.
In Iacoviello (2005), the impatient households face a collateral constraint given by:
Rtb
′′
t = m′′Et(qt+1h′′t pit+1), (2.4.1)
where Rt denotes the interest rate paid on loans, b′′t is the borrowing of the households,
Et is the expectation operator, qt denotes the house price, h′′t the housing stock of
impatient households, pit the inflation rate, and the parameter m is a fixed LTV
ratio. Entrepreneurs face a similar collateral constraint, but since we are interested
in residential housing,5 we consider only a shock to the LTV ratio of impatient
households. We assume that the households’ LTV ratio follows an autoregressive
process given by:
m′′t = ρm′′m′′t−1 − em′′,t, (2.4.2)
where ρm′′ describes the autocorrelation of the LTV ratio and em′′,t is an i.i.d. random
innovation.
5We focus on the residential mortgages, which account for around 80% of all outstanding mortgages
backed by real estate in the U.S. in the considered time period. Moreover, as the IMF (2009), p. 26,
reports, residential properties’ real estate prices experienced a more accentuated boom than that
of commercial properties, whose prices only followed the developments on the residential property
market.
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2.4.1 Simulation for the U.S.
To be more confident about the robustness of the sign restrictions implied by the
model, we follow Enders et al. (2011) who consider intervals of possible values for the
different parameters of the model.6 Table 2.1 shows the parameters of the Iacoviello
(2005) model and the intervals we admit for each of them in the U.S. case. The model
we use is exactly the model of Iacoviello (2005).
Parameter Range Source/Target
β discount factor - patient HHs [0.99, 0.9925] Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
β′′ discount factor - impatient HHs [0.95, 0.97] Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
γ discount factor - entrepreneurs [0.975, 0.98] Iacoviello (2005)
δ capital depreciation rate [0.015, 0.03] Dueker et al. (2007)
µ capital share in prod. function [0.3, 0.35] Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
ν housing share in prod. function [0.03, 0.05] Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello (2013)
m LTV ratio for entrepreneurs [0.85, 0.9] Iacoviello (2005)
m′′ LTV ratio for HHs [0.55, 0.7] Iacoviello (2005)
α patient HHs’ wage share [0.64, 0.88] Iacoviello (2005), Jappelli (1990b)
θ probability fixed price [0.55, 0.75] Enders et al. (2011), Iacoviello (2005)
ψ capital adjustment costs [1, 6] Smets and Wouters (2007)
X steady state gross markup [1.01, 1.15] Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
η′ labor supply aversion p. HHs [1.01, 2] Iacoviello (2005)
η′′ labor supply aversion imp. HHs [1.01, 2] Iacoviello (2005)
J’ weight on housing - p. HHs [0.08, 0.12] Iacoviello (2013), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
J” weight on housing - imp. HHs [0.08, 0.12] Iacoviello (2013), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
ρm′′ autocorr. of LTV shock [0.95, 0.99] high shock persistence
ρu autocorr. of inflationary shock [0.85, 0.95] high shock persistence
ρj autocorr. of preference shock [0.85, 0.95] high shock persistence
ρa autocorr. of technology shock [0.85, 0.95] high shock persistence
ρpi weight of policy resp.. to inflation [0.2, 0.8] Clarida et al. (1999), Orphanides (2004)
ρr weight of policy resp. to int.rate [0.7, 0.8] Iacoviello (2005), Clarida et al. (1999)
ρy weight of policy resp. to output [0.1, 0.2] Iacoviello (2005), Clarida et al. (1999)
Notes: All parameter definitions but the LTV-Shock refer directly to the original model by
Iacoviello (2005). HHs = households.
Table 2.1: Admitted intervals for model parameters in the U.S. case
The values of the discount factors of the different agents ensure that the patient
households have the highest discount factor, and the impatient households the lowest.
The discount factor of entrepreneurs is chosen to be smaller than that of the patient
6As we consider the entire range of plausible parameter values, we cannot exclude that some of
the drawn combinations as a whole may be rather implausible. However, as we only use sign
restrictions that are implied by all drawn combinations, the exclusion of the implausible ones would,
if at all, only further restrict the possible impulse responses, leaving our identification valid.
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households. Such a choice implies that the borrowing constraints of the borrowing
agents are always binding. The range for β, the patient households’ discount factor,
is chosen based on the literature. The lower value matches the parametrization of
Iacoviello (2005) and the higher the parametrization of Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
The values for β′′, the impatient households’ discount factor, have the same source.
The lower value for the discount factor of entrepreneurs, γ, is chosen to be larger
than that of impatient households and the higher value corresponds to the calibration
of Iacoviello (2005). The values for the depreciation rate of capital, δ, are chosen
in line with values commonly used in the literature. One of the lowest values for
this parameter is 0.015 (see e.g. Dueker, Fischer, and Dittmar, 2007) which means
that the capital depreciates at a rate of 6% per year, because the model period
corresponds to a quarter. The higher value implies an annual depreciation at a rate
of 12%. The range for the parameter µ describing the capital share in the production
function is pretty standard and follows Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri
(2010). The share of entrepreneurial housing stock in the production function, ν,
is model-specific because it targets the steady-state value of commercial real estate
over annual output. For the range, we choose values used by Iacoviello (2005) and
Iacoviello (2013). Iacoviello (2005) estimates the steady state values of the LTV ratios
as m = 0.89 for entrepreneurs and m′′ = 0.55 for households. We believe that the
estimated value for LTV of firms may be too high, whereas the LTV for households
may be too low, so we enlarge the parameter sets downwards (for m) and upwards
(for m”). The values of the patient housheholds’ wage share correspond to the values
used by Iacoviello (2005) and Jappelli (1990b).
The Calvo parameter θ determining the probability of a fixed price in a given
period is chosen to include values yielding an average price duration of 6.7 to 9
months, based on Enders et al. (2011) and Iacoviello (2005). The parameter defining
capital adjustment costs in the economy, ψ, is somehow controversial in the literature.
Iacoviello (2005) calibrates it at 2, however also much lower and much higher estimates
are common. We choose the lower value for the parameter to be fairly low to take
into account small adjustment costs, and the higher value is 6, so that our range
includes high adjustment costs estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007) for the U.S
(5.75). Our range for the steady state gross markup X is chosen as to consider
the minimum markup, it includes the Iacoviello (2005) calibration of 1.05 and goes
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up to the value used by Iacoviello and Neri (2010). For the labor supply aversion
of patient and impatient households, η′ and η′′, Iacoviello (2005) uses the lowest
bound implying a very high labor supply elasticity: 100. The upper bound for these
parameters is set at 2, which implies the labor Frisch elasticity of 1, consistent with
macroeconomic estimates as reported by Keane and Rogerson (2011). The weights
on housing services in the utility function of the agents are usually chosen to match
the stock of residential housing relative to annual output observed in the data. For
our exercise, we choose a range basing on Iacoviello (2013) and Iacoviello and Neri
(2010), including the calibrated value 0.1 used by Iacoviello (2005). We choose the
range for parameters determining the autocorrelation of shocks in the model so as
to consider fairly persistent shocks. The LTV shock is most persistent, as changing
regulatory LTV is considered to be a rather permanent macroprudential measure.
The calibration of the parameters appearing in the backward-looking Taylor rule
applied by the central bank considers the estimates of Iacoviello (2005) and enlarges
them considerably. The value used by Iacoviello for ρpi is 0.27, but we consider values
ranging from 0.2 to 0.8. ρr is 0.73 in Iacoviello (2005), while we consider values from
0.7 to 0.8. Lastly, for ρy, which Iacoviello estimates at 0.13, we choose the range
0.1-0.2. Our ranges are in line with estimates by Clarida et al. (1999) and Orphanides
(2004). For the standard deviation of all of the shocks, we consider one-percentage
exogenous deviations from the steady state.
To generate the ranges of possible impulse response functions of the model, we
follow the approach of Enders et al. (2011) and draw the vector of parameters many
times assuming that they are independently uniformly distributed on the stated
intervals. In total, we take 25000 draws. Figure 2.3 shows the resulting intervals
for the model’s impulse response functions to a negative exogenous shock to the
households’ LTV ratio. The lines denote the (pointwise) maxima and minima. The
impulse responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state.
We see that the shock generates a fall in the interest rate, inflation, GDP, borrowing
by the households, and aggregate consumption. Whereas the contraction in borrowing
is long-lasting, the decline of the other variables is observed only in the initial periods
after the shock. With respect to house prices the response is not so clear. Intuitively
one would expect a fall in house prices after a negative credit shock. However, we
see that for some parameter values the response of house prices is positive, and for
93
Chapter 2
0 5 10 15 20−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
Interest Rate
0 5 10 15 20−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Inflation
0 5 10 15 20−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
House Prices
0 5 10 15 20−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
GDP
0 5 10 15 20−4
−3
−2
−1
0
Borrowing by HHs
0 5 10 15 20−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Consumption
Notes: Pointwise minima and maxima of the chosen variables after an exogenous one-percentage
fall in the LTV ratio. The impulse responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady
state.
Figure 2.3: Credit Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE model (U.S.)
some negative. The benchmark Iacoviello (2005) calibration results in a negative
house price response to a negative LTV shock, so it has to be our assumed range of
certain parameters that yields the surprising result. We investigated which of the
parameters is responsible for the positive response of house prices to our shock and
the result is mainly driven by rhoy, the coefficient appearing in the Taylor rule that
determines the weight of policy response to output. If the coefficient is low, as in the
benchmark Iacoviello (2005) calibration, the house price response to a negative LTV
ratio shock will be clearly negative. However, with rhoy attaining values higher than
0.15 the response of house prices may be positive. We see thus that the existence of a
central bank in our model economy that reacts not only to the inflation rate but also
to changes in output, may considerably affect the results of a purely macroprudential
policy. If the central bank decides to offset the negative effects of the change in LTV
ratio for the economy, it will lower the interest rates after a negative LTV ratio shock
which might outweigh the negative direct effect of a lower LTV ratio on house prices.
If, however, the monetary policy does not react strongly to the fall in output, the
interest rates will be lowered by a smaller amount and the LTV ratio shock will have
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the effect that we expect on house prices.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the strong fall in households’ borrowing
after a negative LTV ratio shock (also after a monetary shock, which is visible in
Figure 2.4) is due to a substantial decrease in the housing stock the households are
holding. Since the households borrow up to a certain fraction of the future value of
their housing stock, the fall in the housing stock directly affects the borrowing of
credit-constrained agents.
Figure 2.4 shows the resulting intervals for the model’s impulse response functions
to a contractionary monetary policy shock. As in the case of a negative LTV ratio
shock, we observe a fall in GDP, borrowing and aggregate consumption. Inflation
and house prices also initially fall, whereas the interest rate exhibits an increase due
to the nature of this shock.
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Figure 2.4: Monetary Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE model (U.S.)
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We summarize the resulting sign restrictions in Table 2.2. In both cases we leave
the response of house prices and output open, as this is our main point of interest.
Table 2.2 is constructed to show that given our ranges of parameters, both monetary
and LTV shocks are distinguishable and different from other shocks present in the
Iacoviello (2005). Although we identify only two shocks in our VAR, we show the
restrictions implied by our ranges also for the three other shocks to show that all
shocks are well-identified given our parameter ranges. Specifically, the monetary
shock differs from the LTV shock through the response of the nominal interest rate, r.
The responses after both shocks distinguish them from the preference shock through
the response of consumption c - otherwise the preference shock could be the mirror
image of our shocks of interest. Thus, inclusion of consumption in our VAR analysis
is crucial for the identification strategy. The consumption response distinguished
also the responses after technology shock from the monetary shock and the LTV
shock. The response of consumption helps to distinguish the inflation shock from the
LTV shock, while the inflation response distinguishes it from the monetary shock.
Appendix 2.A contains the impulse response functions for the remaining three shocks
of the model presented in Table 2.2.
Shock r pi hpi GDP b c
Monetary (int. rate up) + - ∅ ∅ - -
(0) (0) (- ) (-) (0-4) (0-4)
LTV (down) - - ∅ ∅ - -
(0-2) (0) (-) (-) (0-4) (0-4)
Preference (up) ∅ ∅ + + + -
(-) (-) (0-5) (0-2) (0-5) (4-6)
Technology (up) - - + + ∅ +
(1-5) (0-5) (0-5) (1-5) (-) (2-5)
Inflation (up) + + ∅ - ∅ -
(1-5) (0-5) (-) (2-5) (-) (1-5)
Notes: The upper row defines the sign of the restriction and the lower row the periods for
which the restriction is imposed. ∅ denotes unrestricted variables.
Table 2.2: Identifying sign restrictions for different shocks derived from the DSGE
model (U.S.)
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2.4.2 Simulation for the U.K.
We apply the same methodology as outlined above for the U.K. Table 2.3 shows the
ranges for the parameters in the U.K. case. Some of the basic parameters, such as the
discount rates of the agents, or model-specific parameters (utility weight on housing,
housing share in the production function) are assumed to have the same ranges as in
the U.S. case. However, there are certain parameters that vary substantially across
countries and are worth to be discussed at this point. First of all, the LTV ratios for
entrepreneurs are chosen to be lower in U.K. than in the U.S., following Hayes and
Kane (2009). Cutler (2002) shows that the LTV ratio for U.S. buyers ranged below
0.7 in years 1981-2001; we choose the range 0.6-0.7. Moreover, there is evidence that
both wage and price rigidities are less pronounced in the U.K. compared to the U.S.
market. We thus have to adjust our θ, the probability of a fixed price, accordingly.
The microdata evidence provided by Bunn and Ellis (2009) suggests that prices in the
U.K. change every 4-5 months, which results in a range of [0.25,0.4] for our model’s
parameter. The last important change in ranges for parameter values in the U.K.
case is visible in the weights used in the Taylor rule. Models estimating the Taylor
rule coefficients for the U.K. give more narrow ranges for rhopi, ρr and ρy than in the
U.S. case. However, as we will see in the figures showing the impulse responses of
the DSGE model, the changes in the parameters do not lead to different conclusions
about the possible sign restrictions for the VAR model.
The sign restrictions resulting from our simulation in the U.K. case are summarized
in Table 2.4 and are based on the results presented in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6.
Despite different parameter values, they very much resemble the sign restrictions that
we applied in the U.S. case. Specifically, our imposed sign restrictions for the LTV
shock and monetary shock are the same for the U.K. as in the U.S. case. As before,
all shocks are distinguishable. Appendix 2.A contains the impulse response functions
for the remaining three shocks of the model presented in Table 2.4.
To sum up, despite the differences in calibration, the identifying restrictions for our
VAR analysis derived from the DSGE simulation in the case of the monetary and the
credit shock are the same for the U.S. and the U.K. and are summarized in Table 2.5.
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Parameter Range Source/Target
β discount factor - patient HHs [0.99, 0.9925] Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
β′′ discount factor - impatient HHs [0.95, 0.97] Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
γ discount factor - entrepreneurs [0.975, 0.98] Iacoviello (2005)
δ capital depreciation rate [0.015, 0.03] Faccini et al. (2011)
µ capital share in prod. function [0.3, 0.35] Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
ν housing share in prod. function [0.03, 0.05] Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello (2013)
m LTV ratio for entrepreneurs [0.75, 0.8] Hayes and Kane (2009)
m′′ LTV ratio for HHs [0.6, 0.7] Cutler (2002)
α patient HHs’ wage share [0.64, 0.88] Iacoviello (2005), Jappelli (1990b)
θ probability fixed price [0.25, 0.4] Bunn and Ellis (2009)
ψ capital adjustment costs [1, 6] Smets and Wouters (2007)
X steady state gross markup [1.01, 1.15] Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
η′ labor supply aversion p. HHs [1.01, 2] Iacoviello (2005)
η′′ labor supply aversion imp. HHs [1.01, 2] Iacoviello (2005)
J’ weight on housing - p. HHs [0.08, 0.12] Iacoviello (2013), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
J” weight on housing - imp. HHs [0.08, 0.12] Iacoviello (2013), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
ρm′′ autocorr. of LTV shock [0.95, 0.99] high shock persistence
ρu autocorr. of inflationary shock [0.85, 0.95] high shock persistence
ρj autocorr. of preference shock [0.85, 0.95] high shock persistence
ρa autocorr. of technology shock [0.85, 0.95] high shock persistence
ρpi weight of policy resp.. to inflation [0.28, 0.59] DiCecio and Nelson (2007), Villa and Yang (2011)
ρr weight of policy resp. to int.rate [0.54, 0.87] Faccini et al. (2011), DiCecio and Nelson (2007)
ρy weight of policy resp. to output [0.34, 0.39] Faccini et al. (2011), Villa and Yang (2011)
Notes: All parameter definitions but the LTV-Shock refer directly to the original model by
Iacoviello (2005). HHs = households.
Table 2.3: Admitted intervals for model parameters for the U.K. case
Shock r pi hpi GDP b c
Monetary (int. rate up) + - ∅ ∅ - -
(0) (0) (-) (-) (0-4) (0-4)
LTV (down) - - ∅ ∅ - -
(0-2) (0) (-) (-) (0-4) (0-4)
Preference (up) ∅ ∅ + + + -
(-) (-) (0-5) (0-4) (0-5) (0,4-6)
Technology (up) - - + + ∅ +
(1-5) (0,2-5) (0-5) (1-5) (-) (1-5)
Inflation (up) + + - - ∅ -
(1-5) (0,2-5) (0-3) (1-5) (-) (1-5)
Notes: The upper row defines the sign of the restriction and the lower row the periods for
which the restriction is imposed. ∅ denotes unrestricted variables.
Table 2.4: Identifying sign restrictions for different shocks derived from the DSGE
model (U.K.)
98
0 5 10 15 20−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
Interest Rate
0 5 10 15 20−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
Inflation
0 5 10 15 20−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
House Prices
0 5 10 15 20−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
GDP
0 5 10 15 20−4
−3
−2
−1
0
Borrowing by HHs
0 5 10 15 20−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Consumption
Notes: Pointwise minima and maxima of the chosen variables after an exogenous one-percentage
fall in the LTV ratio. The impulse responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady
state.
Figure 2.5: Credit Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE model (U.K.)
Shock r pi hpi GDP b c
Monetary (int. rate up) + - ∅ ∅ - -
(0) (0) (- ) (-) (0-4) (0-4)
LTV (down) - - ∅ ∅ - -
(0-2) (0) (-) (-) (0-4) (0-4)
Notes: The upper row defines the sign of the restriction and the lower row the periods for
which the restriction is imposed. ∅ denotes unrestricted variables.
Table 2.5: Sign restrictions imposed on the VAR model (U.K. and U.S.)
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Figure 2.6: Monetary Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE model (U.K.)
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 The VAR Analysis for the U.S.
Using the sign restrictions outlined in the previous section, we employ the method
explained in Section 2.3 to estimate the VAR for the U.S. data and compute the
resulting impulse response functions of the considered variables to the identified
structural shocks. Figure 2.7 shows the reaction of the six variables to a negative
credit shock. In addition to the (pointwise) median of the impulse response functions
Notes: The graph shows the pointwise median and the 16 and 84 percentiles of the estimated
impulse response functions to a negative credit shock. The dashed line is the impulse response
of the median model as suggested by Fry and Pagan (2007).
Figure 2.7: Estimated impulse responses to a credit shock (U.S.)
(continuous middle line), we also plot the impulse responses of the single model whose
impulse response functions are the closest to the pointwise median (the dashed line).
This approach is suggested by Fry and Pagan (2007) because for the median of the
impulse response functions, it is neither certain that there is a single model that
generates this shape, nor do the median responses necessarily represent orthogonal
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shocks, as they very likely stem from different admissible models. The dashed lines
in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 show the impulse responses of this single model. The
shaded areas correspond to the periods for which the sign restrictions are imposed.
Looking at the reaction of variables to a credit shock (Figure 2.7), we note that the
response of house prices, which was left unrestricted, is not clear, although the mean
and median model suggest a short-term contraction. The GDP exhibits a significant,
but short-lived contraction. All other variables fall, which is consistent with the
imposed sign restrictions, however, the contraction is rather short-lived.
Figure 2.8 shows the impulse responses resulting from a contractionary monetary
shock. As in the case of the negative credit shock, we left the response of house
prices unrestricted. Unlike the credit shock, a negative monetary shock induces a
clear and persistent, although not immediate, decline in house prices. Moreover, we
left the GDP response unrestricted and we see that the median response of output to
a contractionary monetary shock is indeed contractionary, however, not all impulse
responses deliver a clear negative result. With respect to the other variables, the
effects of a monetary shock seem to be longer-lasting than those of a negative credit
shock.
Figure 2.9 shows the forcast error variance decomposition of the median model
for the house prices up to 20-quarter horizon. We see that the LTV shock accounts
for a very small fraction of the forecast error variance of the house prices over the
considered time period, while the monetary shock contributes up to 10% in the
medium-term horizon. 7
Given our estimates, we calculate the historical structural innovations of the two
shocks for the considered time period. As Enders et al. (2011), we calculate four-
quarter moving averages. The left panels of Figure 2.10 show the median and quantiles
from our estimates. The middle panels compare the median from the left panel (solid
line) with the innovations resulting from the the single “median” model a’ la Fry
and Pagan (2007) identified above. The obtained structural innovations have a large
volatility. However, we can identify some main spikes that should be confirmed in
the data about LTV ratios in the U.S. and important macroeconomic episodes. The
evidence suggests that the LTV ratio for first-time homebuyers was indeed fluctuating
7Figure 2.21 in the Appendix 2.A shows how the FEVD of the median model compares to the FEVD
of the full set of admissible models.
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Notes: The graph shows the pointwise median and the 16 and 84 percentiles of the estimated
impulse response functions to a negative monetary shock. The dashed line is the impulse
response of the median model as suggested by Fry and Pagan (2007).
Figure 2.8: Estimated impulse responses to a monetary shock (U.S.)
over the past three decades (Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy, 2012). We focus on the
innovations implied by the median model (red dashed line). Looking at the upper
middle panel of Figure 2.10 we see that a big spike is observed at the beginning of the
new century. Temkin et al. (2002) identify a liquidity crunch in the subprime market
that started in 1998 and continued until 2000. During this time, prices of many
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) decreased, the loan supply was reduced which
may have led to lower average LTV ratios reflected in the rise on the graph depicting
structural innovations. Several important hikes occur in 2008 and 2009, at the height
of the Great Recession. The analysis of the lower middle panel of Figure 2.10 is
more difficult due to the high volatility of innovations. However, the innovations
can be related to existing narratives of the monetary policy over that time period.
For example, the two hikes around 1995 correctly identify ’the preemptive strike
against inflation’, a change in monetary policy when authorities started to increase
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Figure 2.9: Forecast error variance decomposition for house prices (U.S.)
interest rates after a period of falling and stable federal funds rate at the beginning
of the 1990s (see Goodfriend, 2002). The beginning of the new century was a period
of falling and low federal funds rate, the FOMC started to increase the rate from
August 2004 on and did not start to lower the rate until September 2007, which is
well captured by the last substantial hikes on the graph showing monetary shock
innovations. The right panels of Figure 2.10 present the historical decomposition
of house prices in the U.S. We see that monetary shocks contributed more to the
development of house prices in the U.S. in the considered period.
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shock only.
Figure 2.10: Estimated innovations (U.S.)
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2.5.2 The VAR Analysis for the U.K.
Turning to U.K. data, Figure 2.11 shows the impulse responses generated by the
VAR after a LTV ratio shock. The sign restrictions are identical to the ones imposed
on the U.S. data and indicated by shaded areas on the graph. Comparing Figure 2.11
with the analogous figure for the U.S. (Figure 2.7), we see that in the case of the U.K.
the LTV ratio shock has a more substantial impact on the behavior of the considered
variables, specifically on house prices and credit. Also, GDP and consumption go
down significantly, but as in the case of the U.S., the contraction is rather short-lived.
Looking at the impulse responses to a monetary shock, which are depicted in
Figure 2.12, we see that in contrast to the case of the U.S., the impulse responses
for U.K. data do not generate a clear response of house prices. However, the median
responses suggest a slight fall in house prices. The negative reaction is not immediate:
it only realizes a few quarters after the monetary shock. However, when it does,
the impact of the monetary shock is quite big and seems to be persistent. After an
exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate, real GDP and consumption experience
a fall over a longer period of time than in the case of the LTV shock. There is a
strong and persistent fall in the volume of loans secured by real estate and only a
short-term fall in the inflation rate.
Figure 2.13 shows the forcast error variance decomposition of the median model
for the house prices up to 20-quarter horizon. We see that the LTV shock accounts
for roughly 40% of the forecast error variance of the house prices in the first period,
with a decreasing share over time, while the monetary shock has an approximately
stable contribution of around 5%.8
Figure 2.14 shows the structural innovations identified by our VAR model. As in
the case of the U.S., we focus again on the indications of the median model, given by
the dotted red line in the middle panels of the Figure. The largest spike in the middle
upper graph corresponds to the peak of the recent financial crisis. The monetary shock
innovations exhibit substantial volatility and indicate a large expansionary shock in
the crisis period. The right panels of the figure present the historical decomposition
of house prices in the U.K. We see that a fall in house prices in the recent crisis
episode was substantially driven by a negative credit shock.
8Figure 2.22 in the Appendix 2.A shows how the FEVD of the median model compares to the FEVD
of the full set of admissible models.
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Notes: The graph shows the pointwise median and the 16 and 84 percentiles of the estimated
impulse response functions to a negative credit shock. The dashed line is the impulse response
of the median model as suggested by Fry and Pagan (2007).
Figure 2.11: Estimated impulse responses to a credit shock (U.K.)
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Notes: The graph shows the pointwise median and the 16 and 84 percentiles of the estimated
impulse response functions to a negative monetary shock. The dashed line is the impulse
response of the median model as suggested by Fry and Pagan (2007).
Figure 2.12: Estimated impulse responses to a monetary shock (U.K.)
Comparing the results for U.K. and U.S. data, we may conclude that in both
cases monetary policy has a longer-lasting effect than the credit shock. We find it
particularly interesting to compare the strength of impulse responses in both countries
that may reflect diverse transmission mechanisms and differences in their mortgage
markets. Comparing the responses from the median model in Figure 2.12 with the
ones in Figure 2.8, we see that for the median model the impact of a monetary
shock on house prices in the U.K. is stronger and longer-lasting than in the U.S. One
reason for that may be that the majority of mortgage loans in the U.S. are fixed
interest rate contracts (65% of loans held by federal agencies have a fixed rate for 30
years, further 15% for 15 years, see Coles and Hardt (2000)), whereas in the U.K.,
the variable interest rate contracts prevail (60% of all contracts, the remaining ones
often fixed only for 1-5 years, see Miles, 2004). On top of that, in the U.S. due to
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, mortgage interest paid on the primary residence (as
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Figure 2.13: Forecast error variance decomposition for house prices (U.K.)
well as home equity loans) is tax-deductible. The taxation generally favors housing
wealth as opposed to other forms of wealth and mortgage debt over other types of
loan contracts (see Lehnert, 2006). Given that specific feature of the U.S. mortgage
market, we would not expect a substantial change in households’ demand for housing
after an increase in the nominal interest rate. However, in the U.K. not only is the
majority of mortgage contracts of variable interest rate type, but there is also no
mortgage tax relief. This kind of tax exemption was available in the U.K. until 6
April 2000, when the relief was removed.9 Given the absence of the tax provision, we
would expect the changes in the nominal interest rates in the U.K. to have a more
pronounced effect on lending and house prices than in the U.S., and this seems to
be confirmed by our VAR results. The housing prices in the U.K. seem generally to
be more susceptible to different exogenous changes due to the characteristics of its
9See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/ria/miraswithdrawal.pdf
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Figure 2.14: Estimated innovations (U.K.)
housing market. The U.K. housing market is characterized by both limited supply
because of the lack of suitable space and by strict planning laws (see HMTreasury,
2003).
2.5.3 Comparison with the Literature
Our results for the U.S. are consistent with the evidence provided by Assenmacher-
Wesche and Gerlach (2008), despite a different method of VAR identification and the
inclusion of equity prices instead of consumption as a VAR variable in Assenmacher-
Wesche and Gerlach (2008). The credit shock in Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach
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(2008) has only very short-lasting effects on the considered variables, and the house
prices show no significant response. The effects of the monetary shock are clearer:
the variables of interest exhibit a long-term contraction, even though it does not
occur immediately after the shock. The contraction in credit is very long-lasting,
while GDP recovers in our model relatively faster than in Assenmacher-Wesche and
Gerlach (2008), although also after a long period of downturn. The decline of house
prices after a monetary policy shock is also consistent with the results by Vargas-Silva
(2008) who analyzes the effects of monetary policy on the U.S. housing market using
a VAR identified by sign-restrictions. Also, Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) in their
panel analysis for 17 countries find that a monetary shock has longer lasting effects
on variables such as GDP, house prices and credit, compared to a credit shock. Musso
et al. (2011), analyzing the VAR responses for the U.S. and euro area economy, show
that a monetary policy shock has a large effect on housing market related variables,
such as residential investment and real house prices. On the contrary, a negative
credit supply shock, defined as an increase in the mortgage lending rate, does not
lead to a robust response of house prices in the short and medium run and leads to a
significant decrease in U.S. house prices only after around 12 quarters. This supports
our findings about a clearer impact of monetary policy rather than a credit shock on
house prices.
When it comes to the studies that do not include housing prices in their analysis,
the results of Hristov et al. (2012) also confirm our findings in the euro area context:
the effects of a loan supply shock on GDP and loan volume are shorter-lasting than
the ones of a monetary shock. On the contrary, Helbling et al. (2011) find that
following a global credit shock, global GDP increases initially but afterwards there is
a long-lasting decline. However, the results are not statistically significant. For the
U.S. credit shock, Helbling et al. (2011) find no significant effects on U.S. GDP.
2.6 Conclusion
Estimating a VAR for U.S. and U.K. data using sign restrictions derived from
a DSGE model, we analyze the effectiveness of monetary and credit policies in
influencing house prices in the economy. For both countries, we find that a negative
monetary shock has a stronger effect on house prices, while the impact of a negative
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credit shock on house prices is insignificant, which is in line with other studies
including house prices in a VAR analysis. The comparison of the results for the U.S.
and the U.K. suggests that both monetary and macroprudential policies are more
effective in the U.K. This might be explained by the structure of the mortgage market
and e.g. taxation rules.
As our sample also includes the time period of the financial crisis, we analyze the
contribution of the considered shocks to the recent house price developments in both
countries. The historical decomposition suggests that in the U.S. the monetary shocks
played an important role in the build-up of house prices before the crisis. For the
U.K., we find that the drop in the house prices during the crisis can be attributed to
a large extent to a credit shock.
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2.A Additional Graphs
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Figure 2.15: Housing Preference Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE
model (U.S.)
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Figure 2.16: TFP Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE model (U.S.)
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Figure 2.17: Inflation Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE model (U.S.)
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Figure 2.18: Housing Preference Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE
model (U.K.)
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Figure 2.19: TFP Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE model (U.K.)
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Figure 2.20: Inflation Shock - Impulse response functions of the DSGE model (U.K.)
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Figure 2.21: Forecast error variance decomposition of house prices (U.S.)
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Figure 2.22: Forecast error variance decomposition of house prices (U.K.)
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The Price vs Quantity Debate: Climate
Policy and Business Cycles
3.1 Introduction
Although the recent financial crisis primarily emphasized the significance of the
financial and housing markets in business cycles, covered in the previous two chapters
of this dissertation, it also renewed interest in the optimal design of environmental
policies, particularly in the European Union.1 As economic agents rarely internalize
the costs of their polluting activities, addressing the problem of climate change
remains an important challenge for policymakers.
Two classical alternatives for regulating pollutants considered by the literature are
a cap-and-trade system (present e.g. in the European Union) and a tax (present e.g.
in Norway or certain Canadian provinces); the former is a quantity instrument and
the latter is a price instrument. It seems that there is no consensus on the superiority
of one instrument over another. In this chapter, we contribute to this debate by
analyzing the optimal instrument design in the face of uncertainty stemming from
unexpected changes in economic circumstances.
The literature that compares the relative performance of price and quantity instru-
ments under uncertainty starts with the seminal contribution of Weitzman (1974)
who analyzes the optimal instrument choice in a static partial equilibrium framework.
1The European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) works under a ’cap and trade’ principle,
setting the level of greenhouse gases’ emissions to a certain level. It came unter scrutiny during
the crisis, as the price of emissions allowances plunged due to the weak economic activity and an
oversupply of allowances. Currently, the European Comission is working on improving the EU
ETS system, addressing the problem of allowances surplus, which arose ”largely as a result of
the economic crisis”, as we can read on its website, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
reform/index_en.htm.
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He shows that, under uncertainty about the abatement costs, the relative slopes of the
marginal benefit (damage) function and the marginal cost functions determine which
instrument is preferred. If the expected marginal benefit function from reducing
emissions is flat relative to the marginal cost of abatement, a price instrument is
preferred. If, however, the marginal benefit function is steeper, a quantity instrument
is preferred.2 The literature has extended Weitzman (1974)’s framework to a dynamic
(but still partial equilibrium) setting (e.g. Hoel and Karp, 2002; Newell and Pizer,
2003; Karp and Zhang, 2005).3 This literature emphasizes that, for stock pollutants
such as greenhouse gases, the total stock of pollution changes little from one year to
another, so that the marginal benefit function is basically flat in the short-run. Thus,
in the case of the CO2, price instruments are preferable.
In this chapter, we extend this line of research by analyzing the optimal design of
environmental policy in a business cycle framework. Given the long-term impact of
climate change, the analysis of environmental policies in a rather short-term business
cycle setup may come as a surprise. However, a vast literature on the design of
environmental policies in such a setup has recently emerged. It is summarized by
Fischer and Heutel (2013). In his paper, Heutel (2012), p. 244, provocatively writes:
“Environmental policy (...) typically has not been designed to respond to business
cycles, likely because the scale of most environmental policies is small relative to
the economy. However, addressing global climate change will require policies that
dwarf conventional environmental policies in scale and scope. Can climate policy
designers continue to ignore business cycles, or does climate policy require a more
explicit integration with macroeconomic fluctuations?”.
The main difference between the papers in the real business cycle literature and
the earlier works is that the latter consider instruments which are fixed at least
for some time, while the real business cycle models feature instruments which are
2Another implication of Weitzman’s result is that benefit uncertainty, unless it is correlated with cost
uncertainty, does not affect the net benefit under both price and quantity controls and thus, does
not affect the optimal choice between carbon taxes and emissions caps. As a result, many followers
of Weitzman (1974) have primarily focused on uncertainty arising from shocks to abatement costs
of firms, with a key exception of Stavins (1996) who shows that under reasonable conditions,
the correlation between costs and benefits can reverse the conclusions drawn on the basis of the
relative-slope rule.
3Weitzman’s original analysis has been also extended to analyze the performance of hybrid policies
that combine elements of taxes and cap-and-trade schemes (e.g., Roberts and Spence, 1976) and to
indexed-instruments (e.g., Newell and Pizer, 2003).
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state-contingent and adjusted each period. Earlier studies established the result that
for stock pollutants, such as carbon dioxide, price instruments are preferable, because
of the relatively flat benefit function from the reduction of pollution. Given the
short-term character of business cycles and the fact that the pollution stock does not
change much over the business cycle, one would expect this result to be even stronger
in a real business cycle framework. A carbon tax imposed on the pollution externality
can be interpreted as a Pigovian tax, and thus should be set equal to the marginal
damages from the pollution stock. As damages are approximately constant in the
short-term, so should be the imposed carbon tax in order to correct this externality.
Surprisingly, Heutel (2012) finds that, in the response to a productivity shock, the
optimal response of carbon taxes is procyclical, and that taxes fluctuate more than
emissions, which may suggest that a quantity restriction is preferred over a price
instrument. (Lintunen and Vilmi, 2013) continue this line of research by investigating
the conditions for the procyclicality of carbon taxes.
Thus, models analyzing fixed policies and state-contingent policies yield different
policy recommendations. We investigate the reasons for this divergence, starting
from the most recent literature on the subject. Our theoretical framework is an
extension of the real business cycle model in Heutel (2012). We incorporate labor
and distortionary fiscal policy into his setup to show that the surprising result of
carbon tax procyclicality can be explained by tax-incompleteness. We calibrate the
model to the U.S. economy and use it to investigate the design and dynamics of
optimal carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies. The policies considered in the business
cycle framework are state-contingent policies that can be adjusted every period. In
practice, regulators usually choose single-order, fixed, instruments due to difficulty in
implementation. We see state-contingent policies as instruments in an idealized world,
in which policymakers can readjust their decisions every period. These policies serve
as benchmarks in our analysis. We contrast their welfare implications, comparing
them with non-state-contingent policies, which are respresented in our model by
either a carbon tax or a cap on emissions fixed at their corresponding steady-state
values.
Simulations of the model produce several results. First, we demonstrate that, in
an idealized world in which planners can continually adjust instruments to reflect
current contingencies of the state of the economy, the expected welfare outcome and
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stock of greenhouse gases are very similar irrespective of whether a regulator uses
a baseline price or a quantity instrument. Second, we show that the carbon tax
remains approximately constant over the business cycle. If a quantity restriction
is chosen, then the optimal quantity varies more over the business cycle relative to
the volatility of carbon tax in the model with environmental taxation. Third, we
observe that, if a regulator cannot continually adjust instruments and must choose
either a fixed price instrument or a fixed quantity instrument, taxes are the more
efficient instrument. Intuitively, if under idealized conditions, as discussed above, the
carbon tax is approximately constant and emissions vary more, then the welfare costs
associated with fixing the instrument at its steady-state value should generate smaller
losses under the former than under the latter policy. Our estimates of such welfare
losses confirm this intuition: we find that a fixed tax policy leads to a welfare loss of
USD 232.83 per capita per annum, as opposed to the fixed quantity instrument that
generates a loss of USD 258.22 per capita per annum.
Our main finding that the carbon tax is almost constant and fluctuates less than
emissions in response to a TFP shock contrasts with the result presented in Heutel
(2012). The reason is that, in Heutel’s framework, the tax system is incomplete and
the regulator uses the carbon tax partly to offset revenue fluctuations over the course
of the business cycle. If, as in our model, the carbon tax is used solely to address
the environmental policy problem, the procyclicality disappears. Heutel’s result is
obtained, therefore, due to a violation of Tinbergen’s optimal policy principle, i.e.
that each policy problem should be attacked with a specific policy instrument (see
Tinbergen, 1952).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the core model.
Section 3.3 discusses the model’s calibration. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the
results under price and quantity instruments when the regulator can continuously
adjust instruments to reflect current states of nature. The same section presents
the results for the version of the model when the economy is hit by two correlated
shocks - productivity and shock to abatement technology; it also discusses policy
implications of our main results. Section 3.5 discusses what drives divergence in our
results when compared to those of Heutel (2012). Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Real Business Cycle Model with Distortionary
Taxes and Climate Externality
The baseline model used in this chapter extends Heutel (2012)’s real business
cycle model with climate externalities by introducing distortionary fiscal policy. The
economy consists of households, firms, and the government. Households obtain utility
from the consumption of both public and private goods, as well as from leisure. Goods
are produced using private capital and labor. Following Heutel (2012), production
causes greenhouse gas emissions, which accumulate in the atmosphere and lead to
climate change that causes damages by reducing output according to a damage
function. As in Heutel (2012), we assume that firms can counteract the adverse
productivity effect of climate change by increasing spending on abatement. The
government levies emissions, output and labor taxes on firms. The revenues from
these taxes are used to finance public good provision and the public debt.
3.2.1 Households
A representative household maximizes:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lt, gt). (3.2.1)
In this utility function, ct and gt represent private and public consumption and lt is
the number of hours worked by the household. The representative household faces
the following budget constraint:
ct + it + ρBtbt+1 = wtlt + rtkt−1 + pit + bt, (3.2.2)
where it is private investment, pit is firm profits, bt+1 denotes one-period government
bond purchases and ρBt is the price of one-period bonds. Households derive income
from supplying labor and capital to firms at rental rates wt and rt. The private
capital stock is accumulated according to:
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + it. (3.2.3)
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First-order conditions of the household maximization problem imply:
wt = −u
′
L(t)
u′c(t)
, (3.2.4)
u′c(t) = βEtu′c(t+ 1)[1− δ + rt+1], (3.2.5)
u′c(t)ρBt = βEtu′c(t+ 1). (3.2.6)
Equation (3.2.4) equates the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption
to real wages and defines the household’s labor supply. Condition (3.2.5) is a standard
stochastic Euler equation, which determines intertemporal allocation: it equates the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption to the real rate of return
on private capital. Condition (3.2.6) is the counterpart of equation (3.2.5) for domestic
bonds.
3.2.2 Final Goods Production
Output yt is produced by identical firms, and can be used for consumption, invest-
ment, abatement or government spending:
yt = (1− d(xt))f(kt−1, lt; at), (3.2.7)
where at represents an exogenous productivity shock that follows a stationary stochas-
tic process:
ln at = ρ ln at−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε), | ρ |< 1. (3.2.8)
We assume that the stock of pollution in the atmosphere, denoted by xt, adversely
affects output through the damage function d(xt). The formulation of climate damages
as a fraction of output lost as in (3.2.7) was introduced by Nordhaus (1991) and
since then has been extensively used in the literature. The mapping of emissions to
economic damage can be thought as comprising two steps. First, emissions increase
the concentration of greenhouse gases leading to climate change, and, second, climate
change causes economic damages. Some papers, e.g., Barrage (2014) follow Nordhaus’s
approach and model two steps of mapping from carbon concentration to damages.
We follow the equally common specification of Heutel (2012) and Golosov et al.
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(2014) who map CO2 concentration to damages in one step.4 The specification (3.2.7)
assumes that climate change affects output directly. Such a specification is standard
in climate change modeling and represents the dependence of the production of
many goods on climate conditions, such as production of agricultural goods, forestry,
fisheries etc.
Profits of firms are defined as:
pit = (1− τt)yt − wt(1 + τLt)lt − τEtet − rtkt−1 − zt, (3.2.9)
where τLt is payroll (labor) tax, τt is output tax, τEt is tax on emissions, et are
emissions, which are by-products of production, and zt is spending on abatement by
firms. Private abatement spending is assumed to abate the µt fraction of emissions
via the following relation:
zt
yt
= m(µt), (3.2.10)
so that firms face the emissions constraint given by:
et = (1− µt)h(yt), (3.2.11)
where h(yt) determines total emissions from producing yt output. Following Heutel
(2012), we assume that a climate change externality arises because firms do not take
into account their emissions’ impact on the pollution stock and thus on productivity.
In other words, firms take xt as a given. Optimality conditions of the firm imply:
rt = (1− d(xt))f ′k[1− τt − τEt(1− µt)h′(yt)−m(µt)], (3.2.12)
wt(1 + τLt) = (1− d(xt))f ′L[1− τt − τEt(1− µt)h′(yt)−m(µt)], (3.2.13)
4The two stage mapping would have introduced a set of lags in the effect of current-emissions on
output, but would have not changed our results. This is because cyclical changes in emissions
levels have very little effect on the pollution stock due to the long-lived nature of CO2, and thus it
is relatively immaterial whether a ton of carbon dioxide is emitted today or a few periods later.
We demonstrate in the Appendix 3.A that the damages from pollution do not change significantly
with business cycles.
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τEt =
ytm
′(µt)
h(yt)
. (3.2.14)
Equation (3.2.12) is an optimality condition for the demand for capital. It implies
that the return associated with an increase in capital stock by one unit is equal to
the marginal product of capital. The marginal product of capital is net of additional
tax payments on increased emissions and net of additional spending on abatement to
clean a given fraction µ of extra emissions. Equation (3.2.13) is the counterpart of
equation (3.2.12) for labor demand. Finally, equation (3.2.14) says that firms react to
the carbon tax by choosing the level of abatement (equivalently the level of emissions)
such that the tax on emissions equals the marginal cost of emissions reduction.
3.2.3 Government
The government budget constraint is given by:
gt + bt = wtτLtlt + τEtet + τtyt + ρBtbt+1, (3.2.15)
where the government raises revenues by taxing labor income and emissions and
levying output tax to finance public debt bt and provision of public goods, gt. The
government can issue one-period bonds bt+1. The government budget constraint
(3.2.15) incorporates market clearing for bonds which requires that households’
demand for bonds and government supply for bonds are equated.
3.2.4 Carbon Cycle
Following Heutel (2012), we assume that in each period carbon dioxide emissions
by domestic and foreign firms increase the existing pollution stock which decays at a
linear rate η:
xt = ηxt−1 + et + erowt , (3.2.16)
where et are current-period domestic emissions that are related to the output produced
and fraction µt that is abated, while erowt is current-period emissions from the rest of
the world and η is the fraction of the pollution stock that remains in the atmosphere.5
5The atmosphere is not the only reservoir of carbon dioxide. Even without industrial emissions there
exists a natural carbon cycle encompassing flows of carbon dioxide among different reservoirs: the
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3.2.5 Equilibrium
We solve the model by constructing a Ramsey problem since our main interest lies
in specifying optimal governmental policies that lead to a second-best outcome in
the presence of environmental externalities. It is well known that the existence of
enivronmental externality breaks the equivalence between the outcome of the social
planner’s problem and the decentralized economy (see Xepapadeas, 2005). However,
the social optimum can still be approached by an appropriate design of taxation. We
model a decentralized economy in which the Ramsey planner finds optimal fiscal
policies so as to internalize the externalities. To construct the Ramsey problem, we
reorganize some of the constraints in order to reduce the number of choice variables
and to obtain a compact expression for the household budget constraint. In particular,
combining (3.2.2),(3.2.9) and (3.2.15) gives the following resource constraint for the
economy:
ct + kt − (1− δ)kt−1 + zt + gt = yt. (3.2.17)
Next, by adding and substituting for wt from (3.2.4), we rewrite the government’s
budget constraint as follows:
gt + bt = −u
′
L(t)
u′c(t)
τLtlt + τEt(1− µt)h(yt) + τtyt + ρBtbt+1. (3.2.18)
Substituting (3.2.4) into (3.2.13) gives:
− u
′
L(t)
u′c(t)
(1 + τLt) = (1− d(xt))f ′L[1− τt − τEt(1− µt)h′(yt)−m(µt)]. (3.2.19)
3.2.6 Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey planner maximizes the utility of households:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lt, gt) (3.2.20)
atmosphere, oceans etc., present e.g. in Nordhaus (2008). In this model, we leave the flows between
the atmosphere and other carbon reservoirs aside and model the effect of industrial activity on
the atmosphere. The one-dimensional representation of the carbon cycle based on the stock of
pollution in the atmosphere only has been also utilized in Golosov et al. (2014).
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subject to (3.2.5), (3.2.14), (3.2.17), (3.2.18), (3.2.19) and
yt = (1− d(xt))f(kt−1, lt; at), (3.2.21)
xt = ηxt−1 + (1− µt)h(yt) + erowt , (3.2.22)
where we also use function (3.2.12) for the definition of rt.
The government chooses ct, µt, kt, yt, xt, lt, τLt, τEt, τt, gt and bt+1 to maximize
(3.2.20) subject to the constraints specified above.
The Lagrangian for this problem is given by:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{u(t) + λt [−u′c(t) + βu′c(t+ 1)(1− δ + rt+1)] +
+Ωt[ct + kt − (1− δ)kt−1 +m(µt)yt + gt − yt] +
+χt[τEth(yt)− ytm′(µt)] +
+Λt[−gt − bt − u
′
L(t)
u′c(t)
τLtlt + τEt(1− µt)h(yt) + τtyt + ρBtbt+1] +
+λpt[yt − (1− d(xt))f(kt−1, lt, kGt−1)] +
+ςt
[
−u
′
L(t)
u′c(t)
(1 + τLt)− (1− d(xt))f ′L(t)(1− τt − τEt(1− µt)h′(yt)−m(µt))
]
+
+Φt[xt − ηxt−1 − erowt − (1− µt)h(yt)]}.
The first-order conditions of the Ramsey problem are given in Appendix 3.C.
3.3 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we select parameter values that enable the theoretical model
to generate features that are (as closely as possible) consistent with the main features
of the U.S. economy. We assign values to structural parameters using values that are
common in business cycle studies of fiscal policy and macroeconomic models with
climate change externalities. To calibrate the climate part of the model, we draw on
the estimates and parameter values used in Heutel (2012). Baseline parameter values
of the model are summarized in Table 3.1, while Table 3.2 reports macroeconomic
ratios implied by the theoretical model as well as the corresponding values for the
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U.S. data. Data sources employed in these calculations are summarized in Appendix
3.B.
Parameter Value Definition
α 0.36 private capital share in the production function
ρ 0.95 persistence of the TFP shock
σε 0.007 standard deviation of the TFP shock
δ 0.025 private capital depreciation rate (quarterly)
β 0.98 subjective discount factor (quarterly)
κ 1.6 coefficient of relative risk aversion
θ 0.236 weight of public consumption in utility
1/ψ 0.4 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
η 0.9979 pollution decay
d2 5.2096e-10 damage function parameter
d1 -1.2583e-06 damage function parameter
d0 1.3950e-3 damage function parameter
θ1 0.05607 abatement cost equation parameter
θ2 2.8 abatement cost equation parameter
1− ν 0.696 elasticity of emissions with respect to output
Table 3.1: Baseline parameter values
A time period represents one quarter. The production function is given by
f(kt−1, lt; at) = atkαt−1l1−αt . (3.3.1)
We set α to 0.36, which is a value commonly used in the standard RBC literature.
For the TFP process, we assume that ρ = 0.95 and σε = 0.007, where the value of
the standard deviation is as in Heutel (2012) and is similar to the value 0.0056 as in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). We show below that our results are not sensitive
to changes in the value of ρ. The private capital depreciation rate, δ, is set to 0.025
(Heutel, 2012). We set the discount factor β to 0.98.
For the quantitative analysis, we consider the following form of the households’
utility function:
u(ct, lt, gt) =
c1−κt − 1
1− κ + θ
g1−κt − 1
1− κ −
l1+ψt
1 + ψ, (3.3.2)
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with the coefficient of relative risk aversion, κ, set to 1.6, which implies that the value
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (EIS) is 0.625. The standard value of
κ in the literature is 1 (see, e.g., Golosov et al., 2013). We set the value of ψ such
that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 0.4, in line with macroeconomic estimates
reported by Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). The weight of public consumption in the
utility function, θ, is set to 0.236 to match the average labor tax observed in the U.S.
Our steady state labor tax is a function of government spending, indirectly governed
by the value of θ, see equation 3.2.15.
Following Heutel (2012), the pollution stock in the atmosphere evolves according
to the following equation: xt = ηxt−1 + et + erowt . We set the value of η to 0.9979 as
in Heutel (2012), who calibrates this parameter assuming that 83 years represent the
half-life of atmospheric carbon dioxide.6
The emissions produced by the rest of the world, erowt are set to 4 times the steady
state level of domestic emissions. According to data by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. accounted for 19% of global CO2 emissions from
fossil fuel combustion in 2008, which means that global emissions were four times
higher than those in the U.S.7
The loss of potential output due to pollution is governed by the function d(x) =
d2x
2 +d1x+d0. We set the values of d2, d1, d0 respectively to 5.2096e-10, -1.2583e-06,
1.3950e-3, following Heutel (2012), who calibrates these values to match the damages
from carbon dioxide in the atmosphere estimated by papers in the environmental
literature. Heutel (2012) bases this estimation on Nordhaus (2008). Our baseline
calibration gives damages of 0.59%.
The abatement cost function is taken directly from Nordhaus (2008) and has the
form m(µ) = θ1µθ2 . We set θ1 = 0.05607 and θ2 = 2.8, following Heutel (2012).
6In actuality, there is no single number that describes the lifetime of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
because it is a weighted sum of exponential decays at different rates. Carbon dioxide is not destroyed
in the air, but is instead exchanged between the atmosphere, the ocean, and land. For other
greenhouse gases, lifecycle estimation is possible, see the report of Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (2001). Thus, the values used by different studies vary. Following Archer (2005),
Golosov et al. (2014) we alternatively calibrate the half-life of CO2 to 150 years. Assuming a
half-life of 150 years would lead to η = 0.9988 in our model. Our model’s results are not sensitive
to changes in η - the decay parameter influences quantitative responses of only three variables
(emissions, stock of pollution and fraction of emissions abated), while the responses of all other
variables remain the same.
7http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html
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Symbol Variable Model Data
c/y personal consumption/output 0.58 0.68
g/y government consumption/output 0.26 0.15
i/y private domestic investment/output 0.16 0.16
e/y emissions/output 0.76 0.60
b/y public debt/output 0.77 0.77
µ fraction of emissions abated, % 0.54 1.85
τE tax on emissions, % 0.002 -
τL labor tax, % 15.4 15.4
τ output tax, % 21.25 35
τEe/y revenue from carbon tax, % of GDP 0.0013 0.7 (estimate)
Table 3.2: Structure of the theoretical economy and the data
Given our baseline parametrization, the theoretical model implies a very low
level of carbon taxes in the steady-state, 0.002% (for comparison, Heutel’s model
implies 0.0487%), and respectively a very low share of carbon tax revenues in GDP,
only 0.0013% of GDP. In most countries with carbon taxation, the revenue from
environmental taxes does not exceed 1%. Different estimates for the U.S. evaluate
the possible net revenue in the range 0.51-0.8% of U.S. GDP (Table 2 in Gale et al.,
2013). As Gale et al. (2013) report, in 2007 the carbon tax raised revenues were
equivalent to 0.3% of GDP in Finland and Denmark and 0.8% of GDP in Sweden. In
Australia carbon tax revenue in 2012-2013 accounted to 1.2% of GDP.8
Finally, output is mapped into emissions through h(yt) = y1−ν , with et = (1 −
µt)h(yt), where 1 − ν represents the elasticity of emissions with respect to output.
We set the value of 1− ν at 0.696, which is the estimate from a (seasonally adjusted)
ARIMA regression of the log of emissions of CO2 on the log of GDP for U.S. data in
years 1981-2003, presented in Heutel (2012). We solve the model by log-linearizing
around the steady-state.
8http://www.treasury.gov.au
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3.4 Simulation Results
3.4.1 Results under Baseline Price Instrument Policy
Figure 3.1 shows the impulse responses (IR) of the key variables to a 1% increase
in productivity under both carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies. All variables
are expressed in terms of percentage deviations from the steady state, except for
the tax rates, for which responses are expressed as absolute deviations from their
steady-state values.9 Given the objectives of the chapter, we report plots of the
impulse response functions only for key variables related to our analysis, but the
results for the remaining variables are available upon request. The continuous line
represents the model with baseline carbon tax policy, and the dashed line represents
the model with baseline cap-and-trade policy. We start with discussing the results
under baseline carbon tax policy in this section and discuss the results under baseline
cap-and-trade policy in the next section.
Impulse responses obtained from simulations of the baseline model yield the
following key qualitative results. First, in line with the findings of other studies on
optimal carbon tax over the business cycle (e.g. Heutel, 2012), emissions increase
in the periods following a positive productivity shock. Given the long-lived nature
of carbon dioxide, increased emissions result in a higher pollution stock over the
medium term, and increase by around 0.0085% in 25 years time. We demonstrate in
the Appendix 3.A that this number is quite small, by estimating increases in mean
global temperature and sea levels associated with this rise in atmospheric greenhouse
gases. Second, the labor tax increases by 1.66 percentage points (10.77 percent),
the output tax decreases by 1.22 percentage points (5.75 percent), while the tax on
emissions is raised by only 0.000014 percentage points, corresponding to 0.7 percent
relative to the steady-state value in response to the shock.
The small fluctuations in the carbon tax rate can be explained drawing on the
intuition of the “price versus quantity” literature. Given the long-lived nature of
greenhouse gases, the additional damage from each additional ton of carbon emissions
is constant in the short-run. In terms of the model presented in section 3.2, the
9Please note that for each time period t, we plot the values of those stock variables which enter the
current production process, namely xt and kt−1. Since et affects xt contemporaneously, xt jumps
in response to the shock, while kt−1 does not.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses under baseline carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies
to a positive TFP shock
concentration of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere xt = ηxt−1 + et + erpwt , xt ∼ xt−1,
as well as damages d(xt) = d2x2 + d1x + d0 remain essentially constant over the
business cycle. Following Pigou’s principle, the private sector’s marginal cost - carbon
tax under baseline policy - must correspond to the level of marginal damages, which
are “flat” in the short-run. This explains why the optimal carbon tax is essentially
constant over the business cycles.
3.4.2 Results under Baseline Quantity Instrument Policy
Following Heutel (2012), we introduce a cap-and-trade scheme into our framework
by assuming that the government mandates the level of emissions a firm can produce,
qt. In other words, the government allocates permits to each firm (one representative
firm) for free, so that it does not generate revenue. The setting is an example of the
simplest cap-and-trade scheme that does not allow for policies similar to a “safety
valve”, in which firms are allowed to purchase an unlimited number of permits at
a set price (see Pizer, 2002); we also abstract from incorporating active banking
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of permits, which would allow firms to shift obligations across time in response to
periods of unexpectedly high or low marginal costs (see e.g. Fell et al., 2012).10
In addition, since the theoretical framework features one representative firm, the
quantity constraint is equivalent to a cap-and-trade scheme.
An individual’s budget constraint and FOC in this setting remain as in the baseline
model. There are only changes in the firm’s problem and in the government’s budget
constraint. Specifically, firms do not pay taxes and consequently, the government
budget omits revenues from taxing emissions. Profits of the firms are defined as:
pit = (1− τt)yt − wt(1 + τLt)lt − rtkt−1 − zt (3.4.1)
subject to the emissions constraint qt = (1 − µt)h(yt) and abatement spending
zt = m(µt)yt. The government budget constraint is:
gt + bt = wtτLtlt + τtyt + ρBtbt+1. (3.4.2)
Optimality conditions of the firm imply:
rt = (1− d(xt))f ′k[1− τt −m(µt)−
m′(µ)yt
h(yt)
(1− µt)h′(y)], (3.4.3)
wt(1 + τLt) = (1− d(xt))f ′L[1− τt −m(µt)−
m′(µ)y
h(y) (1− µt)h
′(y)], (3.4.4)
qt = (1− µt)h(yt). (3.4.5)
Equation (3.4.5) is a constraint on the quantity of emissions produced. Equations
(3.4.3)-(3.4.4) are analogous to equations (3.2.12)-(3.2.13) under tax policy, and they
are optimal conditions of demand for capital and labor, respectively. They also
demonstrate that the price of permits - the shadow price of a unit of emissions under
quantity policy - is pEt ≡ m′(µ)yt/h(yt). For comparison, under a price instrument,
10Active banking of permits can make the cap-and-trade scheme more flexible in terms of intertem-
poral allocation of abatement decisions by firms. As a result, in the face of temporary uncertainty
in costs, under cap-and-trade with banking and borrowing, emissions fluctuate period-by-period
and prices are relatively constant (Parsons and Taschini, 2013).
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as shown in equation (3.2.14), firms reduce emissions until the marginal cost of
reductions equal the tax, i.e. the price of carbon.
The simulation results of the baseline carbon tax (continuous line) and baseline
cap-and-trade policies (the dashed line) are reported in Figure 3.1. There are two
important results we want to emphasize. First, both baseline policies lead to very
similar welfare and emissions outcomes in the medium-term under uncertainty driven
by the same productivity shock. Second, the optimal restriction under a cap-and-trade
policy is procyclical. These results can be explained as follows.
Our baseline policies are state-contingent, meaning that after the shock is realized,
the regulator updates the regulatory instrument (either the value of the tax or cap
on emissions) along with other policy instruments to reflect the new conditions of the
state of the economy and to facilitate the adjustment to the shock. It is then intuitive
that state-contingent policies under the same shock yield the same expected welfare
outcome. After uncertainty is resolved, the marginal costs are certain, but they change
with the business cycles. They tend to increase during booms and to fall during
recessions. That is, every period will be associated with a different level of marginal
costs. As the private sector’s cost, the shadow price of carbon, must correspond to
the marginal damages of pollution (Pigou, 1920), with essentially constant damages
in the short-run and varying the marginal costs, the optimal quantity control must
vary with business cycles to deduce a shadow price that is not only consistent with
the target for emissions, but also internalizes externalities. This explains why the
optimal restriction under state-contingent cap-and-trade is procyclical.
3.4.3 Fixed Price and Fixed Quantity Based Policies and Welfare
As discussed above, when the regulator can continually readjust the policies, the
choice of the optimal instrument - price or quantity - becomes irrelevant as both
policies lead to the same expected welfare outcome. However, state-contingent
policies are difficult, if not impossible, to implement in practice because they involve
continuous readjustment of policies and require complete knowledge of the distribution
of the shocks affecting the economy. Baseline state-contingent policies in our analysis
serve as benchmarks to assess the relative performance of fixed price and quantity
policies, which is done by comparing welfare losses from fixing instruments at their
steady state levels.
137
Chapter 3
Following the procedure of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), our measure of welfare
is the amount of baseline steady-state policy consumption a household would be
willing to give up to be as well off under the alternative specification as under the
baseline policy. The results are shown in Table 3.3. For the consumption-equivalence,
a number of, e.g., 0.64 means that the alternative environmental tax policy reduces
welfare by 0.64% of consumption on average.
Welfare in consumption-equivalents, %
Model with fixed emissions tax 0.64
Model with fixed quantity 0.71
Table 3.3: Welfare effects of alternative tax policies
We express welfare costs associated with single order instruments in monetary
value, using the 2013 U.S. annual personal consumption expenditure,11 which stood
at USD 11,496.2 bn. By using this data, and converting it to per capita terms,12
we find that a fixed tax instrument leads to a lower welfare loss compared to the
fixed quantity instrument: USD 232.83 per person with taxes vs. USD 258.22 under
quantity controls.13
It is important to note that under fixed environmental regulation policies, the rest
of the economy still continually readjusts after the shock is realized. Moreover, as
the impulse responses reveal (Figures 3.2 and 3.3), pronounced differences in the
adjustment paths of the variables under fixed policies vs. state-contingent policies
appear at the firm level, through adjustment in abatement spending and respectively
in the fraction of emissions abated. The negligible differences in responses of other
variables explain why the welfare costs of basic policies relative to baseline are
relatively small.
11Data source is the NIPA table, see Appendix 3.B for more details.
12Population in the U.S. in 2013 stood at 316.1 million people.
13The uncertainty in our model arises from temporary shocks and our results are not sensitive to
changes in the persistence of the shocks. See Figure 3.5 in Appendix 3.A that presents the IRFs
under different values of the persistence of the shock under carbon tax policy. The welfare ranking
of the instruments also remains unchanged and the results are available upon request. Yet, in
general, the dynamic structure of cost uncertainty can affect the choice between a price or quantity
control, as shown in Parsons and Taschini (2013). Specifically, by using reduced form specification
in tradition of the early price-quantity literature, they show that temporary shocks to abatement
cost favor the use of a price control, while the permanent shocks favor a quantity control.
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Figure 3.2: Responses under baseline carbon tax and fixed carbon tax policies to a
positive TFP shock
Finally, some other studies also find very small differences in the welfare gains
from contrasting different policy instruments, even though those estimates are not
directly comparable with ours. In particular, Pizer (1999) investigates the relative
performance of taxes versus rate controls (which hold the fractional reduction in
emissions constant) in an integrated climate-economy model under uncertainty which
is modeled including thousands of different states of nature. He finds that uncertainty
leads to a preference for taxes over control rates, with the optimal rate control
generating welfare gains14 equivalent to a USD 73 increase in current per capita
consumption, while the optimal tax policy generates a USD 86 increase.
14The source of such a gain is due to those states of the nature in which the marginal costs of
reduction of emissions are low, while the marginal benefits are high, which favors more stringent
policies. Opposing states of nature favor less stringent policies and thus generate losses from
more stringent policies, but such losses are not as significant as the gains, resulting in an overall
improvement in welfare. In other words, policies more stringent than the optimal control rate
policy ignoring uncertainty improve welfare.
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Figure 3.3: Responses under baseline cap-and-trade and fixed quantity restriction
policies to a positive TFP shock
3.4.4 Associated Shocks to Abatement Technology
In this section, we discuss the simulation results of the scenario under which the
economy is affected by two correlated shocks, a productivity shock and a shock to the
abatement technology. This experiment is motivated by the following considerations.
In our baseline model, uncertainty comes from the productivity shock. The existing
“price versus quantity” literature, however, models a reduced form of the abatement
cost function with mean-zero random shocks to marginal abatement costs. The shocks
to the reduced form of abatement costs may originate (indirectly) from productivity
shocks or directly from business cycles. In our framework, we can differentiate between
these two types of shocks to abatement costs by considering a productivity shock and
an abatement shock. We introduce an abatement shock as a shock to the abatement
technology εab,t:
zt
yt
= m(µt)εab,t (3.4.6)
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which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process, defined as:
ln εab,t = ρεab,t ln εab,t−1 + ρabεt, (3.4.7)
where εt is the shock to productivity, and ρabεt is a shock to abatement technology.
We assume ρab > 0, which means that during expansions stemming from a positive
productivity shock, abatement of a given fraction of emissions µ associated with a
given output becomes more costly. As mentioned earlier, there are two new values
in this extension that we need to parametrize, the value of the persistence of the
shock to the abatement technology, and the value of the correlation between the
shocks to productivity and the shocks to abatement. Since we assume that abatement
costs vary with business cycles, we can set the value of persistence of the shock to
abatement technology equal to the one of productivity shock. As the value of the
correlation between productivity and abatement a priori is unknown, we experiment
with two values of ρab: 0.4 and 0.7.
Comparison of the impulse responses under the baseline policy and under the
correlated shock case (Figure 3.4) reveals that adjustment to the shock to abatement
technology happens through changing the total spending on abatement, without
any notable effects on the behavior of the remaining variables. As a result, the
firm produces the same level of emissions and abates the same fraction of emissions.
This exercise illustrates that adjustment to some shocks, particularly those affecting
abatement technology, is better dealt with at the firm level. This, as we discuss in
the next section, provides an underpinning behind our argument in favor of price
over quantity regulation in the real world.
3.4.5 Assumptions and Policy Implications
Our theoretical framework assumes a genuine uncertainty that exists not only
for the regulator but also for producers. In Weitzman’s (Weitzman, 1974) original
analysis and in most studies that have followed, it is assumed that uncertainty in the
marginal costs function is an information gap on the side of the regulator - randomness
known to a producer but unknown to a regulator.15 In this section we discuss how
15Laffont (1977) provides a detailed discussion of the information structure present in policy choice
problems by a regulator choosing between prices or quantities in tradition of the original Weitzman’s
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Figure 3.4: Responses to a TFP shock and to a TFP shock correlated with a shock
to abatement technology
the presence of information asymmetry as in previous studies can affect the result
on the relative preference of price over quantity and we conclude by drawing policy
implications.
We do not model information asymmetry explicitly in our framework, but we
believe that some of our results can provide arguments in favor of price over quantity
instruments in the presence of information gap described above. In particular, we have
shown that optimal adjustment to some type of shocks, such as shocks to abatement
technology, occurs at the firm level. Thus, our results can imply that even in the
more “ideal” situation with the absence of information asymmetry, it is more optimal
for firms to find their own efficient solutions. In a world with such an uncertainty gap,
it may be even more desirable to provide firms and businesses with the flexibility to
innovate and find their best adjustment solutions, while not requiring the regulator
to face the difficult task of estimating the marginal costs of abatement by firms. This
is because firms possess better information about abatement costs than the regulator
as they are closer to the actual production process. That is why we believe that
analysis.
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the presence of information gap further reinforces our argument in favor of price
instruments.
This line of reasoning echoes more general arguments about the superiority of price
over quantity instruments in the face of shocks to growth and technology outlined by
Pizer (2003), p. 19:16
“Rather than attempting to hit a fixed quantity target at any cost, we
should instead price emissions at our best guess concerning their rate of
marginal damage. Since there is a real risk that the costs of hitting a fixed
quantity target can be extremely high - depending on growth and technology
- such targets make little sense.”
3.5 Carbon Taxes and Business Cycles
We have shown that the optimal carbon tax is approximately constant over the
business cycle. Our results are in contrast with the findings of Heutel (2012) who
finds a procyclical behavior of optimal carbon taxes. In this section, we explain what
drives the divergence of our results.
We start with reporting the standard deviations of carbon tax, output and emissions
and their ratios in the two models in Table 3.4. Following Heutel (2012), the statistics
are obtained by simulating the economy for 100 periods, and the reported standard
deviation is the mean of over 10,000 draws from the distribution of the productivity
shock. To compute statistics in Heutel’s original model, we use the replication codes
available on his webpage.
Two results emerge from the table. First, the standard deviation of the optimal
carbon tax is about the same as the standard deviation of output, and just slightly
higher than the standard deviation of emissions in Heutel’s original model. Second,
the table shows that the extension of Heutel’s model with distortionary fiscal policy
which equips the regulator with additional instruments to accommodate the business
cycles (our model), plays an important role in reducing overall volatility. Most
16Pizer (2003) tests the robustness of the claim that under the possibility of catastrophic damages,
a quantity instrument is the preferred instrument. The existence of some thresholds of climate
change is one of the arguments for quantity-based regulations. For more comprehensive discussions
of the advantages of carbon tax vs cap-and-trade, see, e.g., Hepburn (2006) and Goulder and
Schein (2013).
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importantly, the volatility of carbon taxes declines, and is reduced by more than
those of output and emissions. Furthermore, the relative volatility of emissions to
output is the same across the two models.
Standard deviation (%)
Model τE y e
Heutel’s 2.02% 2.04% 1.4%
ours 0.48% 0.77% 0.53%
ratio 4.2 2.6 2.6
Table 3.4: Standard deviations of carbon tax, output and emissions
To explain the procyclicality result of carbon taxes in Heutel’s model, we present
the optimal conditions of the firms and household’s Euler equations from his model:
rt = (1− d(xt))f ′k[1− τEt(1− µt)h′(yt)−m(µt)], (3.5.1)
τEt =
ytm
′(µt)
h(yt)
, (3.5.2)
uc,t = βEtuc,t+1[1− δ + rt]. (3.5.3)
Equation (3.5.2) is identical to the equation in our model (3.2.14) and represents
the role of carbon taxes internalizing the climate externality. The setting of the
theoretical framework in Heutel’s model, however, implies that carbon taxes, in
addition to internalizing climate externality, facilitate the intertemporal allocation of
consumption across periods (equations (3.5.1) and (3.5.3)). Intuitively, as abatement
is more costly during economic expansions, the carbon tax rises to prompt firms
to avoid producing more emissions during expansions; the opposite is true during
recessions. This implies an intertemporal trade-off in emissions and consequently in
consumption: emit (consume) relatively less today during booms, but be compensated
for that with relatively higher emissions (consumption) during recessions. In line
with this, Heutel (2012), p.261 , points out that: “It is this variance in consumption,
not in the pollution stock, that leads to the variance in the emissions tax”. In such a
way, carbon taxes end up doing double duty by accommodating the business cycles.
Such a “non-standard” outcome usually appears in the optimal taxation literature
when the tax system is incomplete. We demonstrate below that incompleteness of
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the tax system is in fact present in Heutel’s model but is not an issue for the model
of this chapter.
Chari and Kehoe (1998) define a tax system as incomplete, if, for at least one
pair of goods, the government has no tax instruments that drive a wedge between
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and the marginal rate of transformation
(MRT) for those goods. A tax system is said to be complete when this is not the case.
Incomplete tax systems can lead to“non-standard” policy prescriptions because some
instruments end up substituting for the ability to create certain wedges that cannot
be created in a decentralized economy.17 Chari and Kehoe (1998) argue that optimal
taxation is best understood in terms of the optimal wedges between the MRS and
the corresponding MRT. There is one independent MRS/MRT pair in Heutel’s model
summarized as follows:
MRSct,ct+1 ≡
βuc,t+1
uc,t
; MRTct,ct+1 ≡
1
yk,t+1 + 1− δ . (3.5.4)
MRS and MRT above have the standard interpretation: the MRS is a ratio of
marginal utilities, while the MRT is a ratio of the marginal products of an appropriate
production possibilities frontier. The intertemporal MRT can be interpreted by using
the economy-wide intertemporal budget constraint as follows. If consumption today
is reduced by one unit, then the economy gains one additional unit of capital kt+1
(holding output of all other goods constant), which increases ct+1 via next period
production. Thus, a unit reduction in ct leads to a gain of yk(t+ 1) + 1− δ.
A (first-best) socially efficient allocation is characterized by a “zero wedge” condi-
tion:
Et
MRSct,ct+1
MRTct,ct+1
= 1, (3.5.5)
while in Heutel’s model, carbon taxes introduce a wedge between MRS and MRT as
MRT is a function of carbon taxes; and carbon taxes thus affect the intertemporal
consumption allocation over business cycles:
Et
MRSct,ct+1
MRTct,ct+1(τEt)
= 1 (3.5.6)
17Correia (1996) provide examples in which an incomplete tax system results in non-zero capital-
income taxation. See also Aruoba and Chugh (2010) for further discussion.
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in addition to correcting the externality as captured by equation (3.5.1). Thus, to
ensure completeness of the tax system in the framework similar to the one in Heutel,
it is necessary to introduce one additional distortionary tax. However, since we also
introduce labor and as a result, carbon taxes can affect the labor-leisure choice in
our setting, we need to introduce two distortionary taxes: on labor and production18,
and under such setting the carbon tax only plays the role it was originally introduced
for - correction of climate externality. Specifically, the counterpart of the condition
(3.5.6) in our model is:
Et
MRSct,ct+1
MRTct,ct+1(τEt, τt)
= 1 (3.5.7)
and our model also features another MRS/MRT pair summarized as follows:
MRSc,l ≡ uc(t)
uL(t)
;MRTc,l ≡ −yL(t) = − wt(1 + τLt)1− τt − τEt(1− µt)h′(yt)−m(µt) . (3.5.8)
The conditions that characterize the allocation in the absence of distortionary taxes
include (3.5.5) and:
MRSc,l
MRTc,l
= 1, (3.5.9)
but in our model, tax on labor drives a wedge between the MRS and the MRT between
consumption and work (or between consumption and leisure with the opposite sign):
MRSc,l
MRTc,l
= − 1 + τLt1− τt − τEt(1− µt)h′(yt)−m(µt) . (3.5.10)
In sum, conditions (3.5.7) and (3.5.10) prove that the regulator in our model has two
tax instruments, tax on labor and tax on output for each wedge between the MRS
and the MRT, which proves the completeness of the tax system. The carbon tax
internalizes the climate externality through (3.2.14). The introduction of additional
18Introducing an output tax is not the only option to distort the intertemporal allocation of
consumption; another option would be a tax on capital income. We have experimented with a
version of the model with both capital and labor taxes; our results go through but the welfare
cost differences under fixed tax and fixed cap-and-trade policies become much smaller. Intuitively,
with another set of instruments which can potentially “better” cushion the economy against the
shocks, the policy framework becomes equivalent to the certainty case under which there is simple
duality between price and quantity instruments. For our objective, it is does not matter which
model is presented, but since the model with capital tax is a bit more cumbersome as it requires
re-writing the Ramsey problem in a time-consistent way, we present the model with output tax.
The results for another model are available upon request.
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taxes is in line with Tinbergen (1952) who notes that the number of policy instruments
needs to be equal to the number of policy targets. However, in the case of policy
instruments with side-effects, supplementary instruments may be needed to control
these side-effects. This is the case in our model.
The above discussion raises a question which has important policy implications:
should environmental policies, carbon taxes in particular, be used as instruments
to stabilize the economy in the face of shocks to economic activity? Our analysis
suggests that carbon taxation is unlikely to be justified on the grounds other than
to target climate externalities. This logic is similar to the conclusion of the optimal
taxation theory applied to the taxation of energy and energy-related products: pure
revenue raising is best done with wide-base taxes, such as VAT or taxes on labor,
rather than carbon taxes, and carbon taxation should not be pursued merely in order
to raise public revenues.
3.6 Conclusion
The analysis of the optimal policy instrument to control CO2 emissions under
uncertainty from business cycles has recently gained relevance and importance,
particularly in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis of 2008. The
debate is under way on how the EU ETS system needs to be reformed to make the
system more resilient to unanticipated shocks, in particular stemming from changes
in economic circumstances. Within academic literature, there are two strands of
research, price vs. quantity literature and studies that analyze the optimal design of
environmental policies over the business cycle; which yield different implications for
the behavior of carbon taxes in response to fluctuations in economic activity.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the optimal design
and the relative performance of two distinct instruments - price and quantity -
over the business cycles. We analyze both state-contingent and “basic” regulations
(with price or quantity fixed at their steady state levels) within a dynamic general
equilibrium framework with distortionary fiscal policy. Our focus is on price-based
and quantity-based policies, most frequently contrasted in the literature, but we
acknowledge that it is possible to form hybrid instruments, a combination of price
and quantity mechanisms. We take into account the simplest form of a cap-and-trade
147
Chapter 3
mechanism when considering quantity based regulation, and in particular, we abstract
from the so-called banking or borrowing of emission permits, which in a dynamic
setting, can make quantity policies more flexible.
We find that the optimal state-contingent policy in response to a productivity shock
turns out to be a carbon tax that fluctuates very little, while emissions fluctuate
more. We note that the marginal abatement costs that vary with business cycles are
a reason why the optimal quantity regulation under state-contingent cap-and-trade
policy is procyclical. Using state-contingent policies as ideal instruments, we argue
that the same dynamics of the marginal abatement costs make fixed quantity policies
disadvantageous over fixed price based regulations. We also explain what causes
divergence in our results from the ones in Heutel (2012), suggesting that carbon taxes
in his framework play double duty by accommodating business cycles, leading to
procyclical responses to business cycle shocks.
Our results lend support to the findings of Pizer (1999), Hoel and Karp (2002) and
others who argue in favor of a price rather than quantity instrument in controlling
CO2 emissions in the short-run, when damages from climate changes remain relatively
“flat”.
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3.A Productivity Shock and Associated Increase in
the Stock of Pollution
In our baseline model a 1% TFP shock results in an increase in the pollution
stock of about 0.0085% over 25 years. How does this number relate to reality? The
Mauna Loa Observatory19 provides monthly information on the concentration of the
atmospheric carbon dioxide. The concentrations are expressed in parts per million
(ppm), which give the ratio of the number of greenhouse gas molecules to the total
number of molecules of dry air. The Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center20
provides conversion tables that enable us to convert this measure of atmospheric CO2
concentration into gigatons of carbon. 1 ppm by volume of atmosphere CO2 equals
to 2.13 GtC. This measure does not count the mass of oxygen in the CO2 molecule,
but since the atom weight of carbon (12 units) and of CO2 (44 units), one unit of
GtC is equivalent to 44/12=3.67 GtCO2 (see Dessler and Parson, 2010, p.201), and
1ppm is therefore equivalent to 2.13 GtC and 7.82 GtCO2.
As of January 2015, the concentration of CO2 in atmosphere stood at 399.85 ppm
or equivalently at 851.68 GtC or 3126.83 GtCO2. If we treat this value as our steady
state, an additional increase of 0.0085% in the pollution stock over 25 years time
period, as suggested by impulse response function, corresponds to 0.034 ppm, or 0.07
GtC and 0.27 GtCO2 increase in the concentration of CO2 in atmosphere. World
CO2 emissions in 2013 stood at 35.3 GtCO2. Assuming that the level of yearly
emissions does not change, over a period of 25 years the world will emit 882.5 GtCO2
meaning that an additional increase in the CO2 stock due to a TFP shock constitutes
only 0.03% of all emissions over a 25-year period.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) reports a table (Table 5.1,
p. 67) that relates CO2 concentration in the atmosphere to the global temperature
and average sea level increase above pre-industrial levels. At CO2 concentrations of
350-400 ppm (current level), global temperature increase above pre-industrial levels
ranges from 2.0-2.5°C, and the global average sea level rises above the pre-industrial
19http://co2now.org/
20http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/convert.html
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level from 0.4-1.4 m. For the 400-440 ppm range the corresponding numbers are:
2.4-2.8°C and 0.5-1.7°C. Thus an increase in CO2 concentration from the current
level to 440 ppm (by 40 ppm) could lead to a maximal increase in the temperature
above pre-industrial levels of 0.4°C (2.8°C-2.4°C) and the maximum sea rise level of
0.3 m (1.7m-1.4m). Treating these estimates as our reference, we can conclude that
an additional increase in CO2 concentrations of 0.034 ppm would correspond to an
increase in temperature by 0.00034°C and an additional increase in the sea level by
0.000255m over 25 years interval following the productivity shock.
3.B Data Sources
In this section we describe data sources and U.S. data entry components into Table
3.2.
Data from the NIPA tables are for year 2013.
• GDP - from the NIPA Table 1.5.5. Gross Domestic Product, Expanded Detail,
line 1.
• Personal consumption expenditure - from the NIPA Table 1.5.5. Gross Domestic
Product, Expanded Detail, line 2.
• Government consumption expenditure - from the NIPA Table 1.5.5. Gross
Domestic Product, Expanded Detail, line 55+line 58+line 61.
• Government gross investment - from the NIPA Table 1.5.5. Gross Domestic
Product, Expanded Detail, line 56+line 59+line 62.
• Gross private domestic investment - from the NIPA Table 1.5.5. Gross Domestic
Product, Expanded Detail, line 26.
• Emissions per unit of total GDP - for 2012 for the U.S. from the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (2013), p.ES-24, Table ES-9.
• Fraction of emissions abated: derived from author’s calculations with original
data from Creyts et al. (2007), who provide estimates of potential abatement
projections for greenhouse gases in the U.S. They estimate that the U.S. would
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potentially abate cumulative 3GtCO2 of emissions for the period 2005-2030.
Assuming the same amount of emissions abated every year during 25 years
time period, from 2005 to 2030, and given that total greenhouse gas emissions
amounted to 6.5GtCO2 by the U.S. in 2012 (United States Environmental
Protection Agency (2013)), we obtain 1.85%, an estimate of the fraction of
emissions abated in 2012.
• Abatement Spending - from the U.S.Census Bureau (2008), Table 1 (Pollu-
tion Abatement Operating Costs) and Table 2 (Pollution Abatement Capital
Expenditures). U.S.Census Bureau (2008) is a survey of a sample of 20000
manufacturing plants, which, according this survey, spent 20677.6 mln USD
on pollution abatement operating costs and 5907.8 mln USD on pollution
abatement capital expenditures in 2005. By combining these data with the U.S.
GDP data for 2005, USD 13095.4 bln, we obtain estimate of the fraction of
abatement spending in GDP, 0.2%, reported in the main part of the chapter.
• Labor tax - OECD, TaxingWages 2014 (May 2014), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.
org/taxation/taxing-wages-2014_tax_wages-2014-en
• Output tax - gross receipt tax, similar to a sales tax, but levied on the seller
of goods rather than on consumers. It is in place in several states in the U.S.,
e.g. Washington, Ohio, Texas. We use the calculations of the Tax Foundation21
that converted the gross receipt taxes into an effective corporate income tax,
taking into account also the burden of the federal tax imposed on corporations.
• Revenue from environmental taxes - Congressional Budget Office (2013) esti-
mates potential tax revenues from carbon taxes at 1.2 trillion USD in a 10 years
period. Assuming a yearly revenue of 0.12 trillion USD, we calculate it as a
fraction of US GDP in 2013 and obtain the estimate 0.7% of GDP.
• Steady state value of government bonds as relation to output - based on Table
B79 (federal debt held by public as percent of gross domestic product) from
Council of Economic Advisers (2013).
21http://taxfoundation.org/article/us-states-lead-world-high-corporate-taxes
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3.C First-order Conditions of the Ramsey Problem
The first-order conditions of the Ramsey problem outlined in section 3.2.6 are given
by:
u′c(t)−λtu′′cc(t)+λt−1u′′cc(t)(1−δ+rt)+Ωt−(ΛtτLtlt−ςt(1+τLt))
u′′Lc(t)u′c(t)− u′L(t)u′′cc(t)
(u′c(t))2
= 0
(3.C.1)
λt−1u′c(t)
∂rt
∂µt
+Ωtm′(µ)yt−χtytm′′(µ)−ΛtτEth(yt)+ςt(1−d(xt))f ′L[τEth′(yt)−m′(µt)]+Φth(yt) = 0
(3.C.2)
λtβu
′
c(t+ 1)
∂rt+1
∂kt
+ Ωt − β(1− δ)Ωt+1 − λpt+1β(1− d(xt+1))f ′k(t+ 1) +
+βςt+1(1− d(xt+1))fkL(t+ 1) ∗
∗[1− τt+1 − τEt+1(1− µt+1)h′(yt+1)−m(µt+1)] = 0 (3.C.3)
λt−1u′c(t)
∂rt
∂yt
+ Ωt(m(µt)− 1) + χt[τEth′(yt)−m′(µt)] + Λt[τEt(1− µt)h′(yt) + τt] +
+λpt + ςt(1− d(xt))f ′L[−τEt(1− µt)h′′(yt)]− Φt(1− µt)h′(yt) = 0 (3.C.4)
λt−1u′c(t)
∂rt
∂xt
+λptd′(xt)f(t)−ςtd′(xt)f ′L[1−τt−τEt(1−µt)h′(yt)−m(µt)]+Φt−βηΦt+1 = 0
(3.C.5)
u′L − λtu′′cL + λt−1u′′cL(1− δ + rt) + λt−1u′c
∂rt
∂lt
+
+Λt[−u
′
L
u′c
τLt − τLtltu
′′
Lcu
′
c − u′Lu′′cc
(u′c)2
]− λpt(1− d(xt))f ′L + ςt(1 + τLt)
u′′Lcu
′
c − u′Lu′′cc
(u′c)2
+
+ςt(1− d(xt))f ′′LL[1− τt − τEt(1− µt)h′(yt)−m(µt)] = 0 (3.C.6)
λt−1u′c(t)
∂rt
∂τLt
− Λtu
′
L
u′c
lt + ςt
u′L
u′c
= 0 (3.C.7)
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Figure 3.5: Responses to a TFP shock under different values of the persistence of the
shock ρ
λt−1u′c(t)
∂rt
∂τEt
+ χth(yt) + Λt(1− µt)h(yt)− ςt(1− d(xt))f ′L(1− µt)h′(yt) = 0 (3.C.8)
λt−1u′c(t)
∂rt
∂τt
+ Λtyt − ςt(1− d(xt))f ′L = 0 (3.C.9)
ΛtρBt − βΛt+1 = 0 (3.C.10)
u′g−λtu′′cg+λt−1u′′cg(1−δ+rt)−Λt+Ωt+(ςt(1+τLt)−ΛtτLtlt)
u′′Lgu
′
c − u′Lu′′cg
(u′c)2
= 0 (3.C.11)
153

Bibliography
Adrian, T. and H. S. Shin (2010): “Liquidity and leverage,” Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 19, 418–437.
——— (2011): “Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet Management,” Annual Review
of Financial Economics, 3, 289–307.
Amromin, G. and A. Paulson (2010): “Default rates on prime and subprime
mortgages: differences & similarities,” Profitwise, 1–10.
Angelini, P. (2000): “Are Banks Risk Averse? Intraday Timing of Operations in
the Interbank Market,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32, 54–73.
Angelini, P., S. Neri, and F. Panetta (2011): “Monetary and macroprudential
policies,” Bank of Italy Working Paper.
Archer, D. (2005): “Fate of fossil fuel CO2 in geologic time,” Journal of Geophysical
Research: Oceans, 110, n/a–n/a.
Aruoba, S. and S. Chugh (2010): “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy when
money is essential,” Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 1618–1647.
Assenmacher-Wesche, K. and S. Gerlach (2008): “Monetary policy, asset
prices and macroeconomic conditions : a panel-VAR study,” National Bank of
Belgium Working Paper.
Barrage, L. (2014): “Optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate-economy model
with distortionary fiscal policy,” working paper, University of Maryland.
155
Bibliography
Bernanke, B. S. and M. Gertler (1995): “The Credit Channel of Monetary
Policy Transmission,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 27 – 48.
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999): “Chapter 21 The
financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework,” Elsevier, vol. 1,
Part C of Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1341 – 1393.
Bunn, P. and C. Ellis (2009): “Price-setting behaviour in the United Kingdom: a
microdata approach,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q1, 28–36.
Calza, A., T. Monacelli, and L. Stracca (2013): “Housing Finance And
Monetary Policy,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 101–122.
Chari, V. V. and P. Kehoe (1998): “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy,”
Research Department Staff Report 251, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler (1999): “The Science of Monetary Policy:
A New Keynesian Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1661–1707.
Coles, A. and J. Hardt (2000): “Mortgage markets: why US and EU markets
are so different,” Housing Studies, 15.
Congressional Budget Office (2013): Effects of a Carbon Tax on the Economy
and the Environment.
Correia, I. (1996): “Should Capital Income be Taxed in the Steady State?” Journal
of Public Economics, 60, 147–151.
Council of Economic Advisers (2013): Economic Report of the President,
United States Government Printing Office.
Creyts, J., A. Derkach, S. Nyquist, K. Ostrowski, and J. Stephenson
(2007): Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: How Much at What Costs, U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Mapping Initiative.
Crowe, C., G. Dell’Ariccia, D. Igan, and P. Rabanal (2011): “How to
Deal with Real Estate Booms: Lessons from Country Experiences,” IMF Working
Paper.
156
Bibliography
Cutler, J. (2002): “UK house prices - an accident waiting to happen?” CML
Housing Finance, 55, 11–25.
Dedola, L. and G. Lombardo (2012): “Financial frictions, financial integration
and the international propagation of shocks,” Economic Policy, 27, 319–359.
Demyanyk, Y. and O. V. Hemert (2011): “Understanding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis,” Review of Financial Studies, 24, 1848–1880.
Dessler, A. and E. A. Parson (2010): The Science and Politics of Global Climate
Change: A Guide to the Debate, Cambridge University Press.
Devereux, M. B. and A. Sutherland (2010): “Country portfolio dynamics,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34, 1325–1342.
Devereux, M. B. and J. Yetman (2010): “Leverage Constraints and the In-
ternational Transmission of Shocks,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42,
71–105.
Dhyne, E., L. J. Alvarez, H. L. Bihan, G. Veronese, D. Dias, J. Hoffmann,
N. Jonker, P. Lunnemann, F. Rumler, and J. Vilmunen (2006): “Price
Changes in the Euro Area and the United States: Some Facts from Individual
Consumer Price Data,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 171–192.
DiCecio, R. and E. Nelson (2007): “An Estimated DSGE Model for the United
Kingdom,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 89, 215–31.
Duca, J. V., J. Muellbauer, and A. Murphy (2012): “Credit standards and
the bubble in US house prices: new econometric evidence,” BIS Papers: Property
markets and financial stability, 83–89.
Dueker, M., A. Fischer, and R. Dittmar (2007): “Stochastic Capital Depre-
ciation and the Co-movement of Hours and Productivity,” The B.E. Journal of
Macroeconomics, 6, 1–24.
Eickmeier, S. and T. Ng (2015): “How do {US} credit supply shocks propagate
internationally? A {GVAR} approach,” European Economic Review, 74, 128 – 145.
157
Bibliography
Enders, Z., G. J. Müller, and A. Scholl (2011): “How do fiscal and technology
shocks affect real exchange rates?: New evidence for the United States,” Journal
of International Economics, 83, 53 – 69.
Faccini, R., S. Millard, and F. Zanetti (2011): “Wage rigidities in an estimated
DSGE model of the UK labour market,” Bank of England Working Paper.
Faia, E. (2011): “Credit Risk Transfers and the Macroeconomy,” Kiel Working
Papers.
Fell, H., I. A. MacKenzie, and W. A. Pizer (2012): “Prices versus quantities
versus bankable quantities,” Resource and Energy Economics, 34, 607–623.
Fischer, C. and G. Heutel (2013): “Environmental Macroeconomics: Environ-
mental Policy, Business Cycles, and Directed Technical Change,” Annual Review
of Resource Economics, 5, 197–210.
Forlati, C. and L. Lambertini (2011): “Risky Mortgages in a DSGE Model,”
International Journal of Central Banking, 7, 285–335.
Fry, R. and A. Pagan (2007): “Some issues in using sign restrictions for identifying
structural VARs,” National Centre for Econometric Research Working Paper, 14.
Gale, W. G., S. Brown, and F. Saltiel (2013): Carbon Taxes as Part of the
Fiscal Solution.
Geithner, T. (2011): “Macroeconomic effects of risk retention requirements,”
mimeo.
Gerali, A., S. Neri, L. Sessa, and F. M. Signoretti (2010): “Credit and
Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking,, 62, 107–141.
Golosov, M., J. Hassler, P. Krusell, and A. Tsyvinski (2014): “Optimal
Taxes on Fossil Fuel in General Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 82, 41–88.
Golosov, M., M. Troshkin, A. Tsyvinski, and M. Weinzierl (2013): “Pref-
erence heterogeneity and optimal income taxation,” Journal of Public Economics,
97, 160–175.
158
Bibliography
Goodfriend, M. (2002): “The phases of U.S. monetary policy : 1987 to 2001,”
Economic Quarterly, 1–17.
Goodhart, C. and B. Hofmann (2008): “House prices, money, credit, and the
macroeconomy,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24, 180–205.
Gorton, G. B. (2008): “The Panic of 2007,” Yale School of Management Working
Papers.
Gorton, G. B. and N. S. Souleles (2007): “Special Purpose Vehicles and
Securitization,” in The Risks of Financial Institutions, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc, NBER Chapters, 549–602.
Goulder, L. H. and A. Schein (2013): “Carbon taxes vs. cap and trade: a critical
review,” NBER working paper 19338.
Grodecka, A. (2013): “Subprime borrowers, securitization and the transmission of
business cycles,” Bonn Econ Discussion Papers.
Grodecka, A. and K. Kuralbayeva (2014): “The Price vs Quantity Debate:
Climate policy and the role of business cycles,” OxCarre Working Papers.
Hayes, P. and G. Kane (2009): “Deleveraging commercial real estate in Europe,”
Prudential Real Estate Investors.
Helbling, T., R. Huidrom, M. A. Kose, and C. Otrok (2011): “Do credit
shocks matter? A global perspective,” European Economic Review, 55, 340 – 353.
Hellwig, M. (2009): “Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the
Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis,” De Economist, 157, 129–207.
Hepburn, C. (2006): “Regulation by prices, quantities, or both: a review of
instrument choice,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22 (2), 226–247.
Heutel, G. (2012): “How Should Environmental Policy Respond to Business
Cycles? Optimal Policy under Persistent Productivity Shocks,” Review of Economic
Dynamics, 15, 244–264.
HMTreasury (2003): “Housing, consumption and EMU,” .
159
Bibliography
Hobijn, B. and F. Ravenna (2010): “Loan Securitization and the Monetary
Transmission Mechanism,” Tech. rep.
Hoel, M. and L. Karp (2002): “Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant,”
Resource and Energy Economics, 24, 367–384.
Hristov, N., O. Hülsewig, and T. Wollmershäuser (2012): “Loan sup-
ply shocks during the financial crisis: Evidence for the Euro area,” Journal of
International Money and Finance, 31, 569 – 592.
Hull, J. and A. White (2010): “The Risk of Tranches Created from Mortgages,”
Financial Analysts Journal, 66, pp. 54–67.
Hutchinson, J. M., A. W. Lo, and T. Poggio (1994): “ A Nonparametric
Approach to Pricing and Hedging Derivative Securities via Learning Networks,”
Journal of Finance, 49, 851–89.
Iacoviello, M. (2005): “House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy
in the Business Cycle,” American Economic Review, 95, 739–764.
——— (2013): “Financial Business Cycles,” mimeo.
——— (2014): “Financial Business Cycles,” forthcoming in Review of Economic
Dynamics.
Iacoviello, M. and S. Neri (2010): “Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from
an Estimated DSGE Model,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2,
125–64.
IMF (2009): “World Economic Outlook,” .
——— (2011): “Global Financial Stability Report,” .
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001): Climate Change 2001:
The Scientific Basis, Cambridge University Press.
——— (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.
160
Bibliography
Jaffee, D., A. Lynch, M. Richardson, and S. Van Nieuwerburgh (2009):
“Mortgage Origination and Securitization in the Financial Crisis,” Financial Markets,
Institutions & Instruments, 18, 141–143.
Jappelli, T. (1990a): “Who Is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy?” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 219–34.
——— (1990b): “Who Is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy?” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 105, 219–34.
Jones, D. (2000): “Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory
capital arbitrage and related issues,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 24, 35–58.
Jordà, O., M. H. Schularick, and A. M. Taylor (2014): “Betting the House,”
NBER Working Papers 20771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Jovanovic`, M. N. (2013): The Economics of European Integration, Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited.
Karp, L. and J. Zhang (2005): “Regulation of stock externalities with correlated
abatement costs,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 32, 273–299.
Keane, M. P. and R. Rogerson (2011): “Reconciling Micro and Macro Labor
Supply Elasticities: A Structural Perspective,” NBER Working Papers 17430,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997): “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy,
105, 211–48.
Kliff, J. and P. S. Mills (2007): “Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent
Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets,” IMF Working Papers.
Kollmann, R., Z. Enders, and G. Müller (2011): “Global banking and
international business cycles,” European Economic Review, 55, 407–426.
Kuncl, M. (2014): “Securitization under Asymmetric Information over the Business
Cycle,” CERGE-EI Working Papers.
161
Bibliography
Laffont, J. J. (1977): “More on Prices vs. Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies,
44(1), 177–182.
Lehnert, A. (2006): “Overview of US Mortgage Markets,” Bank of International
Settlements.
Liebowitz, S. (2009): “ARMs, Not Subprimes, Caused the Mortgage Crisis,” The
Economists’ Voice, 6, 1–5.
Lim, C., F. Columba, A. Costa, P. Kongsamut, A. Otani, M. Saiyid,
T. Wezel, and X. Wu (2011): “Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and
How to Use Them? Lessons from Country Experiences,” IMF Working Paper, 105,
pp. 211–248.
Lintunen, J. and L. Vilmi (2013): “On optimal emission control - Taxes, substi-
tution and business cycles,” Research Discussion Papers 24/2013, Bank of Finland.
Miles, D. (2004): “The UK Mortgage Market: Taking a Longer-Term View,” Final
report and recommendations, HM Treasury.
Moench, E., J. Vickery, and D. Aragon (2010): “Why Is the Market Share of
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages So Low?” Current Issues in Economics and Finance,
16, 1–11.
Mountford, A. and H. Uhlig (2009): “What are the effects of fiscal policy
shocks?” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 24, 960–992.
Musso, A., S. Neri, and L. Stracca (2011): “Housing, consumption and
monetary policy: How different are the US and the euro area?” Journal of Banking
& Finance, 35, 3019 – 3041.
Newell, R. G. and W. A. Pizer (2003): “Regulating stock externalities under
uncertainty,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 45, 416–432.
Nishiyama, Y. (2007): “Are Banks Risk-Averse?” Eastern Economic Journal, 33,
471–490.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1991): “To slow or not to slow: the economics of the greenhouse
effect,” The Economic Journal, 101(407), 920–937.
162
Bibliography
——— (2008): A question of balance, Yale University Press.
Orphanides, A. (2004): “Monetary Policy Rules, Macroeconomic Stability, and
Inflation: A View from the Trenches,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36,
151–75.
Parsons, J. E. and L. Taschini (2013): “The role of stocks and shocks concepts
in the debate over price versus quantity,” Environmental and Resource Economics,
55, 71–86.
Peterman, W. B. (2012): “Reconciling micro and macro estimates of the Frisch
labor supply elasticity,” .
Pigou, A. C. (1920): The economics of welfare, London: Macmillan.
Pizer, W. A. (1999): “The optimal choice of climate change policy in the presence
of uncertainty,” Resource and Energy Economics, 21, 255–287.
——— (2002): “Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate
change,” Journal of Public Economics, 85(3), 409–34.
——— (2003): “Climate change catastrophes,” RFF, discussion paper 03-31.
Ratti, R. A. (1980): “Bank Attitude toward Risk, Implicit Rates of Interest, and
the Behavior of an Index of Risk Aversion for Commercial Banks,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 95, 309–31.
Reinhart, C. M. and K. S. Rogoff (2009): This Time Is Different: Eight
Centuries of Financial Folly, vol. 1 of Economics Books, Princeton University
Press.
Roberts, M. J. and M. Spence (1976): “Effluent charges and licences under
uncertainty,” Journal of Public Economics, 5, 193–208.
Rogerson, R. and J. Wallenius (2009): “Micro and macro elasticities in a life
cycle model with taxes,” Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 2277–2292.
Rubio-Ramirez, J. F., D. F. Waggoner, and T. Zha (2010): “Structural
Vector Autoregressions: Theory of Identification and Algorithms for Inference,”
The Review of Economic Studies, 77, 665–696.
163
Bibliography
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2007): “Optimal simple and implementable
monetary and fiscal rules,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 1702–1725.
Schularick, M. and A. M. Taylor (2012): “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary
Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008,” American Economic
Review, 102, 1029–61.
Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2007): “Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles:
A Bayesian DSGE Approach,” American Economic Review, 97, 586–606.
Stavins, R. N. (1996): “Correlated uncertainty and policy instrument choice,”
Journal of environmental economics and management, 30, 218–232.
Temkin, K., J. E. H. Johnson, and D. Levy (2002): “Subprime markets, the
role of GSEs, and risk-based pricing,” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s Office of Policy Development and Research.
Tinbergen, J. (1952): On the Theory of Economic Policy, North-Holland Publishing
Company; Amsterdam.
Uhlig, H. (2005): “What are the effects of monetary policy on output? Results
from an agnostic identification procedure,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 52,
381 – 419.
United States Environmental Protection Agency (2013): Draft inventory
of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and sinks:1990-2012, National Service Center for
Environmental Publications.
U.S.Census Bureau (2008): Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures: 2005,.
Vargas-Silva, C. (2008): “Monetary policy and the US housing market: A VAR
analysis imposing sign restrictions,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 30, 977 – 990.
Villa, S. and J. Yang (2011): “Financial intermediaries in an estimated DSGE
model for the United Kingdom,” Bank of England Working Paper.
Weitzman, M. L. (1974): “Prices vs quantities,” Review of Economic Studies, 45(2),
229–238.
164
Bibliography
Wong, E., T. Fong, K. fai Li, and H. Choi (2011): “Loan-to-value ratio as
macro-prudential tool - Hong Kong’s experience and cross-country evidence,” Hong
Kong Monetary Authority Working Paper.
Xepapadeas, A. (2005): “Chapter 23 Economic growth and the environment,” in
Economywide and International Environmental Issues, ed. by K.-G. Maler and J. R.
Vincent, Elsevier, vol. 3 of Handbook of Environmental Economics, 1219 – 1271.
165
